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Foreword By Kurt
Carraway,UAS Department
Head & Executive Director,
Applied Aviation Research
Center
I am honored to introduce this fourth book, once again led by
Professor Randall Nichols and his esteemed colleagues and subjectmatter experts on unmanned vehicles and cybersecurity. This
compilation of work is thoughtfully broken down into sections
including air and underwater domains in which unmanned vehicles
operate as well as a section dedicated to unmanned vehicles as
weapons and a section focused on geopolitical and legal advances.
The first section, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” walks students
through a series dedicated to the constantly evolving information
advances on the topic, including a review on the state-of-the-art,
serving as an exploration of current and emerging technologies
and some fascinating implications it may have on the UAS industry.
The entire section introduces some fascinating applications for
UAS—both by the commercial sector as well as the federal
government.
Section 2 provides a fascinating glimpse into the maritime
domain, with an emphasis on Unmanned Underwater Systems, or
UUVs. The introduction focusses on navigational solutions for
submarines and UUVs, including a discussion on the use of
exteroceptive sensors to supplement map references, and when
they do not exist, they may use these sensors for simultaneous
xx | Foreword By Kurt Carraway,UAS
Department Head & Executive

localization and mapping, or SLAM. All of these methodologies are
able to operate underwater without the use of global navigation
systems—an area where one could argue that their unmanned air
counterparts are overly reliant. The UUV section also goes into
some depth (pun intentional) on the subject of underwater basing
and military applications. Chapter 6 provides a reflection on the
history of underwater vehicles, the advancement of sensors and
UUV technology and commercial implications for the UUV market.
This section is rounded off by chapter 7, a bit of a “deep dive” into
UUV design considerations for naval architecture.
Section 3 kicks off by adding historical context on regulatory
development pertaining to technologies and an exploration on the
subject of multi-domain traffic management systems. It goes on to
introduce the counter UAS problem set and uses Iranian attacks on
Saudi Arabian oil fields as a case study to illustrate challenges with
cyber defense and vulnerabilities posed to Air Defense Systems,
followed by an examination of path planning tactics.
In section 4, one chapter stems from a graduate research project
in which the author explored how FAA regulations pertaining to
UAS operations are influenced by the Fourth Amendment, as well
as privacy laws at multiple levels of government. This section also
introduces how UVs may be vulnerable to misinformation and
disinformation, and the consequences if unaddressed.
Section 5 is fascinating. Carter’s chapter on Chinese Unmanned
Proliferation Along New Silk Road Sea/Land routes offers some
important strategic context on the People’s Republic of China. The
chapter on crossing the machine-human barrier reviews the risks
posed by social media and links its use to acceptance and trust—and
then explores how it may be utilized in a nefarious manner. This
offers a thought-provoking examination on the broader topic of
artificial intelligence and autonomous technology. The final chapter
explores the relationship between increased dependencies on the
Foreword By Kurt Carraway,UAS Department Head & Executive Director,
Applied Aviation Research Center | xxi

Internet of Things and how its incorporation into maritime systems
may be bringing the industry into the future, but not without
broadscale risks from a cybersecurity perspective.
Common threads across all of the sections includes an illustration
of how technological advances promote the technical readiness
level and implications of unmanned vehicles across all three
domains, including military and commercial applications. This is
underscored by a theme of considering various levels of autonomy
and artificial intelligence across the range of systems—including the
topics of dependability, trust, vulnerabilities, and human interaction
associated with them.
This body of work is derived from open source references and
written by esteemed subject matter experts in their field is a
compilation of thought provoking and up-to-date materials for
consumption by students of all types. Professor Nichols and his
colleagues have done it again!
Kurt J. Carraway
UAS Department Head and Executive Director, Applied Aviation
Research Center
Kansas State University Polytechnic
Salina, Kansas
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Director, Applied Aviation Research Center

Preface
This is our fourth textbook in a series previously covering the world
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Counter Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (CUAS). Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition and
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations
have seen considerable global recognition in the field. (Nichols R. ,
et al., 2019) (Nichols R. , et al., 2020)
The authors have expanded our purview beyond UAS / CUAS
systems. Our title shows our concern for growth and unique
operations for all unmanned vehicles in all theaters: Air, Sea and
Land. Three different factors have spurred the authors into
expanding our textbook offerings. First, unmanned technology has
seen an economic explosion in production, sales, testing,
specialized designs, and friendly / hostile usages of deployed UAS
/ UAVs / Drones / UUVs / UDV / UGTs (hereafter referred to
as a group as UVs). There is a huge global growing market and
entrepreneurs know it. Small UV companies have been reproducing
like rabbits. Many companies are exploring / creating new, unique,
and profitable unmanned technologies for all military branches,
LEO, commercial, high-mountain and deep-sea rescue, and
recreational purposes. Covid-19 has brought a new dimension to UV
planning and designs for medical and rescue missions.
Second, hostile use of UVs is on the forefront of DoD defense
and offensive planners. They are especially concerned with SWARM
behaviors in the air, over land and a new threat of underwater.
The influence of IoT, AI and Cyber technologies has complicated the
defense planning mission.
Third, UV technology has outpacing our first and second editions
plus our textbook on CUAS. Everyday our writers group read /
discussed new UAS / UV developments in navigation, weapons,
surveillance, data transfer, fuel cells, stealth, weight distribution,
Preface | xxiii

tactics, GPS / GNSS ( and replacement technologies) elements,
SCADA protections, privacy invasions, legislation, big-data usage,
terrorist uses, cryptographic protections, pressure protection for
deep water exploration, maintenance, rescue or intelligence
gathering; ASW, and defense; specialized software and security
protocols and more. As authors we felt compelled to address at least
the edge of some of these new UV developments. It was clear that
we would be lucky if we could cover some of the more interesting
and priority technology updates for the various UV AOs.
Expanded purview means more experience was needed to write
our newest work. We are privileged to add to original writing team
of Nichols, Ryan, Mumm, Lonstein, Carter, and Hood new SMEs in
the various UV technologies: Mai, Jackson, and Shay. Their extensive
backgrounds are found in our tribute to the authors in a latter
section.
Here is an outline of topics in our latest work:
SECTION 1: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
Chapter 1 Information Advances, Remote ID, & Extreme
Persistence ISR [Ryan]
Chapter 2 : Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & How They Can Augment
Mesonet Weather Tower Data Collection [Mai]
Chapter 3 Tour de Drones for the Discerning Palate [Nichols]
SECTION 2: UNMANNED UNDERWATER SYSTEMS
Chapter 4 Underwater Autonomous Navigation & other UUV
Advances [Mumm]
Chapter 5 Autonomous Maritime Asymmetric Systems [Hood]
Chapter 6 UUV Integrated Autonomous Missions & Drone
Management [Mumm]
Chapter 7 Principles of Naval Architecture Applied to UUV’s
[Jackson]
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SECTION 3: UNMANNED VEHICLES FOR GROUND / LAND
OPERATIONS & Penetration of ADS
Chapter 8 : Unmanned Logistics Operating Safely & Efficiently
Across Multiple Domains [Lonstein]
Chapter 9 Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path
Planning in Combat Environment [Nichols]
SECTION 4: UNMANNED VEHICLES WEAPONS FOR C4ISR &
POPULATION TRACKING & CONTROL
Chapter 10 UAS, the Fourth Amendment and Privacy [Shay]
Chapter 11 UV & Disinformation / Misinformation Channels
[Ryan]
SECTION 5: UV GEOPOLITICAL & LEGAL ADVANCES
Chapter 12 Chinese UAS Proliferation along New Silk Road Sea /
Land Routes [Carter]
Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine –
Human Barrier [Lonstein]
Chapter 14 Maritime Cybersecurity [Nichols]

We trust our newest look at Unmanned Vehicles in Air , Sea and
Land will enrich our students and readers understanding of the
purview of this wonderful technology we call UV.
Best
Randall K Nichols
Professor of Practice
Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) –
Cybersecurity Certificate Program
Managing Editor / Co-Author
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Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus &
Professor Emeritus – Cybersecurity, Utica College

LinkedIn Profile:
http://linkedin.com/in/randall-nichols-dtm-2222a691
Illi nunquam cedunt.
“We Never Yield”
References
Nichols, R. K. (2008). Cyber Counterintelligence & Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) Needs – Talking Points,.
Utica College, Chair Cybersecurity. Utica New York: Private Memo
to R. Bruce McBride. Retrieved September 5, 2008
Nichols, R., Ryan, J., Mumm, H., Carter, C., Lonstein, W., & Hood,
J. (2020). Counter Unmanned Aircreaft Systems Technologies and
Operations. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press, #31.
Nichols, R., Ryan, J., Mumm, H., Lonstein, W., Carter, C., & Hood,
J. (2019). Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Cyber Domain: Protecting
USA’s

Advanced

Air

Assets,

2nd

edition.

Manhattan,

KS:

https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27/.
US-CERT. (2015, August 27). Computer Forensics. Retrieved from
US-CERT:

https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/

publications/forensics.pdf

xxvi | Preface

Acknowledgements
Books such as this are the products of contributions by many
people, not just the musings of the authors. Unmanned Vehicle
Systems and Operations on Air, Sea, Land has benefited from the
review of numerous experts in the field, who gave generously of
their time and expertise. In addition to named subject matter
experts, this book was reviewed by sources in the two federal
agencies who must remain anonymous and by export / procedural
/ OVRP committee’s at KSU. Their contributions were especially
helpful in not releasing protected information, classified, or
“deemed exportable” categories. We will name only a few and clearly
miss some special friends whose contributions were noteworthy.
For this we apologize in advance and beg your forgiveness.
There are many people we would like to shout out a special thank
you for your guidance, continued support and experience from
Kansas State University / Kansas State University Polytechnic (KSU
/ KSUP): Dr. Richard Myers, President KSU; Dr. Kurt C. Barnhart,
Associate Dean of Research and Executive Director of the UAS
Research Laboratory KSUP; Dr. Alysia Starkey, Dean & CEO of KSUP;
Dr. Terri Gaeddert, Associate Dean; Professor Troy Harding,
Director of Academics, School of Integrated Studies (SIS) KSUP; Dr.
Donald V. Bergen, prior Director of Graduate Studies KSUP; Fred
Guzek, Professor and current Director of Graduate Studies KSUP;
Dr. Kurt Caraway, Kurt Carraway,UAS Department Head &amp;
Executive Director, Applied Aviation Research Center, Dr. Michael
Most. (Retired) UAS Department Chair, Dr. Mark J. Jackson,
Professor, SIS KSUP; Dr. Saeed Khan, Professor, SIS KSUP; Dr. Tom
Haritos, ARG, Associate Director of Research and UAS Research
Program Manager; Dr. M.J. Pritchard, Sr. Davis Scientist; Dr. Siny
Joseph, ARG, and Associate Professor of Economics; Professor Raju
Dandu; Dr. Katherine Jones, KSUP Research and Library; Rachel
Miles, Assistant Professor, Hale Library KSU; Lisa Shappee, Director,
Acknowledgements | xxvii

KSUP Library; Beth Drescher, Grant Specialist KSUP; Charlene
Simser, prior Professor and Coordinator of Electronic Publishing at
New Prairie Press and Pressbooks,[my mentor in the publishing gig];
Emily Finch and Ryan Otto at NPP; Chad Bailey, Instructor SIS KSUP,
Aris Theocharis, our terrific editor; and especially Joel Anderson,
KSU OVPR and Research Director.
We had some wonderful outside SMEs to bounce ideas off and
get our heads straight. They include Dr. Donald Rebovich, Professor
Emeritus and SME in Fraud and Identity Theft; Professor of Practice
and Cybersecurity Director, Joe Giordano, Utica College; Professor
Harold B. Massey, Executive Director of UAS Drone Port, UAS Pilot
and Dr Amit K Maitra, Chairman and Founder of Borders and
Beyond, Inc., Dr. Bartosz Wojszczyk, President and CEO Decision
Point Global and Bart Shields, Inventor and CTO of Olympus Sky,
Inc.
Next comes our expanded writing team: Dr Julie J. C. H. Ryan,
CEO, Wyndrose Technical Group, is hands down the best subject
matter expert (SME) in the Information Security field. Dr. Hans
C. Mumm is an expert in leadership and UAS weapons – a lethal
combination. Dr. Wayne C. Lonstein, Esq., a previous Dragon
(Nichols’

student)

has

gained

recognition

(licenses

and

certifications) in both law and cybersecurity as well as heads up
his own legal firm. Professor Candice C. Carter, a Dragoness who
is the creator of a cybersecurity program at Wilmington University
and travels globally closing specialized cybersecurity breaches in
major corporations. Capt. John Paul Hood, US Army, (our military
adviser and previous Dragon) joined us to help us understand the
intricacies of military C-UAS (non-classified) applications. Randall
Mai, Research Technologist for KSU, a Dragon convert, with years of
experience in UAS filed operations; Dr Mark Jackson, SME in UUV,
naval architecture, and nanotechnologies, Sgt Jeremy Shay, Dragon
student, COVID-19 expert, RET USAF, Fabrication Production
Manager, Spirit AeroSystems; and Joel Coulter, President, Mobile
Sciences Consortium, LLC.
Last, Professor Randall K. Nichols is managing editor / author
xxviii | Acknowledgements

/ co-author of nine prior books and developer of six Masters and
Certificate programs in Cybersecurity at Utica College and Kansas
State University. He has five decades of Cybersecurity experience.
Finally, Montine Nichols deserves a commendation for her help
on the final drafts and copy edit work for our book (and living with
a real Dragon). Several KSUP UAS pilot – students (now employed)
helped with the “student view,” and made valid suggestions for
improvement, Vincent Salerno, Senior Airman in Kansas Air National
Guard, John Boesen, (our handwriting expert); Diana K. Nichols, UAS
Pilot; Josh Jacobs, Jorge Silva, Sr. UAS Safety Engineer, and Jordan
McDonald. Special thanks go Kira C. Miller who professionally
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The team especially thanks Assistant Professors Ryan W. Otto, and
Emily Finch Scholarly Communication Librarians, for their expert
assistance with the NPP final efforts.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations: Acronyms [Rev 80A] 09212020
The following terms are common to the UAS industry, general
literature, or conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone/UUV systems.
A-STAR

Heuristic search algorithm discussed in chapter 9

A2 / AD

Anti-access / Area Denial

A /Aref

Amplitudes of source and reference points, see

Eq-20-6,7
AA

Anti-aircraft / Adaptive Antennas

AAA

Anti-aircraft artillery

AAIB
AAM

Air Accidents Investigation Board
Air-to-air missile

AAV

Autonomous air vehicle

ABI

Aviation Block Infrastructure

ABMS

Advanced battle management system

A/C
ACAS

Aircraft
Airborne collision avoidance system / Assistant Chief

of the Air Staff
ACL

Agent communication language / Autonomous control

levels
ACOUSTIC

Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds

produced by their motors
ACRP
ACS

Airport Cooperative Research Project
Airbome (defense) control station (system)

ACTD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

AD

Air Defense / Ansar Dine terrorist group

A/D

Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis

ADAC

Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller

ADAPs
ADC
ADF

Adaptive compute acceleration platforms
Air data computer
Automatic direction finder/finding
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ADMS

Air defense missile (radar) system

ADS

Air Defense System (USA)

ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast

systems
ADT
AESA
AEW

Air Data Terminal
Active electronically scanned array
Airbome early warning

AF

Adaptive Filtering

AFCS

Automatic flight control system

AFRICOM

US Africa Command

AGL

Above ground level

AGM

Air- to- surface missile

AGARD

Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and

Development (NATO)
AGM-65

Maverick (USA) is an air-to-surface missile (AGM)

designed for close air support. It is the most widely produced
precision-guided missile in the Western world, and is effective
against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air
defenses, ships, ground transportation and fuel storage facilities.
AGV

Autonomous Guard Vehicle

AHA

Autopilot Hardware Attack

AHD

Analog high definition

AHRS

Attitude and heading reference system

AI

Artificial intelligence: “1. a branch of computer science

dealing with the simulation of intelligent behavior in computers and
2: the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior.”
(Merriam-Webster, 2020)
AIAA
AIC
AIP
AIS

American Institute of Aeronautics and Aerospace
Aeronautical Information Circular
Aeronautical Information Publication
Automated Identification System for Collision

Avoidance
AJ

Anti-Jam

ALB

Air Land Battle
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ALERT

Advanced

Low-observable

Embedded

Reconnaissance Targeting system.
AM

Amplitude Modulation / al-Mourabitoun terrorist

group
AMB

Agile Multi-Beam

AMRAAM

Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile

ANSP

Air Navigation Service Provider

ANO

Air Navigation Order (UK)

AO

Area of Operations

AoA

Angle of Attack

APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

APG

Asia-Pacific Gateway

APKWS

Advanced precision kill weapon system

AQ

Al-Qaeda Terrorist Group – “the Base”

AOA

Aircraft operating authority

AQIM

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Ar

Receive antenna effective area, m2

AR

Aspect ratio

AR drone

AR stands for “Augmented Reality” in AR drone. AR

Drone can perform tasks like object recognition and following,
gesture following.
ARM

Anti-Radiation Munitions

ARS

Airborne Remote Sensing

ART

Autonomous Rail Transport

ARW

Anti-radiation weapons

AS

Airborne Sensing Systems

ASB

Advisory Service Bulletin / Air Sea Battle

ASBM

Anti-ship ballistic missile

ASCM

Anti-ship cruise missile

ASEA

Active electronically scanned arrays

ASEAN

Association of Southeastern Asian Nations

ASICs

Application specific integrated Circuits & circuit

boards
ASL

Airborne Systems Laboratory

ASMS

Automated Separation Management System
Abbreviations and Acronyms | liii

ASR

Chinese Air Silk Road

ASOS

Automated surface weather observation system

ASTM

American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM)

ASTER

Agency for Science, Technology and Research

ASuW

Anti-surface unit warfare

ASW

Anti-submarine warfare

AT

Aerial target

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATHENA

Lockheed Martin Advanced Test High Energy Asset

ATM

Air Traffic Management

ATN

Aids to Navigation (aka ATON)

ATR

Automatic Target Recognition

ATS

Air Traffic Service

AUDS

Anti-UAV Defense System

AUV

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

Avionics

Aviation electronics in manned or unmanned aircraft

AUVSI

Association

for

Unmanned

Vehicle

Systems

International
AV

Air Vehicle

AWOS

Automated weather observation system

AWSAS

All Weather Sense and Avoid System

B

IF equivalent bandwidth, Hz

Backhauling Intermediate links between core network or internet
backbone and small subnets at the edge of the network
BAMS

Broad Area maritime surveillance

BATS

Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study

Bandwidth

Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths,

frequencies, or energy.
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a
modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device
can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of
electrical communications system.
BDA

Battle Damage assessment

BER

Bit error rate

BLOS

Beyond line-of-sight
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BNF
BPAUV

Bind and Fly – with custom transmitter
Battlespace preparation autonomous underwater

vehicle
BRI

Chinese Belt and Road Initiative

BR&T

Boeing Research and Technology

BSR

Bilinear Signal Representation

BSs

Base Stations

BVR

Beyond visual range

c

Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per

sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas the Latin word for speed or
velocity
c

speed of sound (344 m/s) in air

C

Combined methods of CR

C2 / C2W

Command and control / Command and Control

Warfare
C3I

Command,

control,

communications,

and

Command,

control,

communications,

and

Command,

control,

communications

and

Intelligence
C4
computers
C4I

computers, intelligence
C4ISR

Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
C4ISTAR

Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance
CA

Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) /

Cyber Assault (aka CyA)
C/A

Civilian acquisition code for GPS

CAA

Control Acquisition cyber attack

CAS

Close Air Support / Common situational awareness

CASA

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

CASIC

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

C of A

Certificate of Airworthiness

CAP

Civil Air Publication
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CAT

Collision Avoidance Threshold /Connectivity &

automation in transport
CC / CyC

Cyber Crime

CCCI/II

Classical Cryptography Course Volume I/II (Nichols

R. K., Classical Cryptography Course Volume I / II, 1996)
CCE

Cyber Counter Espionage

CCI

Command

control

interface

Cyber

/

Counterintelligence
CCMCPS

Cooperative Cognitive Maritime Cyber Physical

System
CCS

Cyber Counter Sabotage

CCT

Cyber Counter Terrorism

CC-UAS

Counter-Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems

CD

Conflict Detection

CDL

Common datalink

CDMA

code division multiple access

CDR

Collision

detection

and

resolution

systems

(automated SAA in UAS)
CEA

Cyber electromagnetic activities (Cyber, EW,

Spectrum warfare)
CETC

Chinese Electronics Technology Group

CF

Computer Forensics

CFTA

Continental Free Trade Area

CFT

Certificate of flight trials / Cross-functional teams

CHIMERA

Counter-electronic HPM Extended range base air

defense
CI / CyI
CIA

Cyber Infiltration
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central

Intelligence Agency
CIAD

Cyber- Multi-layered Integrated Air Defense

Systems
CIED

Computer improvised explosive device

CIN

Common Information Network

CIR

Color Infrared – artificial standard where NIR bands

shifted so that humans can see the infrared reflectance
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CLE

Airport code for Cleveland

C/N

Carrier to Noise ratio in HAPS, => C/ N0

C/NA

Communication / Navigation Aid

CM / CyM

Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation

CN3

Communications / navigation network node

CNI

Critical National Infrastructure

CNKI

China-North Korea-Iran technical weapons

cooperation agreements
CNO

Chief Naval Operations

CNPC

Control and non-payload links

COA

Certificate of Waiver or Authorization

COB

Chief of the Boat

COMINT

Communications intelligence

COMJAM

Communications Jamming

COMSEC

Communications Security

CONOP(S)

Concepts of Operations

CONUS

Continental United States

COOP

Cooperative Observer Program

COS

Continued Operational Safety

COTS

Commercial off-the-shelf

CPA

Closest Point of Approach

CPA Spoof

CPA spoof involves faking a possible collision with a

target ship
CPL
CPNI

Commercial pilot’s license
Center for Protection of National Infrastructure

(UK)
CPRC

Communist Party of the Republic of China

CPS

Cyber-physical systems

CR

Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka

CyR)
CRH

Coaxial rotor helicopter

CRX

Received Signal Power, watts

CS

Control station

CSDP

Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EU)

CSR

Compact Surveillance Radar
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CSfC

Commercial Solutions for Classified Program

CSIRO

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research

Organization
CT

Counter Terrorism / Counter Terrorism Mission

CTOL

Conventional take-off and landing

C-UAS

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses /

countermeasures)
CUAS

CSIRO Unmanned Aircraft Systems

CV

Collision Volume

CW / CyW

Cyber Warfare

D-STAR

Variation of A-STAR algorithm suitable for solving

path planning problems in unknown environments
D

distance from transmitter in Range equation (Adamy

D. -0., 2015)
DA

Danger area

Danger Close
Definition

www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/

2013/May-June/Myer.html

Nov

14,

2013

– 1) danger

close is

included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target.
… Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate
distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define
danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation.
2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support,
artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term
included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire
which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of
the target.
DARO

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAS

Detection by Acoustical Signature

dB

decibels

DC

Direct Current

DCL

Drone Champions League

DCPA

Distance between vessels approaching CPA
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DDD

Dull, dangerous, and dirty

DDOS

Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack

DE

Directed Energy

DEF CON

DEF CON is the world’s longest running and largest

underground hacking conference.
DE / EP

Directed energy / Electromagnetic pulse

DEM

Digital elevation model

DEW

Directed energy weapons

DF

Direction finding

DFCS

Digital Flight Control System

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIME

Diplomatic, information, military, and economy

DIRCM

Directed Infrared Countermeasures

DIY

Do-it-yourself (amateur built drones or modified

racing drones)
D j

Jammer location – to-target receiver location

distance, in km, FM 34-40-7
DJ

Data Jamming / Drone Jammer

DJI

Popular and functional Chinese made drone series:

Mavic, Phantom, Ryze, Matrix, Spark, Enterprise, Inspire, Tello
{However, banned by USA Army} (Newman, 2017)
DL

Downlink in HAPS

DLA

Date last accessed (usually a web reference)

DLI

Datalink interface

DNA

Deoxyribonucleic acid

DoD

Department of Defense

DOF

Degrees of Freedom

DVL

Doppler velocity log

DOS

Denial of Service cyber attack

DPM

Direct power management / Dynamic Power

Management
DPRK
D-R-O-N-E

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
FAA Guidance: Direct, Report, Observe, Notice

&Execute
DROV

Remote operating vehicle
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DSA

Detect, sense and avoid / Dynamic Sense-and-Act

DSR

Chinese Digital Silk Road

DSS

Decision Support System

DSSS

Direct sequence spread spectrum

D t

Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver

location, in km, FM 34-40-7
DT

Directional

transmission

/

Department

of

Transport (UK)
DTDMA

Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA)

network radio system
DTED

Digital terrain evaluation data

DTF

Drug Task Force

DTH

Direct-To-Home

DTI

Direct Track & Identify

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DUO

Designated UAS operator

EA

Electronic Attack

EARSC

European Association of Remote Sensing Companies

EAS

Equivalent airspeed

EAU

East Africa union comprising of Israel and six East

African states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and
South Sudan
(Eb / No)
ECCM / EP

Thermal noise power spectral density ratio
Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic

Protection
ECM

Electronic countermeasures

ECR

Electronic combat reconnaissance

EDC

Estimated Date of Completion

EDEW

Effects of Directed Energy Weapons

EEZP

Exclusive economic Zone protection

EFF

Electronic Frontier Foundation

EHS

Enhanced surveillance

EIRP

Effective isotopic radiated power

Electrolaser Electroshock weapon that is also a DEW. Uses lasers
to form electrically conductive laser-induced plasma charge
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ELINT

Electronic Intelligence

ELT

Emergency locator transmitter

ECM

Electromagnetic compatibility

EM

Electromagnetic

EMC

Electromagnetic compatibility

EME

Electromagnetic environment

EMI

Electromagnetic interference

EMO

Electromagnetic operations

EMP

Electromagnetic pulse

EMR

Electromagnetic Radiation

EMS

Electromagnetic Spectrum

EMSVIS

Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible Light

EMW

Electromagnetic Waves

EO

Electro-optical (sensing) / Earth Observation

EOTS

Electro-optical targeting system

EPIRB

Emergency Positioning -Indicating Radio Beacon

EQUAS

Explainable question answering system

ERPJ

Effective radiated power of the jammer, in dBm

ERPS

Effective radiated power of the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
ESM / ES

Electronic support measures / Electronic warfare

support / Earth station &

ESM

Electronic

Signal Monitoring
EU

European Union

EUNAVFOR

European Union Naval Force’s anti-piracy naval

mission
EUTM

Somalia Military training mission in Somalia

EVTOL

Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing

EW

Electronic warfare, see 9-15 & footnotes

F

Field theory methods of CR

F

Fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest

frequency of a periodic waveform
f

Frequency, cycles / second RRE)

Fo

Resonant frequency of string, Hz see Eq. 20-5

F

Frequency in MHz, FM 34-40-7
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FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FACE

Future Airborne Capability Environment

FAR

False Alarm Rates

FBL

Fly-by-Light, a type of flight-control system where

input command signals are sent to the actuators through the
medium of optical-fiber …
FBW

Fly-by-wire

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

FCS

Flight control systems / Flight Control Station

FDF

Frequency Domain Filtering

FDM

frequency division multiplexing

FHSS

Frequency hopping spread spectrum

FIIP

Floating Integrated Information Platforms

FIR

Far Infrared (25-40) to (200-350) um

FIRES

definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon

systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.
FL

Flight Level

FLIR

Forward-looking infrared

Fly-by-Wire Predetermine flight mission path based on GPS
coordinates
Floats

Floating sensors (USN)

FMS

Flexible manufacturing system

Follow-Me

UAS autopilot automatically follows operator

Fom

HAPS Figure of merit in upload /download link

FoV

Field of view

FFOV

Forward Field of View

FRAGO

Fragmentary Order – to send timely changes of

existing orders to a subordinate
FPV

First Person View – live streaming video used in

racing drones
FPGA

Field programmable gate array

FS

Fixed service

FSS

Fixed satellite service

FW

Fixed wing

FY

Fiscal year
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G

Geometric methods of CR

G5S

G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force, has membership of five

states: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad
GAO

General Accounting Office USA

gAR

Receiving Antenna Gain as a Factor

GBU

Guided Bomb Unit

GCHQ

Government

Communications

Headquarters

(Britain)
GCS

Ground control station

GDP

Gross Domestic Product (USA)

GDPR

European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection

Regulation
GDT

Ground data terminal

GEO

Geostationary Earth orbit satellite

GEOINT

Geospatial-Intelligence

GeoFence

A geo-fence is a virtual perimeter for a real-

world geographic area
GIGO

Garbage in, garbage out

GLOW

Gross lift-off weight for a missile / rocket

GNSS
GLONASS
GPS
GPS/INS

Global Navigation Satellite System
Global Satellite Navigational System
Global Positioning System / Geo Fencing
Use of GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate

a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method is
applicable for any GNSS/INS system.
GPSSPOOF

Hack of GPS system affecting UAS commands

GPWS

Ground proximity warning system

GR

The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the

desired signal transmitter, dBi
G RJ

Receiving antenna gain in the direction of the

jammer, in dBi
GS

Ground segment of HAPs

GSE

Ground support equipment

GSHM

Ground Station Handover Method

GSM

Global System for Mobile Communications
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GT

Game Theory methods of CR

G/T

ratio of the receive antenna gain to system noise

temperature
(G /Ts) dB

Represents the figure of merit of the HAPS receiver,

in dB
GT

Gain of the transmit antenna, dB

GTA

Ground -to -Air Defense

Hard damage DEW complete vaporization of a target
Harmonic

Frequency, which is an integer multiple of the

fundamental frequency
H

Elevation of the jammer location above sea level,

feet, FM 34-40-7
HAE

High altitude endurance

HALE

High altitude – long endurance

HAPS

High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless

communications enhancements)
HAPS UAVs

UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to

communicate via CNPC links)
HCE

Highly contested environment

HEAT

High-explosive anti-tank warhead

HELWS

High energy laser weapon system

HITL

Human in-the-loop

HMI

Human machine interface

HO

Home Office (UK)

HPA

High power amplifier

HPL

High powered laser weapon

HPM

High powered microwave defense

Ht

Elevation of enemy transmitter location above sea

level, in feet, FM 34-40-7
HUD
Human

Heads-up display
“a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens), a

person” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); Humanity

“the quality or state

of being human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020)
Humanoids

“a humanoid being: a nonhuman creature or being
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with characteristics (such as the ability to walk upright) resembling
those of a human.”
HUMINT

Human intelligence (spy’s)

HVT

High value target (generally, for assassination)

I

Sound intensity, W x m-2 [Source strength S / 4πr2]

(Uni-wuppertal, 2019)
IA

Information Assurance / Intentional cyber warfare

attack
I-actors

Intentional Cyber Actors

IADS

Multi-layered integrated air defense systems

IAI

Israeli Aerospace Industries

IAS

Indicated airspeed

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

I.C.B.C

International Center for Boundary Cooperation

(China)
ICBM

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

ICGs

Information centers of gravity

ICS

Internet Connection Sharing / Industrial control

systems
ID

Information

Dominance

/

Inspection

and

Identification /Identification
IEDs

Improvised Explosive Devices

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IETM

Interactive Electronic Maintenance Manuals

IEWS

Intelligence, electronic warfare, and sensors

IFF

Identification, friend, or foe

IFR

Instrument flight rules

I&I

Interchangeability and Interoperability

IIT

Intentional Insider Threats

Imaging Sensors ARS sensors that build images
IL

Intensity level of sound measured, dB, Eq. 20-2

IMINT

Imagery intelligence

IMM

Interacting-multiple-models tracker

IMU

Inertial Measurement Unit

INS

Inertial navigation system
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IMU

Inertial Measurement Unit

INFOSEC

Information Security

IO

Information Operations, see Figure 9-11 & footnotes

IOB

Internet of bodies

IOC

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission

IOR

India Ocean Region

IoT

Internet of things

IIoT

Industrial Internet of things

IPL

Insitu Pacific Limited

IR

Infrared Sensors

IRST

Infrared search and tracking

IS

Information Superiority

ISCS

Integrated shipboard control systems

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

ISR

Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS

Platform
ISTAR

Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance
IT
ITU

Information Technology
International

Telecommunications

Union

–

Standards Organization
ITU-R

International Telecommunications Union – Radio

Sector
IW

Information Warfare

JADC2

Joint all-domain command & control

JADO

Joint all-domain operations (Thatcher, 2020)

JAGM

Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile

JAUS

Joint architecture for UAS

JDAM

Joint direct attack munitions

JFO

Joint fires observer

JP

Joint Publication – followed by military identifier

JDAM

Joint Direct Attack Munition

JNIM

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

JOAC

Joint Operational Access Concept
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JOPES

Joint Operation and Planning System / Execution

System
JP

Joint Publication

J/S

= the ratio of the jammer power to the desired signal

power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB
JST

Japan Time zone

JTAC

Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

JTIDS

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

(JTIDS) is an L band DTDMA
K

Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component, RRE) (1.38

x 10 -23 J/K), Kelvin
K

2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers

(jamming tuner accuracy), FM 34-40-7
KAMIKAZI Means “Divine Wind,” Tactic best known for Japanese
suicide A/C attacks on Allied Capital Vessels in WWII. UAS TEAMS
or SWARMS could be directed in the same way.
KE

Kinetic energy

KEW

Kinetic energy weapons

KM

Katiba Macina Groups

KSU

Kansas State University

L

λ / 2 in Eq. 20-5

LAANC

Low

Altitude

Authorization

and

Notification

Capability
LASER
of optical

“A laser is a device that emits light through a process
amplification based

on

the stimulated

emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated
as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of
radiation”. A laser differs from other sources of light in that it emits
light coherently, spatially and temporally. Spatial coherence allows
a laser to be focused to a tight spot, enabling applications such
as laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a
laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation),
enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have
high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a
very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light.
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Temporal coherence can be used to produce pulses of light as short
as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices
for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018)
Laser JDAM Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition – dumb bombs,
all weather precision –guided munitions. Guided by an integrated
inertial guidance system.
Laser rangefinder Scope to assist targeting of munitions.
Countermeasure: laser-absorbing paint
LGWs

Laser-guided weapons

Latency

Processing difference between time interval signal is

transmitted and signal is received
LCDR

Lieutenant Commander

L/D

Lift to drag ratio

LDCM

Low Duty cycle methods

LEO

Low Earth Orbit Satellite / Law Enforcement Officer

LGB

Laser-guided bomb, a guided bomb that uses semi-

active laser guidance to strike a designated target with greater
accuracy than an unguided one
LGTF

Liptako-Gourma task force (LGTF) established by

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region
LIDAR

Light (Imaging) Detection and Ranging

LFS

Free- Space Loss as a Factor

LIPC

laser-induced plasma channel

LJ

Propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi

LMADIS

Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (family

of C-UAS systems)
LMM

Lightweight Multi-role Missile (by Thales)

LORAN-C

Long Range Navigation, Revision C

LOS

Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation

LOSAS

Low cost Scout UAV Acoustic System

LPA

Log periodic array

LPI

Low Probability of Intercept

LR

Long range

LRA

Long range artillery
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LRAD

Long Range Acoustic Device (Weapon) (Yunmonk

Son, 2015)
LRCS

Low radar cross section

LRE

Launch and recovery element

LRF

Laser rangefinder

LS

Losses existing in the system (lumped together), dB

(RRE)
LS

The propagation loss from the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
LSDB

Laser Small Diameter Bomb

LST

Laser spot trackers

LTA

Lighter than Air (airship) /Low noise amplifier

LTE /LTE+

Long Term Evolution – refers to mobile

telecommunications coverage
LUSV

Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles

LWIR

Long wave Infrared (sensor or camera)

M

Mass in Eq. 20-5

MA

Multi-agent methods of CR

MAD

Magnetic anomaly detection

MADIS

Marine Air Defense Integrated System

MAE

Medium-altitude endurance

MAGTF

Marine air-ground task force

MALDRONE Malware injected into critical SAA for UAS
MALE

Medium-altitude, long endurance UAS

MALE-T

Medium altitude long endurance – tactical UAS

MAME

Medium altitude, medium endurance

MARIN

Maritime Research Institute Netherlands

MASINT

Measurement and Signal Intelligence

MATS

Mobile Aircraft Tracking System

M-AUDS

Mobile Anti-UAV Defense System

MAV

Micro-air vehicle

Maverick

AGM -65 (USA) Missile

Mesonet

network of automated weather and environmental

monitoring stations

designed

to

observe mesoscale

meteorological phenomena
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MCE

Mission control element

MCM

Mine countermeasures

MCU

Master Control Unit

MCVs

Mesoscale convective vortices

MDR

Missed Detection Rates

MEB

Marine expeditionary brigade (14,500 marines and

sailors).
MEMS

Micro-electromechanical systems

MEO

Medium Earth Orbit satellite

MFD

Multi Function display

MGTOW

Maximum gross take-off weight

MHT

Multiple-hypotheses-testing

MIM

Man in the Middle cyber attack

MINUSMA

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

Mali
MIR

Mid Infrared 5 to (25-40) um

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ML

Machine learning techniques

MLRS

Multi launch rocket systems

MLU

Mid-life upgrade

MMI

Man-machine interface

MORS

Military Operations Research Society

Modulation

Signal Modulation is the process of varying one or

more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal,
with a modulating signal that typically contains information to be
transmitted
MPA

Maritime patrol aircraft

MPI

Message-passing interface

MPC

Model-based predictive control

MPO

Mission payload operator

MR

Medium range / Maritime Reconnaissance

MRE

Medium-range endurance

MS

Mobile service

MSL / AGL

MSL altitudes are measured from a standard datum,

which is roughly equal to the average altitude of the ocean. So, an
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aircraft traveling 5,000 feet directly above a mountain that’s 3,000
feet tall would have an altitude of 5,000 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL) and 8,000 feet MSL.
MSR

Maritime Silk Road (China)

MSSM

Multi-step optimization method to achieve re-

planning for stealth UAV penetration of ADS
MTCR

missile Technology Control Regime

MTI

Moving target indication

MTOM

Maximum take-off mass

MTOW

Maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft at which the

pilot can attempt to take off, due to structural or other limits.
MTS

Multi

Spectral

Targeting

System

/Maritime

Transportation Systems / Sector
MTTR

Multitarget tracking radar/Mean time to repair

MUAV

Mini-UAV or maritime UAV

MUJAO

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

MUM

Manned-unmanned teaming

MUSV

Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles

MW

Microwave

MWIR

Midwave Infrared

MW

microwave towers

N

Available Noise power, watts for HAPS

N

Terrain and ground conductivity factor, FM 34-40-7

5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity
4 = moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground
conductivity
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity[i]
The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy transmitter
location does not include the height of the antenna above the
ground or the length of the antenna. It is the location deviation
above sea level.
NAC

Network Access Control

NACA

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics

NAS

National Airspace (USA)
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NASAMS II National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System
NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAV

Nano-air vehicle / NAV data message for GPS

systems
NBC

Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare

NCO

Network-centric operations

NCW

Network Centric Warfare

NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

(China)
NEC
NEMESIS

Network enabled capability
Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature

against integrated Sensors (USN)
NGA

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NIEM

National Information Exchange Model

NIR

near Infrared

NLOS

Non-line-of-sight

NM
NMAC

Nautical Miles
A NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the

operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as
a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a
report is received from a pilot or a flight crewmember stating that a
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft.
NMLA

the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad

(Tuareg Rebellion)
NO
NOAA

Numerical Optimization methods of CR
National

Oceanographic

and

Atmospheric

Administration
NOLO

No onboard live operator (USN)

NOTAM

Notice to airmen

NPD

Near Peer Doctrine

NPS

National Park Service

NSA

National Security Agency (US)

NSRL

New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (Chinese)
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NTIA

National Telecommunications and Information

Administration
NTM/NTOM Notice to mariners
NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

NTT

Non-Threat Traffic

NULLO

Not using live operator (USAF)

O

Other methods of CR

OEM

Original Equipment Manufacturer

OIO

Offensive Information Operations

OLOS

Out-of-the-line-of-sight

OODA

Decision Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OoT
ONR

Ocean of Things (USN) (DARPA)
Office of Naval Research

OPA

Optionally piloted aircraft

OPAV

Optionally piloted air vehicle

OPSEC

Operations Security

OSI

Open systems interconnection

OT

Operational technology

OTH

Over- the- horizon

P

Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of peak

power, Mw
PANCAS

Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative Collision Alert

System
PB

Particle Beams, Particle beams are large numbers of

atomic or sub-atomic particles moving at relativistic velocities.
PBL

Planetary boundary layer

PCAS

Persistent close air support

PCS

Personal Communication Services

PEIRP

Transmitter effective isotropic radiated power,

watts
PFMS

Predictive Flight Management System

PEMSIA

Partnership in Environmental Management of the

Seas of East Asia
PGB

Precision guided bomb

PGM

Precision guided missile
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PHOTINT

Photographic intelligence (usually sky – ground)

PHX

Airport code for Phoenix

PI

Probability of Incapacitation

PII

Personal Identifiable Information

PIM

Position

of

intended

movements/Previously

intended movements
PIT

Proximity Intruder Traffic

Pj

Minimum amount of jammer power output required,

in watts, FM 34-40-7
PL

Power level, dB, Eq. 20-1

PLA

Chinese People’s Liberation Army

PLAN

People’s Liberation Army Navy (China)

PLC

Programmable Logic Controllers

PLOCAN

Research facility Oceanic Platform of the Canary

Islands
PMIAA

Permissions Management: Identification,

Authentication and Authorization
PNF

Plug and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver,

battery, and charger
PNT

Reliable communications; positioning, navigation,

and timing
PO

Psychological Operations

POS

Position and Orientation System

POV

Point of View

PPP

Precise Point Positioning

PPS

Precise positioning service (GPS)

PRC

People’s Republic of China (China)

Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm (Latin)
PSD
PREACT

Power Spectral Density
Partnership

for

Regional

Counterterrorism (PREACT)
PRF

Pulse repetition frequency codes

PRM

Precision Runway Monitor

PS

Pressure sensor

PSH

Plan-symmetric helicopter
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East

Africa

PSR
P t

Primary Surveillance Radar
Power output of the enemy drone, in watts, FM

34-40-7
PW/PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
PWO

Principal Warfare officer

P(Y)

Precise Signal (GPS)for military positioning

QOS

Quality of Service in HAPs

QR

QR code is a type of matrix barcode which is

machine or phone readable
QUAS

QUT UAS

QUT

Queensland University of Technology

R

1 /Tb is the bit rate (b/s) in link equation

R4

Energy density received at detected target range, R,

nm
RA

Resolution Advisory

RAC

Range air controller

RADAR

Radio Detection and Ranging

RADINT

Radar intelligence

RAM

Radar absorbing materials

RAS

Radar absorbing structure

RAST

Recovery, assist, and traverse

RB

Rule-based methods (Conflict Resolution)

RBW

Red- breasted Woodpecker

RCE

Remote Code Execution

RCO

Remote-control operator

RCS

Radar cross-section

RCTA

Surf Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RED

Risk Estimate Distance

Remote ID Remote ID has two meanings in this textbook. It is
used as an information / technology device to identify people from
a UAV. This term is used in the UAS industry and the FAA as a
mechanism for identifying an aircraft type and the registrant from
the ground, essentially a digital license plate and registration.
RES

Radio electronic systems

RF

Radio Frequency
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RGB

Red Green Blue for VIS camera

RGT

Remote ground terminal

RIAS

Research

Institute

for

Autonomous

Systems

-University of North Dakota
Rician PDF
RIMPAC

Rician probability density function
Rim of the Pacific Exercise – Maritime

RL

Ramp launched

RMS

Reconnaissance management system /Root-mean-

square
RN

Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment Equations

17-2, 17-3
RNRA

Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk

Assessment for Cyber cases
ROA
ROC

Remotely operated aircraft
Republic of China (Taiwan) / Regional Operations

Center (USA)
ROV/ROUV

Remote operating vehicle / Remotely operated

underwater vehicle
RPA

Remotely piloted aircraft

RPH

Remotely piloted helicopter

RPV

Remotely piloted vehicle

RR

Radio regulations

RRE

Radar Range Equation

RSA

RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelman) -authors of early

public –key cryptographic system
RSTA

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

RTA

Dubai Roads and Transport Authority

RTF

Off- the- shelf, Ready -to -Fly

RTK

Real Time Kinematic

RTS

Remote tracking station/Request to send/Release

to service
RTU

Remote Terminal Unit

RUAV

Relay UAV

RWR

Radar warning receiver

S

Intensity at surface of sphere
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SA

Situational Awareness

SAA

Sense and Avoid &

SAA

Sense and Act Systems; replaces See and Avoid

function of a human pilot
SAASM

Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module

SAE

Society of Automotive Engineers

SAHRV

Semi-autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance

vehicle
SAM
SAMPLE

Surface to Air Missile
Survivable autonomous mobile platform, long-

endurance
SAP

Systems Applications and Products also the name of

a company
SAR

Synthetic aperture radar / Search and rescue-

especially using helicopters
SAS

Safety Assurance System

SATCOM

Satellite communications

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems

SCHEMA

Security Incident Identification

SCIF

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SCS

Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo

Camera System / South China Sea
SE

Synthetic environment

SEA

Airport code for Seattle

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

Shadowing

Airframe

shadowing

–

UAV-

Ground

signal

degradation during maneuver
SEZ

Special economic zones

SHM

Simple harmonic motion – represented by sign wave

SHORAD

Short Range Air Defense systems

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

Signature

UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal and

radio /radar
SINS

Ships inertial navigation systems
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SJM

Salafi-Jihad Movement

SKASaC

Seeking airborne surveillance and control

SKYNET

Fictional artificial intelligence system that becomes

self-aware
SLAM

Simultaneous localization and mapping

SLAMRAAM Surface launched AMRAAM
SM

Separation Management

SMC

Single moving camera

SME

Subject matter expert

SMR

Single main rotor

S/N

S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio,

dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver
SOA

Static Obstacle – Avoidance system

Soft damage DEW disruption to a UAS computer
SOLAS

Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime

Convention)
SONAR

Sound Navigation and Ranging

SPL

Sound pressure level, dB = 20 Log p / po [ measured

pressures to reference pressure]
SPS
Spoofing

see Eq. 20-3,4; 6-7

Standard position service (GPS)
A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals

to replace valid ones
Spot sensors ARS sensors that measure single locations without
image library
SPURV

Special purpose underwater research vehicle

SQL

SQL Injection – common malevolent code injection

technique
SR

Short range

SRBM

Short range ballistic missile, ex SCUD missile

SRL

Systems readiness level

SSA

Static Sense-and -Act

SSBN

Ballistic missile submarine force

SSP

Smart Skies Project

SSR

Secondary Surveillance Radar

SST

Self – Separation Threshold
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ST&T

Submarine Track and Trail

STANAG 4856 Standard interfaces of UAV Control System for
NATO UAV
STK

Satellite tool kit

STOL

Short take-off and landing

sUAS

Small Unmanned Aircraft System

SubT

Subterranean Challenge Urban Circuit

SUAVE

Small UAV engine

SWARM

High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or

unmanned boats
SWAT

Special Weapons and Tactics (police / paramilitary)

SWAP

Size, weight, and power

SWIR

Shortwave infrared, 1400-3000 nm, 1.4 -3.0 um

wavelength range
SZ

Safety Zone is defined as the horizontal and vertical

separation criteria which form a cylindrical airspace volume around
the UAS. In figure 3-2 that volume is defined by 1000 ft radius and
200 ft height. It is assumed that initially the UAS is in the center with
100 ft above and below the A/C.
T

In Range equation & environment, strength of a

received signal, function of square or fourth power of distance, d,
from transmitter (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
T

Time, sec (RRE)

T

Tension in Eq.20-5

TA

Traffic Advisory

TAC

Target air controller

TACAN

Tactical air navigation

TAR

Antenna noise temperature, Kelvin

TAS

True airspeed

TBO

Time between overhauls

TC

Type certificate

TCAS

Traffic alert and collision avoidance system

TCPA

Time to reach Closest Point of Approach

Te

Effective input noise temperature, Kelvin,

TEAM (UAS) High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or
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unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team
Leader, (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and
is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt.
TETRA

Terrestrial Trunked Radio for terrestrial terminals /

services
Thermobaric Metal augmented charge
THOR

Tactical high-power operational responder

TIR

Thermal infrared = 8000 – 15000 nm, 8 -15 um

TL

Team Leader

TO

take-off

Tort

A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury

or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts
impose liability.
TP

Trajectory Prediction

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command networks
TRL

Technology readiness level: Technology readiness

levels are a rating method developed by NASA to describe where a
technology is in terms of its development. The lowest levels (1 – 3)
are technologies that are being researched, the middle levels (4 –
6) are technologies that are being prototyped and tested, and the
highest levels (7 – 9) are technologies that are being demonstrated
and used. (NASA, 2017)
TS

Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above

absolute zero
TSTCP

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. TSCTP

partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
TT & C

Telemetry, tracking and command

TUAV

Tactical UAV

UA

Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential

intruder)
U-Actors

Unintentional Cyber Actors

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAM

Urban Air Mobility (vehicle)

UAPO

Unmanned Aircraft Program Office
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UAS

Unmanned aircraft system

UASCdr

Unmanned aircraft system commander

UASIPP

UAS Integration Pilot Program

UAS-p

UAS pilot

UAV

Unmanned aerial vehicle

UAV-p

UAV pilot

UBR

Uplink bit rate, Mb/s

UCAR

Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft

UCARS

UAV common automated recovery system

UCAV

Unmanned combat air vehicle

UCWA / UA Unintentional cyber warfare attack
UG

Underwater glider (USN)

UGCS

Unmanned Ground Control Station

UGS

Unmanned ground-based station

UGT

Unmanned ground transportation

UGV

Unmanned ground vehicle

UHF

Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz – 3 GHz

UIT

Unintentional Insider Threats

UK

United Kingdom

UL

Upload link

ULC

Uniform Law Commission

ULPCG

University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

UMTS

Universal Mobile Telecommunications System

U.N.

United Nations

UND

University of North Dakota

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization
UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

US

United States

USCG

United States Coast Guard

USCGA

United States Coast Guard Auxiliary

USD

Unmanned surveillance drone

USS

Undersea Search and Survey

USV

Unmanned surface vehicle
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UTM

Unmanned Traffic Management / Safe Uniform

Traffic Management
UTV

Unmanned target vehicle

UUV

Unmanned underwater / undersea vehicle

UV

Unmanned Vehicle

UUNs / DUNSs Urgent / deliberate universal needs statements
V

Visible

VFR

Visual flight rules

VHS

Very High Frequency Radio

VIKI

Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence

VLA

Very light aircraft

VLJ

Very Light Jet

VLAR

Vertical launch and recovery

VLOS

Visual Line of Sight

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions

VNIR

Visible light and near infrared 400 – 1400 nm, 0.4 –

1.4 um wavelength range
Voloport

Landing site for Volcopter

VTC

Vessel traffic control

VTM

Vessel traffic management

VTOL

Vertical take-off and landing

VTUAV

Vertical take-off UAV

WABN

wide available broadband networks

WARM

identify war reserve mode emissions

WEF

World Economic Forum

WEZ

Weapon Engagement Zone

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WRC

World Radio Conference Standards Organization

XLUUV

Extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle

XO

Executive Officer of Naval vessel

ZIGBEE or KILLERBEE

Sniffing / penetration tools specific to

UAS
Greek / Mathematical Symbols
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λ

Wavelength in Hz, c / f where c= speed of light 344

m/s and f = frequency, Hz.
Σ

Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2

υ

UAV velocity vector and UAV speed (ms -1)

θ

Horizontal angle in inertial axes (rad)

Ψ

Vertical angle in inertial axes (rad)

x,y,z

Inertial position coordinates (m)

κ

Curvature (m-1)

τ

Torsion, (m-1)

r(q)

Path, with path variable (q)

h

Path length (m)

e

Basis axes vector set

P(x, y, z, θ, Ψ) UAV pose where: where x, y, z, is the UAV location
or waypoint and (θ, Ψ) are the horizontal and vertical angles ,
respectively
Ps

Starting pose for UAV moving to

Pf

Finish pose

Џ

Path constraint in (9.4)

a

lateral acceleration proportional to curvature k

∞

vector operator in (9.6)

f(n)

Path cost function in (9.9)

g(n)

cost of path from start node n to the goal

h(n)

Heuristic function which estimates the distance

from the next node n on the path to goal in (9.9)
h(X)

represents actual journey cost from goal X

g(X,E)

represents the estimate journey cost from state X to

the current position of the stealth UAV in (9.10)
N

Length of the prediction domain in (9.11) & N steps

in (9.12)
W

length of the control domain in (9.11)

qi

Output prediction error

qj

Is the weighting coefficient of the control variable

in (9.11)
k

Kth node for prediction of cost of predicted flight

path in MPC (9.12)
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3-D

three dimensional

Special Definitions
Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the
resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle,
interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic
weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics
of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to
use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their
forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not
necessarily be militarized. (Steponova, 2016)
This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have
comparable military power and resources and rely on tactics that
are similar overall, differing only in details and execution. (Thomas,
2010)

Sources plus Bibliography below: (Nichols R. K., Unmanned
Aircraft Systems In the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced
Air Assets. 2nd Ed. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press., 2019) and
(Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies
and Operations, 2020)
Austin, R, (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design,
Development and Deployment, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, [Condensed
with additions from eleven-page “Units and Abbreviations Table.”
Pp. ix-xxix] Additional sources generated from / specific to Chapter
development / discussion. A few definitions taken from Wikipedia.
Cyber terminology from: Nichols, R. K. (Sept. 5, 2008) Cyber
Counterintelligence & Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(SCIF) Needs – Talking Points & (Randall K. Nichols J. J., 2018)
lxxxiv | Abbreviations and Acronyms

& (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy
Counter Measures, 2019) & (Randall K. Nichols D. , Chapter 20
Acoustic CM & IFF Libraries V SWARMS Rev 1 05142019, 2018)
& (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012)
Alford, L. D., Jr., USAF, Lt. Col. (2000) Cyber Warfare: Protecting
Military Systems Acquisition Review Quarterly, spring 2000, V.7, No.
2, P, 105, (Nielsen, 2012)
Nichols, Randall K.; Mumm, Hans C.; Lonstein, Wayne D.; Ryan,
Julie J.C.H.; Carter, Candice; and Hood, John-Paul, “Unmanned
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain” (2019). NPP eBooks. 27.
https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27
Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/U2/A487951.Pdf
Appendix 1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties
(Entokey, 2019)
and (Gelfand S. A., 2009)
A majority of the technical abbreviations come from (Nichols R. K.,
et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) and
(Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies
and Operations, 2020) Other definitions from the following
references:
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1. Chapter 1 Information
Technology Advances,
Remote ID,[1] & Extreme
Persistence ISR [Ryan]
Student learning objectives. After reading this chapter, students
should be able to do the following:
• — Identify, describe, and explain the advances in technologies
that affect unmanned system design and use
• — Discuss the impacts of technology advances on the ability to
remotely identify individuals
• — Discuss how energy availability affects the range and
duration of unmanned system operations
The Emerging World of Unmanned Vehicle Uses
As noted in the preface to this book, unmanned technology has
undergone a growth explosion. Innovations in production, sales,
testing, specialized designs, and uses continue to push the adoption
of unmanned systems into new markets while expanding its use in
existing markets. The improvement in the underlying technologies,
such as cameras, have enabled many new uses. Further, use in one
area can inspire use in another area as knowledge about capabilities
spreads. The first types of jobs that are being tasked to unmanned
vehicles are typically the ones that are dangerous or relatively
expensive to use humans to execute. The next types of jobs being
assigned to unmanned vehicles are the repetitive but simple tasks
that are less expensive to execute without humans. Examples of
some of the emerging uses of unmanned systems include the
following:
Chapter 1 Information Technology
Advances, Remote ID,[1] & Extreme

• Governmental uses, such as for military purposes and
population control. The use of unmanned systems by military
forces includes bomb disposal robots, surveillance drones, and
battle damage assessment (Page, 2020). Police forces use them
for “mass surveillance, crime investigation, search and rescue
operations, locating stolen goods, and surveying land and
infrastructure.” (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2017)
• Emergency services, including first responder support and
humanitarian relief. These types of applications assist
emergency personnel in finding victims, surveying disaster
areas, and getting relief supplies to people who would
otherwise be unreachable. (CB Insights, 2020)
• Construction and infrastructure. Drones are being used to not
only monitor the progress of construction (Burger, 2019) but
also to move supplies around construction zones. An
emerging use of drones is to actually construct buildings: a
proof of concept experiment in Switzerland used drones to “lift
and stack thousands of polymer bricks… to create a geometric
structure nearly 10 meters high” (CB Insights, 2020).
• Crime. From transporting drugs and contraband into prisons
and across borders to delivering bombs and spying on people,
unmanned systems provide a cost effective and risk reducing
capability to determined criminals. (Swales, 2019)
Predictably, some of the uses are hostile to one or more parties. Of
course, hostility is in the eyes of the beholder: a criminal views law
enforcement use of unmanned surveillance technology as hostile
to their interests; a pro-democracy protestor views population
surveillance as hostile and adversarial. The point is, of course, that
the technology itself is agnostic as to usage and that it is growing
in leaps and bounds, with innovations in both the underlying
technology base and in the use of the technology coming seemingly
every day.
In order to understand how the uses of unmanned systems can
evolve and adapt, it is necessary to keep tabs on how the component
4 | Chapter 1 Information Technology Advances, Remote ID,[1] & Extreme
Persistence ISR [Ryan]

technologies – sensors, communications, controls, etc. – are
evolving. This chapter provides an overview of these advances from
the perspective of unmanned systems.

Many advances in

technologies and uses have occurred, with some of the most
interesting being in the marrying of information technologies –
imagers, signal sensors, etc. – with advances in aeronautics, energy
sources, and engine technologies. In this chapter, we will look some
of the more interesting technology changes and explore some
implications.
Information Technologies
When talking with people about unmanned systems, it is
sometimes surprising to realize that they do not fully appreciate
the fact that few systems are fully autonomous. When something
is unmanned, it just means that the “manning” is outsourced. But
what is “manning” and what is “outsourcing”?
“Manning” implies a lot of things, most specifically that a human
is in the operational loop in the same location as the equipment
being operated. When a piece of equipment is “unmanned”, then
one or more of those elements is different. It may be that a human
is still in the operational loop, but at a different location. It may
be that some aspect of human intelligence has been automated
and integrated into the equipment. Or it may be a combination
of those. Outsourcing is when one or more tasks that one person
would do is given to another entity to perform. Aspects of human
labor are most easily outsourced to machines but could also be
outsourced, when possible, to distant people. Aspects of human
intelligence can be outsourced to smart machines, to distributed
groups of people, or to companies. Therefore, when we say that
“unmanned means that manning has been outsourced”, we are really
saying that some aspects of human labor and cognition have been
separated out and assigned to some mix of distant humans, distant
machines, and on-premise technologies.
The operations of any unmanned system is complex. As noted in
Nichols et al (2020):
Chapter 1 Information Technology Advances, Remote ID,[1] & Extreme
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A UAS can’t fly (very far) if it doesn’t have internal systems to parse
received instructions, make decisions based on sensed data, and
control its onboard systems. The internal systems can be thought
of as the internal nervous system of a UAS. Sensed data is collected
and may possibly undergo some preprocessing, prior to being
transferred to a decision support system, a suite of AI support
elements, or external communications for relay to other UASs and/
or command and control elements, such as an airborne control
system or a ground control system. The internal systems interpret
and instruct navigational control, mission execution, and propulsion
control. When emergency situations occur, the internal systems
execute

preprogrammed

options,

which

could

include

autonomously navigating to safe zones or self-destructing. The
internal systems also monitor the health and welfare of the UAS
according to the instrumentation included onboard. This may
include fuel level monitoring, damage assessment, and interference
detection. According to design, the internal systems may relay
information continuously, on schedule, or in emergencies.
The separation of human labor, cognition, and equipment into
disparate pieces means that a concomitant need for collaborative
technologies becomes important. The most obvious collaborative
technologies are communications – exchanging data, commands,
and responses. Other types of collaborative technologies that need
to be considered are those that prevent adverse interactions
between system components, environmental sensing and reaction
technologies, and control guidance technologies. All of these
enable the remote operation of an unmanned system.
When considering the operation of anything that is unmanned, be
it an earth-bound robot or a high-flying weather balloon, it is very
useful to think about two things: where the intelligence associated
with the operations is located, and how the intelligence is divided
between elements. The process of automation is fundamentally the
process of taking elements of human intelligence and replicating
those elements in machines. Advances in automation follow the
development of technologies that allow increasing distance
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between humans and their tools, but also follow a fairly predictable
cycle of development, use, integration, and innovation. Successful
innovation can both restart the cycle and spawn separate cycles.
In order to explore advances in information technology as applied
to unmanned systems, we will look at the several general categories
of technologies and how they are poised to affect the future of
unmanned systems. When appropriate, examples of real-world
implementations will be provided. (The use of these examples does
not constitute endorsement: they are simply examples of what is
going on in the world.) The general categories of technologies
covered are:
• Internet of Things (IoT)
• Artificial Intelligence
• Advanced Manufacturing
In addition, a short look at energy advances is included, because
without

portable

and

sufficient

energy,

unmanned

system

operations are limited.
Internet of Things (IoT)
The term “Internet of Things” was coined to describe the network
of everyday items (such as thermostats, toasters, and pet collars)
that have been enhanced with information technology and enabled
with communicative capabilities. The simplicity of the term belies
the extraordinary complexity of the reality. Billions of devices
sharing data over the internet means that tons of very granular
data can be combined to create new knowledge. Moreover, the
direct connection to each device enables a level of control that
transcends the individual component. Within the last decade, major
advancements in two fundamental technologies, sensors, and
wireless communications, have led to an explosion of the IoT.
According to SAS, there are “127 new IoT devices connected to the
internet every second” and there will be “more than 150 billion
devices connected across the globe by 2025”. Further, “the global
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datasphere will grow from 33 zettabytes in 2018 to 175 zettabytes by
2025.” (SAS, 2019)
The phenomenon of linking many small devices over very large
networks is one aspect of the IoT. There are also geographically
smaller implementations of interconnected devices that create what
can be effectively considered a swarm of minimally intelligent
elements

collaborating

for

a

larger

purpose.

One

such

implementation has been called an “internet of bodies” (IoB), where
human bodies wearables and embeddables are connected to a
network. The initial purpose of IoB has been to augment health
treatments, diagnoses, and monitoring, but once human health and
behavioral data is being shared and accessed via the greater
Internet, many possibilities emerge, including the merging of
human and machine capabilities over great distances.

Near Term IoT Technologies
According to Strativerse, a collaborative research effort that
“analyzed the capabilities of current technologies and their likely
trajectory” (L’atelier BNP, 2020), there are several technologies that
are at technology readiness levels [2] (TRL) 7 or higher that are
worthy

of

consideration.

These

include

data

marketplace,

simultaneous localization, and mapping (SLAM), and digital
twinning. Those near-term technologies are already being used in
some areas but could be more widely adopted in the coming years
as the infrastructure support for them expands.
Data marketplace is the term given to a service that allows people
to buy and sell data. Buying and selling data is nothing new but the
adoption of marketplaces to connect buyers and sellers has made
the practice more convenient and efficient. As noted by Jeremiah
Smith, data marketplaces provide the following advantages:
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• Crowdsourcing:by making self-serve data selling a reality, they
provide the solution to move away from inaccurate/expensive
single-source data.
• Aligned incentives: data owners/collectors directly benefit from
keeping data in structured form and making it available to
others.
• Standardization: by design, a marketplace defines a common
data model and interface for buyers and sellers to exchange data.
• Fairness: instead of a having a central authority pricing data,
providers can set their own prices while consumers can choose
who they buy from. (Smith, 2018)
How might this affect unmanned systems? A big effect might be
increased use of unmanned systems by individuals: smaller
operations are incentivized because it makes collecting and selling
data, even as a single person operation, possible. This incentive
makes it attractive to collect more data and to compete for buyers
on both price and accuracy. Over time, this could translate to
aggregation of data providers, making the business case for
operating large fleets of unmanned systems for the purpose of
purely commercial data collection.
Simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) is already in use
by some unmanned systems and should be expected to expand
to many more. Imagine being taken into an unfamiliar building
and being asked to draw a detailed and accurate map. You don’t
know where you are, you don’t know the dimensions of any of the
rooms or even how many there are, and you don’t know if there are
stairs or elevators. When you start drawing the map, by measuring
first what is around you and then moving outward, you are doing
simultaneous localization and mapping. Asking a human to do this
is tricky but ultimately doable, because of the experiences that
the human has accumulated over a lifespan with navigating and
mapping. Teaching a robot to do this more difficult because the
problem is inherently paradoxical: in order to know where it is, the
robot needs a map, but in order to make a map, the robot needs to
Chapter 1 Information Technology Advances, Remote ID,[1] & Extreme
Persistence ISR [Ryan] | 9

know where it is. Furthermore, as it moves, it does not know where
it is going. (Martin, 2019) (Burgard, Stachniss, Arras, & Bennewitz,
2020)
The benefits of getting SLAM right are pretty obvious: drop an
unmanned system into a danger zone and let it figure out how to
navigate. Send a robot to another planet and let it find its way
around. Launch an unmanned underwater vehicle to explore a deep
canyon. Send a drone into a cave system to explore. As the
technology matures, it will increasingly be used to assist unmanned
systems in navigation, as well as provide important real time
improvements

in

the

quality

of

data

about

our

physical

environment.
Digital twins are highly detailed computer models of actual
systems, which are different from other models in that they are
continually updated with data from the actual system so the model
reflects the current operational status accurately. The key to
successful implementations of digital twins is the data feed between
the system and the twin: the digital thread. The distinction between
the twin and the thread is time: “the digital twin is the current
representation of a product or system, mimicking a company’s
machines, controls, workflows, and systems. The digital thread
meanwhile is a record of a product or systems lifetime, from its
creation to its removal.” (Miskinis, 2018)
The benefits to unmanned systems lie in the ability to exploit
the real time aspects of the twin in order to detect and react to
challenges faster. The thread provides a way of analyzing the
longitudinal aspects of the system. For example, if “a vehicle has
an accident due to the fault of the system such as unplanned
acceleration, the digital thread through having traceability across
the lifecycle of a vehicle, will be able to identify the issue.” (Miskinis,
2018)
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Longer Term IoT Technologies
Atomic scale storage is an experimental approach to encoding
information in atoms. It is currently at TLR 4 and can only be
done in a laboratory. The promise of this technology is intriguing:
“the storage density of this memory is 500 times larger than that
of state-of-the-art hard disk drives. If perfected, this technology
could enable the manufacturing of memory cards with capacity of
62 terabytes.” (L’atelier BNP, 2020)
A synthetic doppelganger is a “realistic robot powered by
advanced artificial intelligence with the ability to emulate one’s
personality and subsequently substitute for them.” (L’atelier BNP,
2020) The idea here is that a “human brain would be scanned
and digitized, with the resulting content being fed into an artificial
neural network.” (L’atelier BNP, 2020) The application to unmanned
systems would be in using the synthetic copy to operate in places
where human bodies are not well suited, such as space or
underwater, with the full learning, deciding, and personality cues
of the original human. This technology is at TLR 3 and faces many
challenges before being realized. (L’atelier BNP, 2020)
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
The growth and promulgation of both weak and strong AI is
already evident in many aspects of our lives. The integration of
AI into unmanned systems holds a lot of promise. As noted in
Nichols (2020):
… the increasing miniaturization of electronic components, the
incorporation of alternatives to electronics, such as optics, and the
development of special purpose processors have and continue to
revolutionize the ability to squeeze capabilities into a small size
form factor. Size reduction has a lot of advantages: it can mean
lower power requirements, faster execution of computational
cycles, and less heat generation. It can also have some inherent
disadvantages,

including

less

robust

physical

components.

Protecting advanced microelectronics from directed energy
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attacks, for example, can require significantly increased shielding,
which can in turn affect overall energy requirements for flight
operations. In mission situations where energy efficiency and UAS
maneuverability are important, trade offs need to be considered in
overall system design. However, great strides have been made in
both the development of specialized processors that execute AIlike capabilities and the integration of those processors on common
chip sets. Integration of multiple special chips in a system can
provide a marked improvement in on-board intelligence (Morgan,
2019).
The integration of advanced automation, including AI, into UAS
architectures can be thought of as having several faces. First,
decision

support

systems

with

pre-programmed

rules

of

engagement can be embedded onboard the individual systems.
Next, specialized AI processors can be included as well. Naturally,
more complex AI and decision support solutions can be
implemented that rely on backend (either terrestrial or airborne)
processing for the heavy computational lifting. Finally, all of these
can be integrated together. (Nichols, et al., 2020)
There is an enormous amount of progress being made in realizing
applications of AI. Three of the emerging technologies are already
being incorporated into unmanned systems: facial recognition, gait
recognition, and gesture tracking.
Facial recognition has gained a bit of notoriety because of some
governmental

applications.

The

use

of

facial

recognition

capabilities in unmanned systems is useful for threat recognition
as well as for commercial purposes, such as urban planning.
Understanding who goes where in a city and when can be extremely
important information for city management purposes.
Abuses of human rights, however, have made it a controversial
capability. By 2019, 64 countries were using facial recognition for
surveillance purposes. (Feldstein, 2019) China in particular has
made extensive use of facial recognition in many sectors, including
“from catching criminals in huge crowds to detecting and shaming
jaywalkers to deciding whether someone can get an extra square of
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toilet paper in a public bathroom.” (Samuel, 2018) This technology
has been used in unmanned systems, with a new level of secrecy
and disguise has been reached through the development of robotic
birds for population surveillance. (Chen, 2018) “The drones have
wings that flap so realistically they’re difficult to distinguish from
actual birds. In fact, animals on the ground often can’t make the
distinction, and even real birds in the sky sometimes fly alongside
the drones.” (Samuel, 2018)
Gait recognition is less widely proliferated but of great interest to
augment facial recognition and other identification methods. Gait
recognition is based on analyzing how people walk. Even those who
have very similar faces move differently. “One promising extension
of gait recognition is to use inputs from multiple or moving cameras
… (e.g., cameras installed on drones) [to] actively detect people
behaving suspiciously by capturing pedestrians from different
viewpoints.” (Shigeki, Okura, Mitsugami, Hayashi, & Yagi, 2018)
Gesture tracking, which is a technology that captures how people
move, enables a new type of interface for computer system control.
While the early implementations of gesture-based controls relied
on instrumented gloves and other wearables, the use of computer
vision and other sensing systems has freed the human from having
to don equipment. “Gesture-based technology is already in place
and commonly used (e.g., public buildings, public restrooms)
without special instruction required for effective use. A common
example of a well-designed gestural command is the use of hands
to “wave” to activate (e.g., public bathroom faucet).” (Elliott, Hill, &
Barnes, 2016) The use of gestures to control unmanned systems
can enable a more intuitive and rich interface with the systems.
“Navigating and controlling a mobile robot in an indoor or outdoor
environment by using … hand gestures offer some unique
capabilities for human–robot interaction inherent to nonverbal
communication with features and application scenarios not possible
with the currently predominant vision-based systems.” (Stancic,
Music, & Grujic, 2017)
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Advanced Manufacturing
From creating new materials to creating new ways to use
materials, manufacturing is being affected in ways that change
many aspects of system use. Two technologies in particular are
having impacts on the use of unmanned systems: 3-D printing and
auxetic material.
3-D printing can be done in many different ways, such as adding
material incrementally to create something or incrementally
removing material to create something. Swarm 3-D printing occurs
when many small printers are connected together in a swarm.
Each part of the swarm is assigned a small task. The collaboration
makes 3-D printing of very large projects possible. (L’atelier BNP,
2020) The combination of the swarm approach to 3-D printing
with unmanned systems opens up a wide variety of potential
applications, including creating structures in remote or inhospitable
areas.
Auxetic materials are those that can “react to changes in their
physical environment” and which can act as sensors by virtue of
harnessing that change. (L’atelier BNP, 2020) Auxetic materials act
differently than normal materials: they get “wider when stretched
and narrower when squashed.” (Mir, Ali, Sami, & Ansari, 2014) They
also “possess attractive acoustic properties, and it is found that at
frequencies up to 1600 Hz auxetic forms of polymeric and metallic
foams possess enhanced acoustic absorption.” (Mir, Ali, Sami, &
Ansari, 2014) Current applications include smart bandages, which
act both as sensor for detecting when medicine is needed and as
protection for wounds. The integration of auxetic materials into
unmanned systems for enhanced resiliency and acoustic absorption
is intriguing. There is also an application of these types of materials
to create a new type of prosthetic, such as a gripper, that is “smaller,
more energy efficient and more puncture resistant.” (Chin, 2019)
Energy Sources
One never-ending challenge for automated systems of all types
is energy access and availability. Approaches to managing this
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challenge include reducing energy usage, improving energy
efficiency, and creating power sources that have a higher energy
density. Lighter weight materials in unmanned systems contribute
to energy management, as do the incorporation of renewable
energy sources in systems (such as solar panels). Advances in
energy storage technologies, such as batteries, are being made as
well.
Nuclear energy is contributing to small and portable energy
applications. A research team looking to “develop an energy source
that is both small and light, and produces more power for a longer
time” (MaterialsToday, 2009) created a battery that uses radioactive
material. The use of advanced materials for sealing and shielding
the

battery

enables

it

to

be

used

in

a

variety

of

applications. (MaterialsToday, 2009) This work has continued in
many different labs, with an expectation that commercial use of
nuclear batteries could be achieved by the mid-2020s. “The space
industry would also greatly benefit from compact nuclear batteries.
In particular, there is a demand for autonomous wireless external
sensors and memory chips with integrated power supply systems
for spacecraft. Diamond is one of the most radiation-proof
semiconductors. Since it also has a large bandgap, it can operate in a
wide range of temperatures, making it the ideal material for nuclear
batteries powering spacecraft.” (Moscow Institute of Physics and
Technology, 2018)
Concluding Thoughts
The advances made in science and engineering are important
for the future of unmanned systems. The advances in information
technologies enable more complicated operations but require more
energy. The advances in energy technology, both in energy density
and in portability, open the door for more integration of advanced
information technologies in unmanned systems. The advances in
manufacturing technologies and approaches create a rich future for
unmanned systems.
While reading the rest of this textbook, keep these advances in
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mind and imagine how what you are reading will be changed,
enhanced, or revolutionized in the coming decades.
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[1] Remote ID has two meanings in this textbook. It is used as an
information / technology device to identify people from a UAV.
This term is used in the UAS industry and the FAA as a mechanism
for identifying an aircraft type and the registrant from the ground,
essentially a digital license plate and registration.
[2] Technology readiness levels are a rating method developed by
NASA to describe where a technology is in terms of its
development. The lowest levels (1 – 3) are technologies that are
being researched, the middle levels (4 – 6) are technologies that
are being prototyped and tested, and the highest levels (7 – 9) are
technologies that are being demonstrated and used. (NASA, 2017)
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2. Chapter 2: Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles & How They
Can Augment Mesonet
Weather Tower Data
Collection [Mai]
Student Learning Objectives
The student will gain conceptual knowledge of a Mesonet, how
a Mesonet can aid in weather prediction, and how a sUAV (small
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – usually tethered up to 400 feet) can fill
in holes and create a 3D Mesonet.
The student will be able to:

1. Understand the Highlights of Mesonet Data collection selected
weather instrument(s)

2. Gain an overview of sUAV’s currently interaction with
Mesonet(s)

3. Explore future uses of sUAV’s for assisting Weather prediction.

What is a Mesonet? (Wikipedia, 2020)
Mesonet, is a network of automated weather and environmental
monitoring stations

designed

20 | Chapter 2: Unmanned Aerial
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to

observe mesoscale

meteorological phenomena. (Service, 2020) (Glickman, 2000) Dry
lines, squall lines, and sea breezes are examples of phenomena that
can be observed by mesonets. Due to the space and time scales
associated

with

mesoscale

phenomena,

weather

stations

comprising a mesonet will be spaced closer together and report
more frequently than synoptic scale observing networks, such
as ASOS. The term mesonet refers to the collective group of these
weather stations and are typically owned and operated by a
common entity. Mesonets usually record in situ surface weather
observations but
particularly

some

involve

vertical

profiles

other
of

observation

platforms,

the planetary

boundary

layer (PBL). (Marshall, (11 Jan 2016))
The distinguishing features that classify a network of weather
stations as a mesonet are station density and temporal resolution.
Depending upon the phenomena meant to be observed, mesonet
stations use a spatial spacing of 1 to 40 kilometers (0.62 to
24.85 mi) (Fujita T. , 1962) and report conditions every 1 to 15
minutes. Micronets (see microscale and storm scale), such as in
metropolitan areas such as Oklahoma City, (Basara, et al., 2011) may
be even denser in spatial resolution. (Muller, Chapman, Grimmond,
Young, & Cai, 2013)
Thunderstorms, squall lines, drylines, (Pietrycha & Rasmussen,
2004) sea

and

land

breezes, mountain

breezes, mountain
lows, mesoscale

breeze

and

valley

waves, mesolows and mesohighs, wake
convective

cyclone and extratropical

vortices (MCVs), tropical

cyclone rainbands, macrobursts, gust

fronts and outflow boundaries, heat bursts, urban heat islands, and
other mesoscale phenomena can cause weather conditions in a
localized area to be significantly different from that dictated by the
ambient large-scale conditions. (Fujita T. , 1981) (Ray, 1986) As such,
meteorologists need to understand these phenomena in order to
improve forecast skill. Observations are critical to understanding
the processes by which these phenomena form, evolve, and
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dissipate.[ This is where the sUAV comes into play – enhancing the
data collection and reduction of chaos.]
The long-term observing networks (ASOS, AWOS, Coop),1, 2
however, are too sparse and report too infrequently for mesoscale
research. ASOS and AWOS stations are typically spaced 50 to 100
kilometers (31 to 62 mi) apart and report only hourly at many sites.
The Cooperative Observer Program (COOP) database consists of
only daily reports. “Mesoscale” weather phenomena occur on spatial
scales of tens to hundreds of kilometers and temporal (time) scales
of minutes to hours. Thus, an observing network with finer
temporal and spatial scales is needed for mesoscale research. This
need led to the development of the mesonet.
Mesonet data is directly used by humans for decision making,
but also boosts the skill of numerical weather prediction and is
especially beneficial for short-range mesoscale models. Mesonets,
along with remote sensing solutions (data assimilation of weather
radar, weather satellites, wind profilers), allow for much greater
temporal

and

spatial

resolution

in

a

forecast

model.

As

a chaotic nonlinear dynamical system

the atmosphere is

(i.e. Butterfly effect), this increase in data increases understanding
of initial conditions and boosts model performance. In addition to
meteorology and climatology users, transportation departments,
energy producers and distributors, other utility interests, and
agricultural entities also have a need for fine scale weather
information. These organizations operate dozens of mesonets
within

the

US

and

globally.

Environmental, emergency

management and public safety, and insurance interests also are
heavy users of mesonet information.
In many cases, mesonet stations may (by necessity) be located in
positions where accurate measurements may be compromised; for
instance, this is especially true of the stations built for WeatherBug’s
network, many of which were located on school buildings. The
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potential bias that these locations may cause must be accounted
for when entering the data into a model, lest the phenomenon of
“GIGO”3 may occur.
Mesonets were born out of the need to conduct mesoscale
research. The nature of this research is such that mesonets, like the
phenomena they are meant to observe, are short-lived. Long term
research projects and non-research groups, however, have been
able to maintain a mesonet for many years. For example, the U.S.
Army Dugway Proving Ground in Utah has maintained a mesonet
for many decades. The research-based origin of mesonets has led
to the characteristic that mesonet stations tend to be modular and
portable, able to be moved from one field program to another.
Whether the mesonet is temporary or semi-permanent, each
weather station is typically independent, drawing power from
a battery and solar panels. An on-board computer takes readings
from

several

instruments

measuring temperature, humidity, wind speed & direction,
and atmospheric

pressure,

temperature and moisture,
deemed

important

to

and
the

as
other

mission

well

as soil

environmental
of

the

variable

mesonet, solar

irradiance being a common non-meteorological parameter. The
computer periodically saves these data to memory and transmits
the observations to a base station via radio, telephone (wireless or
landline),

or satellite transmission.

Advancements

in computer

technology and wireless communications in recent decades made
possible the collection of mesonet data in real-time. The availability
of mesonet data in real-time can be extremely valuable to
operational forecasters as they can monitor weather conditions
from many points in their forecast area.
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Figure 2.1 A weather map consisting of a station model plot
of Oklahoma Mesonet data overlaid with WSR-88D weather radar
data depicting possible horizontal convective rolls as a potential
contributing factor in the incipient 3 May 1999 tornado outbreak
Source: (Wikipedia, 2020)
Introduction
How does weather prediction work? Weather is extremely
difficult to predict. Atmospheric conditions must be compiled
around the world for a number of days monitoring such things
as changes in pressure, temperature, wind speed, and rainfall.
Weather balloons are sent up to take weather readings. Ships and
aircraft also monitor weather data. Cloud patterns are monitored
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by satellite imagery. Historical data is also used to assist prediction
by using variables of heat, air, and moisture in numerical modeling
to see how they flow over the earth’s surface.
An

examination

a

Mesonet

Data

Collection

weather

instrument(s).
A Mesonet is a network of environmental monitoring stations
designed to measure the environment at the size and duration of
mesoscale weather events. The phrase “Mesonet” is a portmanteau
of the word’s mesoscale and network. One can think of Mesonet
as the average occurring weather, not large scale, or microclimate
without being used in combination of the before mentioned inputs
to weather prediction. In this case we will concentrate on a
network made up of 10-meter towers with a set of research grade
weather and ground sensing instruments.
In Figure 2.2 a 30ft. weather tower is depicted. The instruments
spaced at 10m are: 1 – RM Young anemometer, 1 – HMP60
temperature/relative

Humidity

sensor

w/

radiation

shield.

Instruments at 2m are: 1 – RM Young anemometer, 1 – HMP60
temperature/relative Humidity sensor w/ radiation shield, 1 –
CS301 Pyranometer. Midway up the tower is a 7dbi antenna. Inside
the NEMA enclosure: 1 CR1000X data logger, 1 – RV50 Modem, 1 –
CS106 Barometer, 1 – Charge controller.
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Figure 2.2: 30’ Weather Tower
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
Businesses such as airlines and farming rely heavily upon accurate
weather

forecasting.

Forecasting

accurately

is

extremely

important in keeping track of deadly weather events. That demand
for accuracy places an emphasis on making proper predictions and
also using high quality instrumentation that is proven to be reliable
and repeatable with known calibration intervals that can be traced
to know standards. We will now make an examination of the
standard instrumentation used in Figure 2.2 top to bottom.
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Figure 2.3: 05103 Wind Monitor
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
Wind monitors, also known as Anemometers, are kinetic and
require a robustness that can tolerate all weather conditions. The
wind monitor show in Figure 2.3 is a lightweight, sturdy instrument
for

measuring

wind

speed

and

direction

in

your

harsh

environments. Its simplicity and corrosion-resistant construction
make it ideal for a wide range of wind measuring applications.
Manufactured by R. M. Young. The 05103 Wind Monitor is made
out of rigid UV-stabilized thermoplastic with stainless steel and
anodized aluminum fittings. The thermoplastic material resists
corrosion from sea air environments and atmospheric pollutants. It
uses stainless-steel precision-grade ball bearings for the propeller
shaft and vertical shaft bearings. The 05103 measures wind speed
with a helicoid-shaped, four-blade propeller. Rotation of the
propeller produces an AC sine wave that has a frequency directly
proportional to wind speed. The AC signal is induced in a transducer
coil by a six-pole magnet mounted on the propeller shaft. The coil
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resides on the non-rotating central portion of the main mounting
assembly, eliminating the need for slip rings and brushes. Wind
direction is sensed by the orientation of the fuselage-shaped sensor
body, which is connected to an internal potentiometer. The data
logger applies a known precision excitation voltage to the
potentiometer element. The output is an analog voltage signal
directly proportional to the azimuth angle. (Campbell Sci, 2020)
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Figure 2.4: HMP60 temp/relative Humidity
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
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Figure 2.5: HMP60 temp/relative Humidity w/ radiation shield
Source:(Campbell Sci, 2020)
The HMP60, manufactured by Vaisala, probe measures air
temperature for the range of -40° to +60°C, and relative humidity
for the range of 0 to 100% RH. It uses the INTERCAP® capacitive RH
chip. This field-replaceable chip eliminates the downtime typically
required for the recalibration process.[4] (Campbell Sci, 2020)

Figure 2.6: CS301 Pyranometer
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
The CS301 uses a silicon photovoltaic detector mounted in
a cosine-corrected head to provide solar radiation measurements.
Its dome-shaped head prevents water from accumulating on
the sensor head. To eliminate internal condensation, the sensor
head is potted solid and the cable is shielded with a rugged
Santoprene casing. The CS301 is calibrated against a Kipp &
Zonen CM21 thermopile Pyranometer to accurately measure sun
plus sky radiation. (Campbell Sci, 2020)
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Figure 2.7: CR1000X Datalogger
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
The CR1000X is a low-powered device designed to measure
sensors, drive direct communication and telecommunications,
analyze data, control external devices, and store data and programs
in on-board, non-volatile storage. The electronics are RF-shielded
and glitch-protected by a unique sealed, stainless-steel canister. A
battery-backed clock assures accurate timekeeping. The on-board,
BASIC-like programming language—common to all Campbell
Scientific data loggers—supports data processing and analysis
routines. The CR1000X wiring panel includes two switchable 12 V
terminals, analog grounds dispersed among 16 analog terminals, and
non pluggable terminal blocks for quick deployment. (Campbell Sci,
2020)
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Figure 2.8: CS106 Barometer
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
The CS106 uses Vaisala BAROCAP silicon capacitive sensor to
measure barometric pressure. It is encased in a plastic shell (ABS/
PC blend) fitted with an intake valve for pressure equilibration.
The CS106 outputs a linear signal of 0 to 2.5 Vdc, which allows
the barometer to be directly connected to a Campbell Scientific
data logger. An internal switching circuit allows the data logger to
power the CS106 only during measurement, which reduces power
consumption. (Campbell Sci, 2020)
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Figure 2.9: NEMA Enclosure
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
Note: The Datalogger, Barometer, Charge Controller, and Modem
are housed within the NEMA.
The ENC16/18 is a weather-resistant enclosure that is 16 inches
wide and 18 inches tall. It can house a data logger, a power supply,
and at least one peripheral. This enclosure is recommended for
applications that need to have multiple communication or
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measurement and control peripherals housed in the same
enclosure. (Campbell Sci, 2020)
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Figure 2.10 TE525 Rain Gauge
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
The TE525 funnels precipitation into a bucket mechanism that
tips when filled to its calibrated level. A magnet attached to the
tipping mechanism actuates a switch as the bucket tips. The
momentary switch closure is counted by the pulse-counting
circuitry of our data loggers. (Campbell Sci, 2020)

Figure 2.11: CS655 TDR Soil Moisture and Temperature
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020)
The CS655 consists of two 12-cm-long stainless-steel rods
connected to a printed circuit board. The circuit board is
encapsulated in epoxy and a shielded cable is attached to the circuit
board for data logger connection.
The CS655 measures propagation time, signal attenuation, and
temperature. Dielectric permittivity, volumetric water content, and
bulk electrical conductivity are then derived from these raw values.
Measured signal attenuation is used to correct for the loss effect
on reflection detection and thus propagation time measurement.
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This

loss-effect

correction

allows

accurate

water

content

measurements in soils with bulk EC ≤8 dS m-1 without performing a
soil-specific calibration.
Soil bulk electrical conductivity is also calculated from the
attenuation measurement. A thermistor in thermal contact with a
probe rod near the epoxy surface measures temperature. Horizontal
installation of the sensor provides accurate soil temperature
measurement at the same depth as the water content. Temperature
measurement in other orientations will be that of the region near
the rod entrance into the epoxy body. (Campbell Sci, 2020)

Figure 2.12: 107 Temperature probe
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020)
The 107 is a rugged, accurate probe that measures temperature
of air, soil, or water from -35° to +50°C. It easily interfaces with
most Campbell Scientific data loggers and can be used in a variety
of applications. The 107 consists of a thermistor encapsulated in
an epoxy-filled aluminum housing. The housing protects the
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thermistor, allowing you to bury the probe in soil or submerge it in
water. (Campbell Sci, 2020)
Additional Components in the Weather Ground Station part of
the sUAV ecosystem
Additional components needed are: A rugged modem such as a
Raven RV50 w/ 4g antenna, Solar panel(s) based on power demand,
deep cycle 12Vdc battery for power storage, and a charge controller
for power management.
The above components are by no means the limit to the type
and style of sensors and hardware that can be added to a Mesonet
tower. However, they will acquire the basic data, moisture, wind
speed and direction, temperature, relative humidity, barometric
pressure, solar radiation, used in recording data.
A tower by itself would not be good enough to do any type of
weather prediction. Even combined with multiple towers they are
only good enough to record the weather at each point at any given
time. As a Mesonet increases its number of towers they become more
valuable. As stated before, the data collected on its own is only a
record. If used in conjunction with the other forms and types of
weather data collection, only then can weather prediction become
possible. Even then, many holes could be filled by more towers
creating more data collection points. The only way to be 100%
accurate in weather prediction is to be omniscient or collect data
on every square inch of the earth. Which we all understand that is
economically unfeasible and a temporal impossibility.
Billions of dollars are spent each year in the recording and
prediction of the weather to save lives, assist businesses and help
the public with their individual daily activities. The collection of
more data can only assist in that goal. But just more data is not the
only requirement. Understanding that data and making inferences
to establish a prediction is most important. So how do we interrupt
the weather?
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If a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, could it really cause a
hurricane in Texas?
That’s more or less a spoof on the mathematics of Chaos
Theory.[5] (Roulstone, 2013) To be more specific that is how we
determine weather patterns. The mathematics of the known laws
of motion are not good enough to predict weather. The movement
of weather is so complicated it requires the use of a computer
to develop models of probability. Even if you change the initial
conditions only slightly the end conditions are wildly different
resulting in Chaos. This is where Chaos theory becomes involved.
By using contributing factors of weather, we do have models on
how these variables behave. If a perfect weather prediction is
impossible, then better computer computations and as many
possible data points sampled would be the best we as humans can
expect to strive towards. This is the point sUAV’s could help in
increasing sampling points and predictive of severe weather
events.
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Figure 2.13 120m Tethered UAV on windy weather, cable feeder,
400VDC
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020)
To work with a Mesonet, a Tethered sUAV could be added and
create a 3D Mesonet. Power and data could flow thru the wiring
acting as a tether. This would also provide stability and retrieval.
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Figure 2.14: Automatic Winch to Control Tether Retrieval
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020)

Figure 2.15: Tether Power Pak
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020)
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Oklahoma Mesonet
The following abstract focuses on the efforts of the Oklahoma
Mesonet and their efforts to design and build a 3D Mesonet with
the aid of UAV’s. At the time of this writing the author is aware
of only the Oklahoma Mesonet making significant funded efforts to
use sUAV’s in their operations.
Fixed monitoring sites, such as those in the US National Weather
Service Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) and the
Oklahoma Mesonet provide valuable, high temporal resolution
information about the atmosphere to forecasters and the general
public. The Oklahoma Mesonet is comprised of a network of 120
surface sites providing a wide array of atmospheric measurements
up to a height of 10 m with an update time of five minutes.
The deployment of small, unmanned aircraft to collect in-situ
vertical measurements of the atmospheric state in conjunction with
surface conditions has potential to significantly expand weather
observation capabilities. This concept can enhance the safety of
individuals and support commerce through improved observations
and short-term forecasts of the weather and other environmental
variables in the lower atmosphere.
We report on a concept of adding the capability of collecting
vertical atmospheric measurements (profiles) through the use of
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) at remote Oklahoma sites deemed
suitable for this application. While there are a number of other
technologies currently available that can provide measurements of
one or a few variables, the proposed UAS concept will be expandable
and modular to accommodate several different sensor packages
and provide accurate in-situ measurements in virtually all-weather
conditions. Such a system would facilitate off-site maintenance and
calibration and would provide the ability to add new sensors as they
are developed, or as new requirements are identified. The small
UAS must be capable of accommodating the weight of all sensor
packages and have lighting, communication, and aircraft avoidance
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systems necessary to meet existing or future FAA regulations. The
system must be able to operate unattended, which necessitates
the inclusion of risk mitigation measures such as detect and avoid
radar and the ability to transmit and receive transponder signals.
Moreover, the system should be able to assess local weather
conditions (visibility, surface winds, and cloud height) and the
integrity of the vehicle (system diagnostics, fuel level) before
takeoff. We provide a notional concept of operations for a 3D
Mesonet being considered, describe the technical configuration for
one station in the network, and discuss plans for future
development.
Future uses of sUAV and Weather stations
As the use of UAV’s in a 3D Mesonet configuration are perfected,
these same applications can be moved into situations were
atmospheric gases can be sampled and quantified. For example,
controlled burns in the central US could be monitored by mobile
and tethered UAV’s carrying smoke canisters. The particulates from
the smoke canisters can be quantified then statistically equated
to the imagery of the satellites. This would allow for a close
approximation to the amount of biomass consumed and the amount
of CO and CO2 released into the atmosphere. This technology
could be used on forest fires, oil field fires, and volcanic eruptions to
quantify the number of particulates and greenhouse gases released.
It would allow operators to stay at a safe distance while gathering
data. A sonic anemometer could be used during the study to verify
background CO2 flux and other trace gases. Done correctly, this
could lead into xo-atmospheric research.
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Figure 2.16: Smoke study
Source: (Randall, Mai, author courtesy of KSU/WDL)
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Figure 2.17: Sonic Anemometer
Source: (Tethered Pictures, 2020)

Conclusions
Civilization has come a long way since first trying to predict the
weather. For example: Red sky at night sailors take delight and red
sky in the morning sailors take warning. This revels clouds position
of clouds at sunrise and sunset. We now have very sophisticated
instruments that can take very exact readings. But those readings
cannot act alone in a vacuum. And they are forever changing and
changing immediately. So, the only way humans can improve
weather prediction is to increase the number of readings and the
profile of those readings. And then the never-ending task of making
inference as to what all that data means. As we push into AI and
things such as Quantum Computers we can solve more quickly the
interruption of massive amounts of data. However, physically we
will have to push the envelope on how to sample the never-ending
pool of data the weather presents. Tethered and even mobile UAV
can assist by carrying atmospheric sensors to improve the profile
that we call weather and eventually climate.
Student Think Questions
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1. Where might we find a valuable place to deploy Tethered
UAV’s?
2. How can we assure powering a UAV in its role as a Tethered
UAV package?
3. How would you design a request for funding for a Tethered
UAV?
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3. Chapter 3 Tour de Drones
for the Discerning Palate
[Nichols]
Student Objectives
To enjoy the range of UAS and UUV technologies by shared
stories. At Olive Garden© they call it a “Tour de Italy” This chapter
is a “Tour de Drone for the Discerning Palate.” Through stories and
vignettes, UAS and UUV world are further discovered.
Introduction
In our three previous textbooks, the authors covered the whole
spectrum of UAS / CUAS technologies. (Nichols R. K., et al.,
2020)(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition,
2019)(Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) Every day since our publication
have come to market, news about UAS and CUAS technologies have
emerged in as many publications and media. In this textbook (4th
textbook in the series) the authors have added the unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) as technologies based on many of the
same autonomous principles working in a different medium. This
chapter highlights some of the interesting finds since February
2020 publication of ground-breaking textbook on CUAS. (Nichols,
et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and
Operations, 2020)
Suspicious Drones?
On 3 August 2020, an interesting poster was received from the
Chief of Security at KSU regarding identification of suspicious
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). It was CISA’s Office of Bombing
Protection. (Bombing, 2020)
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Figure 3.1 is aimed at the protection of national critical
infrastructure but has elements common to civilian facilities and
personnel protections from a wide variety of threats.
Figure 3.1 Recognize Suspicious UAS

Source: (Bombing, 2020)
The poster shows several interesting items:
Indicators of Suspicious UAS Activity
• Repeated unauthorize flights
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• Suspected reconnaissance, such as repeated flyovers or
prolonged hovering at low altitudes,
• Testing facility security protocols by flying in sensitive areas to
observe the reaction of security personnel (Bombing, 2020)
Easy Acronym – DRONE
Detect all available elements of the situation; attempt to locate
and identify the individuals operating the drone ( look at windows,
balconies, roof tops)
Report the incident to local LEO and FAA Regional Operations
Center.
Observe the UAS and maintain visibility of the device, look for
damage or injured individuals.
Notice Features: Identify the type of device ( fixed wing/ multirotor), size, shape, color, payload, and activity
Execute appropriate security actions. (Bombing, 2020)
Grounded UAS
Treat a suspicious grounded UAS as a potential explosive threat!
(Treat as an IED) (Bombing, 2020)
Figure 3.1 is aimed at / designed for personnel protecting our
national critical infrastructure. However, it is just as useful for
determining UAS privacy invasions, drug flow and delivery,
fraudulent delivery from retailers, residential property casing,
stalking, child exploitation, and robberies to name a few
possibilities. Treating every downed UAS as an IED is a bit over the
top (perhaps) however, better to be cautious because one mistake
could cost lives. One the key features of the poster is the
“navigation lights taped over or removed” observation. This disabled
safety feature can be seen – especially at night – for quite a distance
or approximately 500 feet elevation. This is a serious indicator that
the UAS is suspicious. (Bombing, 2020)
Cops, Drones and Nudes
50 | Chapter 3 Tour de Drones for the Discerning Palate [Nichols]

From Minnesota comes a strange story. On 31 July 2020 cops in
Minnesota flew a drone over a public beach to see if they could
spot some exposed females – and then sent seven officers down
to ticket topless sunbathers. (Cole, 2020). In response to dozens
of complaints regarding nudism, alcohol and drug use, the Golden
Valley Police Department used a drone to find people in the nude
at Twin Lake, a public beach that’s secluded but popular with locals
who want to let it “hang out a little.” The city defended the police
citing Covid-19 concerns. The drone was used to “avoid unnecessary
face-to-face interactions and the data was used for documentation,
evidence collection, and prosecution if need and deleted as soon as
possible.” (Cole, 2020)
An ordinance from the Minnesota Park and Recreation Board
states that “no person 10 years of age or older shall intentionally
expose his or her own genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female
breast below the top of the areola, with less than a fully opaque
covering in or upon any park or parkway.” (Cole, 2020) (PRBC, 2020)
[1] The ordinance has been attacked by a coalition LGBT civil rights
activists as discriminating. The author of the article chided the
Golden Valley Police Department in her conclusions: “ The fact
that the police department—especially around Minnesota, one of
the cities at the center of protests against police brutality this
year—would break out the most over-the-top means of surveillance
and enforcement they could, shouldn’t be surprising.” (Cole, 2020)
All this over a drone!
28,300 feet
Inspired by the 1924 expedition of George Leigh Mallory and
Andrew ‘Sandy’ Irvine, National Geographic is working on a
documentary titled ‘Lost on Everest.’ Mallory’s remains were found
in 1999, but Irvine’s body is still missing. It remains a mystery as
to whether the team actually reached the summit before their
unfortunate deaths. If they did, it would have been long before
Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay reach the top of Mount Everest
in 1953. A team from National Geographic surveyed Mount Everest
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with a drone at 28,300 feet putting the unmanned aircraft in
uncharted territory. They flew the drone as high as 28,300 feet or
8,625 meters, just shy of the summit of Mount Everest, which is
at 29,000 feet or 8,840 meters, flying the Mavic 2 into ‘uncharted
territory.’ Mark Sinnott and Renan Ozturk from National Geographic
renewed the search for Irvine’s body and brought with them a DJI
Mavic 2 to survey the terrain. With the drone, the team was able to
capture sweeping landscape views and close-up photos of key areas
of Mount Everest (Figures 3.2, 3.3) (Kesteloo, 2020) [2]

Figure 3.2 National Geographic Climbing Team with Mavic 2
Drone
Source: (Kesteloo, 2020)
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Figure 3.3 Key Search area of Mt Everest
Source: (Kesteloo, 2020)
Turtles
From Mt Everest , we fly 8,313 km (5,165.5 miles) to the Great
Barrier Reef. Researchers at Raine Island, the world’s largest green
turtle rookery, have used a drone to conduct accurate population
surveys, with stunning results. Drone vision captured in December
2019 as part of the Raine Island Recovery Project showed up to
64,000 green turtles around the island waiting to come ashore and
lay clutches of eggs. (See Figure 3.4.) Dr Andrew Dunstan from the
Department of Environment and Science (DES) and lead author of
the paper said researchers had been investigating different ways
of conducting turtle population surveys. “New scientific research
published on Monday 8 June in PLOS ONE found that drones, or
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), were found to be the most
efficient survey method,” Dr Dunstan said. “Previous population
survey methods involved painting a white stripe down the green
turtles’ shell when they were nesting on the beach. The paint is nontoxic and washes off in a couple of days. “From a small boat, we then
counted painted and non-painted turtles, but eyes are attracted
much more to a turtle with a bright white stripe than an unpainted
turtle, resulting in biased counts and reduced accuracy. “Trying to
accurately count thousands of painted and unpainted turtles from
a small boat in rough weather was difficult. Using a drone is easier,
safer, much more accurate, and the data can be immediately and
permanently stored.” The drone vision was analyzed, frame by frame
in the laboratory, reducing observer error and allowing accurate
counts on painted and unpainted turtles. “The ratio of unpainted
and painted turtles allowed us to estimate the total population for
last December to be 64,000 green turtles waiting to nest on the
island,” Dr Dunstan said.
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Figure 3.4 Raine-Island-turtle-aggregation
Source: Raine-Island-turtle-aggregation2.-credit-Great-BarrierReef-Foundation-and-Queensland-Government-min (1).jpg
“By using drones, we have adjusted historical data. What
previously took a number of researchers a long time can now be
by one drone operator in under an hour.” “This research is of prime
importance to the understanding and management of the
vulnerable green turtle population, according to Dr. Dunstan.” (USA
weekly, 2020) [3]
Aerobatic Drone
From counting sea turtles’ eggs, we turn our heads to getting air
sick as a passenger (not the pilot) in the first manned aerobatic
drone flown by the Drone Champions League (DCL). The Drone
Champions League (DCL) has been captivating audiences since 2016
with the world’s best pilots of quadcopter racing in head-to-head
battles flying drones that can reach speeds of over 160 km/h. It
is recognized as the World Championship of professional drone
racing. Pilots are chosen by being the best players of the “DCL -The
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Game” video game. The game can be played by anybody at home,
giving everyone the chance to qualify for real-life drone racing
events by playing in the DCL Draft Selection.
Now, Drone Champions AG, the creators of the Drone Champions
League and DCL – The Game, have revealed their latest innovation:
the world’s first manned drone capable of aerobatic maneuvers such
as loops and rolls. It was invented by Herbert Weirather, the Drone
Champions founder and CEO of DCL. (Steffen, 2020) See Figures 3.5
-3.7.
Dubbed the “Big Drone,” the aircraft is a full-sized, carbon fiber
airframe that has six arms protruding from an aerodynamically
faired chassis. Each arm has a pair of coaxial rotors mounted at the
end. There is a middle seat to carry a passenger, not a pilot. The Big
Drone was designed to be flown from the ground by professional
drone racing pilots over a remote control. (Steffen, 2020)
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Figure 3.5 “Big Drone” by DCL
Source: (Steffen, 2020)

Figure 3.6 “Big Drone” by DCL (2)
Source: (Steffen, 2020)
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Figure 3.7 “Big Drone” by DCL (3)
Source: (Steffen, 2020)
A very cool flying machine!
Swarm Farming
In our textbook on CUAS we consider drone SWARMS a
dangerous threat. (Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Technologies and Operations, 2020) However, what if we
could use it for improving our agricultural outputs. Swarm farming
is the concept of using multiple smaller robotic platforms to
autonomously conduct farming operations as a substitute to large
manned agricultural equipment. (See Figures 3.8 & 3.9) Now, rural
agricultural communities have large sections of farmlands and large
equipment, which can rapidly cover acres for planting, nutrition,
pesticide, and harvesting operations (sometimes involving multiple
operations for nutrition and pest control). During a growing season,
limited days suitable to work are available to timely complete the
specific operation without penalty on yield and profitability.
(Precision AG , 2020)
Key drivers for the motivation in swarm farming include
decreasing number of people engaged in agriculture, sustainable
crop production methods for environmental sustainability, potential
negative effects from soil compaction when using larger ag
equipment, increasing size of farming operations, and rising average
age of U.S. farmers. (Precision AG , 2020)
When it comes to substituting current large equipment with
swarm farming, one of the key qualifiers is going to be comparative
system productivity and accuracy. There are probably dozens of
different types of robotic platforms which have been designed in
Europe and the U.S. Some examples include Robotti by Agrointelli,
Tertil by Franklin robotics, OZ, and DINO by Naio technologies,
TerraSentia by Earthsense, AVO and ARA robots by Ecorobotix, DOT
by Raven Autonomy, SwarmFarm Robotics, and BoniRob by
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Deepfield Robotics. Platform sizes vary from small robots to do
scout activities, medium sized for operations like weeding, and
some large enough to conduct multi-row operations like spraying
and seeding. (Precision AG , 2020)
Most of the robotics platforms currently in sight are standalone
with a future vision to operate as swarms. The majority of these
robotic platforms are light enough to just conduct non-soil
engaging activities, whereas only a few can do soil engaging
activities. These platforms are currently shown to operate on crops
with low canopy heights (vegetable and fruits), with few exceptions
like vineyards. (Precision AG , 2020)
However, there are very few options for row crop operations
requiring operation on substantially large acreage, greater draft,
and weight transfer. Another interesting facet is that not all of these
robotic platforms have been designed with full considerations on
implementations or application systems to be utilized in the realworld. Today’s producers use a lot of technology, automation,
automatic machine data, and not to mention, the human
intelligence sitting inside the machine. One question we need to ask
ourselves as stakeholders in the industry is, are farmers ready to
provide a practical switch?

(Precision AG , 2020)

Currently, there are a handful of swarm farming concepts which
are being explored. Robotic platforms, like ones from Swarmfarms,
DOT, Naio, Guss and others, are examples of how swarm robots
could become reality. Personally, I feel the biggest hurdle we need
to cross is the ability of such robotic platforms to operate as a
fleet or implement swarm farming on large acres in a representative
manner. (Precision AG , 2020)
Swarm farming definitely has some foreseeable advantage, if this
swarm fleet becomes fully autonomous in operation over larger
fields. Personally, I see two biggest advantages. One, a fully
integrated system can reduce operational time spent by farm
owners on and off the machines and continuous optimization using
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machine learning, Two, the automatic decision-based applications
using artificial intelligence, data assimilation, and aggregated data
availability for analytics are strong assets. Swarm has the ability
to operate on its own, detect and communicate faults, automatic
reloading of operational boundaries if one platform is down, and
many more. (Precision AG , 2020)
The big dream is that platforms within swarm farming will have
capability to operate nearly 24/7, but the question is, how far are we
from that reality? (Precision AG , 2020)

Figure 3.8 Swarm Farming -Spray Operations
Source: https://www.silicon-saxony-day.de/
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Figure 3.9 Swarm Farming – Land Survey Operations
Source:

https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficheiro:Aerial_View_-

_Landschaft_Markgr%C3%A4flerland1.jpg
COVID-19
It is an understatement that Covid-19 pandemic has affected
millions of lives globally. However, a company called SkySkopes is
doing something positive in the midst of chaos.
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are being studied as tools to
fight the novel coronavirus. (See Figure 3.10 sprayer for disinfectant)
The UAS will be used to disinfect large public areas and to deliver
supplies. In Grand Forks, N. Dakota, SkySkopes, a UAS flight
operator that serves a wide variety of industries; the Center for
Innovation at the University of North Dakota (UND); and a number
of other companies are engaged in a study to determine how drones
can be used to accomplish these tasks. (Zimmer, 2020)
SkySkopes is also testing the use of thermal sensors that are
positioned in stationary locations above research participants. The
sensors detect elevated temperatures and help ensure that an
individual is healthy enough to return to work. Like Syracuse-based
drone startup EagleHawk, SkySkopes is determining what methods
can be used to disperse disinfectant effectively and on a large scale.
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Since mid-March, the company has been making test runs, spraying
public playgrounds using nozzles and tanks. The only substance
SkySkopes has sprayed outdoors is water. When its UAS have been
used indoors, they have sprayed a solution of 3 percent hydrogen
peroxide and 97 percent water. (Zimmer, 2020) [4]
SkySkopes is also developing procedures for drone pilots and
visual observers to travel to and from a site, and to clean
instruments before, during and after use, and take measures to
inform and protect the public. SkySkopes CEO Matt Dunlevy said
that reconsidering the use of drones during the pandemic requires
identifying new precautions and protocols. (Zimmer, 2020)

Figure 3.10 SkySkopes Covid-19 Disinfectant sprayer drone
Source: (Zimmer, 2020)
“One of our biggest questions is what we will need to do to
discourage crowds who want to observe our work from forming. We
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do not want to exacerbate community spread as we disinfect public
spaces,” said Dunlevy. (Zimmer, 2020)
Dunlevy added that while playgrounds are not the only target
site being considered, they are good locations to conduct research.
“We’re using them to learn how to disinfect many other objects and
areas, including vehicles, the outsides of different types of buildings,
park equipment, and indoor spaces such as movie theaters and
gymnasiums,” said Dunlevy. (Zimmer, 2020)
Fortunately, playgrounds are ideal for study because they contain
a number of complex elements that can indicate how to tackle
similar areas in other outdoor workplaces. For instance, SkySkopes
has a number of clients in the energy industry, where ladders and
platforms are present, and crowds are unavoidable for project
executions. (Zimmer, 2020) (See Figure 3.11 SkySkopes Playground
Test Area)

Figure 3.11 SkySkopes Playground Test Area
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Source: (Zimmer, 2020)
Dunlevy explained that smaller areas could be disinfected with a
single payload of liquid carried on the drone and released by “one
fell swoop” of a drone pilot. Larger areas could be disinfected with
liquid drawn from a tank on the ground by an assistant, carried
to the drone by a tube, and sprayed out of a nozzle attached to
the tube. A tank-and-hose combination could also be effective at
disinfecting the underside of elements like monkey bars. The drone
could fly under the play structure and turn the nozzle to spray
disinfect upwards.
Currently, SkySkopes is running thermal sensor tests with
Infrared Cameras Inc.’s Optical Gas Imaging camera, which is made
with components by FLIR Systems, Inc., on DJI’s Zenmuse XT.
SkySkopes expects real-life use of the sensors could involve
mounting the device on the wall of a hospital or care facility, with
an employee standing under the device to take a reading. (Zimmer,
2020)
“Right now, we’re just testing out use of that on the ground.
We are only testing it on SkySkopes employees and research
participants. As for nozzles for drone spraying, we are testing out a
combination of different spray nozzles and tanks. We’re borrowing
heavily from already-proven techniques in agriculture,” said
Dunlevy. (Zimmer, 2020)
Mark Askelson, a professor of atmospheric sciences and executive
director of the Research Institute for Autonomous Systems (RIAS) at
the University of North Dakota, is assisting with the study. Askelson
said the studies indicate that a spray of very small drops of
disinfecting liquid would likely limit the fluid’s ability to kill the virus.
“The smaller the droplet, the faster it evaporates. That is the reason
SkySkopes is out there under different conditions to determine how
drop size, wind speed, and direction affect coverage,” said Askelson.
Askelson noted that determining the “residence time” of droplets of
cleaning fluid is important to determine whether the drops stay on
the surface of an object long enough to kill the virus. (Zimmer, 2020)
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HAPS UAV – Stratospheric Test Flights
In our CUAS textbook, we covered the failed promises of HAPS
technology using UAVS. (Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Technologies and Operations, 2020) However, there is
progress.
HAPSMobile has successfully completed the fourth test flight of
its Sunglider solar-powered high-altitude pseudo-satellite (HAPS)
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The test flight took place at
Spaceport America in New Mexico, and its completion marks the
conclusion of all basic aircraft tests for the aircraft. HAPSMobile will
now begin preparations for stratospheric test flights. (UST Weekly
eBrief, 2020) (See Figure 3.12)
During this round of testing, Sunglider reached altitudes higher
than those of previous flights and maintained high altitudes for a
long duration. Other test milestones included flight speed changes,
steep turns, automated flight control in the event of interrupted
communications with the Ground Control System, and in-flight
balance control. (UST Weekly eBrief, 2020)
HAPSMobile has constructed a new specialized test site at
Spaceport America, providing an additional facility to the existing
test site on the Hawaiian island of Lanai. Spaceport America offers
flexibility

in

coordinating

test

flight

schedules,

providing

opportunities to conduct test flights with greater frequency and
more freedom to conduct various types of tests. HAPSMobile also
plans to conduct stratospheric test flights at Spaceport America.
(UST Weekly eBrief, 2020)
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Figure 3.12 HAPS Sunglider
Source: (UST Weekly eBrief, 2020)
Drones to Deliver Organ Transplants
Drones are slated to be the ideal technology to deliver organs
to transplant patients—and a test program could soon make this
premise a reality. Dr. Joseph Scalea, transplant surgeon at the
University of Maryland Medical Center, is working with a group
of researchers to explore if drones are a suitable method for
transporting organs . The team recently concluded a series of 14 test
flights that demonstrate the potential for drones to work as organ
couriers. (Greenwood, 2019)
The team used a DJI M600 Pro drone for the experiment. See
Figure 3.13. Its six motors lie directly below their respective
rotors—and further away from its cargo, a smart cooler that contains
an organ, reducing the organ’s exposure to heat from the robot’s
motors. The team also designed a wireless biosensor that measures
the organ’s temperature, barometric pressure, altitude, vibration,
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and GPS location while it is being transported. Finally, the team
used a kidney that was not a viable transplant to test its drone.
(Greenwood, 2019)

Figure 3.13 DJI M600 Pro for Organ Transplant
Source: (Greenwood, 2019)
The results, published by the IEEE, show the test was a success.
[5] Biopsies of the kidney before and after the flight showed it
remained undamaged. The temperature of the kidney remained at
a stable 2.5°C, the air pressure matched the altitude, and the drone
flew up to 67.6 kph. The kidney was even subjected to marginally
fewer vibrations than it would have been exposed to on a fixed wing
plane. (Greenwood, 2019)
Organs do not last very long outside the body, which means they
must get to their intended recipients as soon as possible—often on
short notice, making every second critical. But the current organ
transport system relies on couriers, commercial airline schedules
and expensive charter flights. Any delay or mistake during this
process

could

mean

the

organ

loses

its

effectiveness—or
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deteriorates so much that it cannot be used at all. (Greenwood,
2019)
These costs and mistakes could be reduced by using drones. “It
will be faster and cheaper and more predictable,” said Scalea. There
are regulatory obstacles to overcome. The FAA strictly enforces
limits on drone use, but the agency is planning to make changes
based on data from 10 pilot programs—two of which plan to
transport medical supplies. Those changes would make it possible
for drones to make the organ transportation system—which supplies
organs for more than 30,000 transplants a year—faster and more
efficient. “Drones really work for this purpose,” said Scalea.
(Greenwood, 2019) See Figure 3.14.

Figure 3.14 Organ Transplant coming in for landing at Hospital
Source: (Greenwood, 2019) https://spectrum.ieee.org/image/
MzE3NTIwOA.gif
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Robot Trucks?
The author is all for expanding the uses of drones in the
transportation theater. But Robot trucks? Respectfully, this is a
horrible idea. Living near a major trucking thoroughfare in
Pennsylvania with 50+ huge trans-shipment / storage complexes
off I-81 /, where real semi-trucks going North and South at a rate
100,000 + per hour along with triple that number in regular cars
moving about 70 mph pile up the accidents (many fatal) every single
day. This is with drivers that understand human nature, road rage,
tailgating and impaired drivers have an advantage. Add to this mess
robotic, autonomous, computer algorithm-based vehicles with lots
of momentum and weight, portends a huge risk to public
transportation. [6]
However, TuSimple, a self-driving startup with operations in the
U.S. and China,[7] is opening what it calls the world’s first
“Autonomous Freight Network,” a highway corridor stretching over
1,100 miles from Phoenix to Houston for its robot trucks to haul
loads in a technology partnership with UPS, U.S. Xpress, Penske
Truck Leasing and Berkshire Hathaway. The project involves the San
Diego-based company’s fleet of 40 self-driving semis (with human
safety drivers in the cab), new proprietary software for TuSimple
and its customers to monitor their on-road performance and
location data, high-definition digital route maps and freight
terminals at strategic locations.
TuSimple will haul revenue-generating loads for UPS and
foodservice McLane as well as new customer U.S. Xpress on routes
throughout the network–with Penske helping to maintain the
trucks–and the partner firms can learn how to integrate robotic
trucks into their operations. (Ohnsman, 2020)
If all goes as planned, TuSimple will expand the network from Los
Angeles to Jacksonville, Florida, along U.S. Interstate-10 by 2022 and
then start operating Level-4 self-driving truck services across the
U.S. by 2023. “The network is the first of its kind to address how
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you can bring autonomy to the market at scale,” TuSimple President
Cheng Lu tells Forbes. (Ohnsman, 2020)

Figure 3.15 TuSimple Autonomous Truck
Source: (Ohnsman, 2020)
Can you be sued for flying a Drone over Private Property – The
New Tort Law
The draft of the proposed tort law relating to drones, due to be
discussed by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) soon, is out – and
drone operators should be paying very close attention. What is Tort
Law, and Who is the ULC? Why is this new Tort law important to
drone owners?
The definition of “Tort,” according to the Cornell Legal
Information Institute, is “an act or omission that gives rise to injury
or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts
impose liability,” and the point of a tort law is “to provide relief
to injured parties for harms caused by others, to impose liability
on parties responsible for the harm, and to deter others from
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committing harmful acts.” That relief, says the Institute, is typically,
“damages in the form of monetary compensation.” (McNabb, 2019)
The ULC, by their own definition, “provides states with nonpartisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.” ULC
is proposing a tort law relating to drones, which would give
homeowners the right to sue drone operators for flying over their
private property under certain conditions. (McNabb, 2019) See
figure 3.16.

Figure 3.16 Drone footage over a private house and barn
Source: (McNabb, 2019)
Background on the Tort Law Relating to Drones – Draft One
The first draft of the tort law drew nearly universal condemnation
from the drone industry. According to one expert “If the draft Act
became law, the mere presence of a drone in the airspace up to
200 feet over private property would be, by definition, injuring the
landowner and committing aerial trespass. Essentially, the draft Act
does not recognize a distinction between a drone which harasses
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the property owners by hovering feet from a window and a drone,
operated by a certificated professional, hovering one foot inside a
neighbor’s property line to snap a photo of an adjacent property.”
That draft received many comments from drone industry
stakeholders and failed to pass when the ULC met to discuss it.
(McNabb, 2019)

The New Draft
The new draft does attempt to address some of the issues found
in the first draft: for example, it creates a more narrow definition
of aerial trespass that includes the terms “substantial interference
with the use and enjoyment of the property,” and defines
“substantial interference.” The new draft also includes clauses about
the accidental or unavoidable landing of a drone on private property
and specifies that landowners must return a drone that lands on
their property to the operator. This proposal has such potential to
materially impact legitimate drone operation that it behooves drone
operators to take the time to educate themselves. (McNabb, 2019)
See additional quoted verbiage below from the new proposed ULC
draft Tort law relating to drones. (McNabb, 2019)
Definition of “Airspace Intrusions” from the draft:
SECTION 5: AIRSPACE INTRUSIONS.
(a) An aerial trespass occurs when a person intentionally and
without consent of the landowner operates an unmanned aircraft in
the airspace over the landowner’s property and by so doing causes
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the property.
(b) The determination of whether an unmanned aircraft’s
operation over property has caused substantial interference with
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the use and enjoyment of property shall be based upon a review of
the totality of the circumstances, including:
(1) The amount of time the unmanned aircraft was operated over
the landowner’s property.
(2) The altitude at which the unmanned aircraft was operating.
(3) The number of times unmanned aircraft have been operated
over the property.
(4) Whether the unmanned aircraft recorded or captured audio,
video, or photographs while in operation over the property.
(5) Whether the landowner has regularly allowed operation of
unmanned aircraft over the property.
(6) Whether the operation of the unmanned aircraft caused
physical damage to persons or property.
(7) Whether the operation of the unmanned aircraft caused
economic damage.
(8) The time of day the unmanned aircraft was operated over the
landowner’s property.
(9) Whether an individual on the land saw or heard the unmanned
aircraft while it was over the property; and,
(10) The operator’s purpose in operating the unmanned aircraft
over the property.
(c) Repeated or continual operation of an unmanned aircraft over
a landowner’s property shall not give rise to prescriptive rights in
the airspace
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Definition of “Intrusions on Land”:
SECTION 6: INTRUSIONS ON LAND.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who, without
permission, intentionally lands an unmanned aircraft on the land of
another, or who intentionally causes an unmanned aircraft to come
into physical contact with a structure, plant life, or individual on the
land of another, commits a trespass to land.
(b) A trespass to land does not occur under subsection (a) when:
(1) the unmanned aircraft operator is forced to land the unmanned
aircraft because of unexpected circumstances that reasonably
justify such a landing; or,
(2) the unmanned aircraft malfunctions or otherwise touches
down upon the surface of the land because of weather or other
factors beyond the operator’s control.
(c) A person asserting the privileges provided in subsection (b) is
liable for any damage caused by the unmanned aircraft’s operation.
(d) Regardless of how an unmanned aircraft came to rest upon
the property of another, the owner or operator of the unmanned
aircraft has a right to recover the unmanned aircraft upon a request
to the owner of such property. A landowner shall not unreasonably
refuse a request to return the unmanned aircraft or to permit the
unmanned aircraft’s operator to recover the unmanned aircraft
from the property.
Definition of “Violations of Privacy”:
SECTION 8: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT AND VIOLATIONS OF
PRIVACY.
(a) Privacy related civil actions may be based upon the operation
of an unmanned aircraft.
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(b) A determination of whether an unmanned aircraft’s operation
over property was used to violate a privacy-related right shall be
based upon a review of the totality of the circumstances, including:
(1) Whether by hovering or repeated flights the unmanned aircraft
was likely to have provided the operator with the opportunity to
use the unmanned aircraft to view, listen to, record or capture by
camera, microphone or other device, individuals who were present
at that place and time; and,
(2) Whether the operator made statements or took other overt
actions indicating a desire to use an unmanned aircraft to infringe
upon rights of privacy recognized in this state.
The full draft of the proposed Tort law on drones (which is still
being

debated)

can

be

obtained

at

this

link:

https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/
march-2019-committee-meetingdraf-1?CommunityKey=2cb85e0d-0a32-4182-adeeee15c7e1eb20&tab=librarydocuments (McNabb, 2019)
Drone owners should take note of above. This may be the
restrictive direction that drone tort law is heading.
GPS Interference crashes drone in UK – Ligado debate rages
Staying on the trend of legal interest, the next story is about GPS
interference crashing a survey drone in the US. An expensive drone
crashed into a house in December when it lost GPS signals due to
interference, according to an accident investigation by the United
Kingdom. The drone, a DJI M600 Pro was surveying a construction
site when the mishap occurred. The DJI M600 Pro can weigh as
much as 34lbs (15.5kg) and is listed at $5,699 on the vendor’s
website. (Goward, 2020)
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According to D.A. Goward ( (Goward, 2020), The mishap has given
added impetus to those in the United States opposed to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) decision to allow Ligado
Networks to transmit on a frequency near to that of GPS. U.S.
government tests have shown that high precision GPS receivers, like
those used on some survey drones, may not have reliable signals
whenever they are within 3,400 meters (2+ miles) of a Ligado
transmitter. Drones with less precise, general purpose GPS
receivers could be impacted within 1,040 meters (.6 miles).
Drones with unreliable GPS can wander into areas they are not
allowed and eventually crash. The larger and heavier the drone, the
more dangerous this can be. Most commercial drones are less than
100 lbs (45kg), though some models can weigh in at 200 lbs (90 kg)
or more. While drones are supposed to remain within the line of
sight of the operator, when GPS navigation is lost, many enter an
“attitude mode.” This results in the aircraft maintaining its height
above the ground and its wings level using on-board barometric
and inertial sensors. It cannot hold its position over the ground
though, without GPS and so will drift with the wind. Unless the
operator takes manual control right away the drone can drift out of
the operator’s sight. That usually also means it is unable to receive
radio commands sent by the operator. (Goward, 2020)
This is precisely is what happened in this case, according to the
UK’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Board’s report. A survey of a
construction site by drone was in its second day. The first three
flights were without incident. On the fourth flight the drone took
off and reached about 65 feet above the ground. The pilot’s
controller then showed a GPS compass error. At that point, the
drone stopped climbing and began drifting away in the wind at
about 15 miles per hour. The pilot repeatedly selected the “return
home” function to no avail before the aircraft flew beyond a line of
trees and was out of sight. It hit the roof of a home several hundred
yards beyond the trees and crashed in the backyard. (Goward, 2020)
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After notifying police of the missing drone, the pilot prepared
another drone to search for the lost one. However, shortly after
takeoff, the controller again showed a signal‑interference error
message and the pilot immediately landed it. The accident report’s
analysis cites signal interference with GPS as cause of the
malfunction of the drone that crashed and the second one that
was to look for it. It says the source of the interference was not
identified. The report also observes that serious injury or death
could have resulted. (Goward, 2020) The report indicates:
“… analysis indicated that a mass of more than 2 kg falling from
the roof of the house could have resulted in a serious or even fatal
injury to people if they had been struck. The aircraft mass, at 12.8 kg,
was well in excess of this figure and therefore it is very likely that
serious injuries would have occurred even if the person struck was
wearing a hard hat for protection.” (Goward, 2020)
Aviation interests in the United States had for years opposed
the FCC granting Ligado Networks’ application. Despite this and
the formal and strong opposition of the executive branch of
government, the FCC approved Ligado’s request in April. The FCC’s
approval of Ligado Network’s application has not silenced
opposition. Rather it has caused opposition to spread across many
industries and sectors. Vocal opponents now include agricultural,
maritime, vehicle and industrial interests.
Legislation is under consideration in Congress that would cause
the FCC’s decision to be re-examined and prevent the Defense
Department from doing business with any company that interferes
with GPS signals. Some proposals would put a hold on the FCC’s
approval. While the drone mishap in the United Kingdom can be
seen as a relatively minor event, as a portent of things to come, it is
MIGHT [8] have a huge impact in the United States. (Goward, 2020)
Time to move from air to sea – specifically UUVs.
Autonomous Underwater Glider
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Teledyne Marine’s Slocum G2 Glider autonomous underwater
vehicle (AUV) has completed a four-part circumnavigation of the
Atlantic Ocean that lasted for over four years. The glider, named
Silbo, covered a total of 22,744 km and spent approximately 1,273
days at sea. The trip is the first such journey to ever be undertaken
by an AUV. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates
Atlantic Ocean, 2020) See Figure 3.17
Over the four legs of its journey, Silbo interacted with
international science teams from several countries, and collected
scientific and critical engineering data for a variety of programs.
During its three stops, the glider received repairs to a scratched
hull, an external cleaning, and a fresh set of batteries, and required
no other maintenance. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider
Circumnavigates Atlantic Ocean, 2020)
Following a factory upgrade to install an extended energy bay and
thruster in preparation for its voyage, Silbo was launched in the
early spring of 2016 from Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The first leg of
its journey took it from Cape Cod to Ireland, covering a distance
of 6557 km in 330 days. While in Ireland, Silbo participated in a
Glider Training session hosted by the Marine Institute and P&O
Maritime Services, Galway. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider
Circumnavigates Atlantic Ocean, 2020)

Figure 3.17 Teledyne Marine’s Slocum G2 Glider autonomous
underwater vehicle (AUV)
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Source: (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates
Atlantic Ocean, 2020)
On the second leg, Silbo travelled from Ireland to the Canary
Islands, covering 3695 km in 178 days, and participated in a “glider
school” at the research facility Oceanic Platform of the Canary
Islands (PLOCAN) and the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
(ULPCG). The third leg lasted 418 days, taking Silbo from the Canary
Islands back across the Atlantic to St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands,
gliding 6256 km. Supported by staff and students from University
of the Virgin Islands (UVI), St. Thomas, Teledyne technicians
recovered, re-batteried and re-deployed Silbo in less than 24 hours.
(Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates Atlantic
Ocean, 2020)
Silbo’s fourth and final journey from St. Thomas began on July 18,
2019 and concluded on June 29, 2020 south of Martha’s Vineyard,
completing the final 6236 km trek in 348 days. During this transit
Silbo spent three months flying a butterfly pattern south of
Bermuda contributing data to Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study
(BATS). Silbo then joined the Gulf Stream, becoming the season’s
first storm glider as Tropical Storm Arthur passed directly over
the glider. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates
Atlantic Ocean, 2020)
During this circumnavigation, Silbo collected hurricane data,
corrected current models, and provided close to 5000 CTD
(conductivity,

temperature,

and

depth)

casts

that

aided

meteorological forecasting. With partners from Rutgers University
and its student base, UVI, PLOCAN, UGCLP, the Marine Institute,
and others, Silbo also participated in the Challenger glider mission.
Silbo has also been used as a test bed for many new engineering
hardware and software features for both existing and next
generation Slocum gliders. Recent legs have provided data on new
battery configurations, advanced software, and techniques for
piloting long endurance missions and minimizing biofouling. (Ball,
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Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates Atlantic Ocean,
2020)
Very cool![9]
New Autonomous Guard USV
Author Mike Ball gives us another cool view. This time for a new
autonomous Guard USV unveiling.
A design for a new unmanned surface vessel (USV) concept,
created by Sea Machines and a consortium of partners including
C-Job Naval Architects, LISA Community, Seazip Offshore Service,
Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN) and eL-Tec
Elektrotechnologie, has been unveiled. The Autonomous Guard
Vessel (AGV) is designed to provide a small, lighter, and more
efficient alternative to current manned guard vessels used to
protect maritime and offshore operations such as wind farms and
cabling routes. (Ball, New Autonomous Guard USV Unveiled, 2020)
See Figure 3.18.

Figure 3.18 Sea Machines USV Concept
Source: (Ball, New Autonomous Guard USV Unveiled, 2020)
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The AGV can continuously monitor nearby marine traffic visually
as well as via radar and AIS (automatic identification system) data,
taking measures to secure the area in order to avoid collisions
and damage to offshore infrastructure. The USV will attempt
communications with any vessel that approaches the area,
providing information on how to safely navigate the area as well as
physical escort away from the site. The encounter will be recorded
to provide video footage in case of any violation or accident. (Ball,
New Autonomous Guard USV Unveiled, 2020)
As the autonomous platform does not require an onboard crew,
it is considerably smaller than equivalent manned guard vessels.
This lowers the operational cost and also allows it to be sustainably
powered by batteries, which can be recharged via a charging
station. This station can be moored independently or connected
to existing onsite equipment, such as an offshore transformer
platform. Depending on the situation, charging could be performed
either via a cable connection to the on-site equipment, or locally
generated using renewable fuels. (Ball, New Autonomous Guard
USV Unveiled, 2020)
The consortium envisions that a typical offshore site will require
a number of AGVs, which can take turns in monitoring the area and
recharging. In addition to autonomous operation, remote control is
also being considered for the vessel, in order to deal with situations
that require human intervention. The AGV would be connected to
a command center on a mothership or at a shore-based location,
where a human operator will control the AGV remotely to ensure
correct action is taken. In addition, all data collected by the AGV will
be sent to the command center. (Ball, New Autonomous Guard USV
Unveiled, 2020)
Frank Relou, business development manager at Sea Machines,
stated: “Smart vessel technology will have the most significant
initial impact on small workboats, such as this guard vessel. The
development of autonomous technology for vessel operations are
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occurring on an international level but namely in niche segments,
such as the guard vessel and other examples, currently operating in
(with supervised autonomy), marine survey, fire, patrol, aquaculture
and offshore wind operations[10].” (Ball, New Autonomous Guard
USV Unveiled, 2020)
Protecting Undersea Cables – A National Security Priority
Nadia Schadlow and Brayden Helwig [11]of Defense News (opinion)
present a compelling national security case for protecting data
transiting via underseas cables. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Data is arguably the most important strategic asset to emerge
in the 21st century. Access to data and the ability to protect its
integrity are vital to American security and prosperity. As 5G and
artificial intelligence transform our societies into highly integrated
networks, protecting data will become even more crucial. In recent
years, American efforts have focused on preventing Huawei, the
party-controlled Chinese telecommunications giant, from gaining
ground as the world’s largest supplier of 5G infrastructure. But
defending a less understood part of our digital infrastructure —
undersea fiber-optic cables — should be an equal priority. Without
the approximately 750,000 miles of cables that crisscross the
world’s oceans, our interconnected, digitally driven societies would
be unable to function. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
In 1858, when the first submarine cable was installed, sending a
message across the Atlantic took nearly 18 hours. Today, the fastest
undersea cables can transfer data at speeds upward of 25 terabytes
per second — more than twice the amount of data generated by the
Hubble Space Telescope each year.
Undersea

cables

make

instant

communications

possible,

transporting some 95 percent of the data and voice traffic that
crosses international boundaries. They also form the backbone of
the global economy — roughly $10 trillion in financial transactions
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are transmitted via these cables each day. And undersea
infrastructure is not just for civilian use. The U.S. government relies
on cables to transmit information. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
America’s competitors consider undersea cables strategically
significant. Tapping undersea cables could provide foreign leaders
with valuable intelligence, while severing cables could slow
communications between the U.S. and its NATO allies significantly
— perhaps by even months. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Data can also be siphoned from undersea cables. This is most
easily done during the cable manufacturing process, when
backdoors could be inserted to collect information. Similar
vulnerabilities exist at onshore landing stations, where cables
connect to terrestrial networks. Cables can be tapped at sea, though
this is relatively difficult to do. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Russia and China have developed capabilities in these areas.
Russian

submarine

activity

near

undersea

cables

is

well-

documented: The Yantar, a Russian spy ship, carries mini
submersibles that can either sever or tap them. Russian activity
often clusters around crucial, yet hard-to-reach cables because
these are difficult to repair. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Chinese officials view control of undersea infrastructure as part
of a broader strategic competition for data. One official Chinese
Communist Party outlet explained that “although undersea cable
laying is a business, it is also a battlefield where information can
be obtained.” Huawei Marine, a Huawei subsidiary, is a major player
in the undersea cable industry. The company has built or repaired
almost a quarter of the world’s approximately 400 submarine cables.
But American officials worry that cables laid or serviced by the
company may be accessed by the Chinese government. In 2019,
amid increasing scrutiny from the U.S. and its allies, Huawei sold
its subsidiary to Hengtong Optic-Electric, a Chinese fiber and cable
manufacturer. But the sale failed to alleviate national security
concerns: Hengtong’s director and founder is a Chinese government
official. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) China could also integrate
undersea cable disruption into its military strategy. Last year, a
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Taiwanese think tank warned that in the early stages of a Chinese
invasion of the island, the People’s Liberation Army may sever
Taiwan’s undersea cables, isolating it from the U.S. and regional
allies. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Protecting undersea cable infrastructure must become a priority
for U.S. officials and lawmakers. According to Schadlow and Helwig,
there are several steps they can take to address the problem.
First, the U.S. government should take more responsibility for
repairing undersea infrastructure. Currently, cable repairs are
considered a commercial responsibility, rather than a national
security concern. Classifying cable repairs as matters of national
security and developing a public-private operational plan — that
includes a division of resources — to repair them is one step toward
reducing the response time to a disruption or an attack. (Schadlow
& Helwig, 2020)
Second, as a 2017 report from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence suggested, the U.S. should push for stronger
protections for undersea infrastructure in international law,
including criminalizing attacks on submarine cables. These efforts
should be coordinated closely with America’s allies, especially those
in Europe and East Asia. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Third, telecommunications companies must better secure cable
infrastructure against potential attacks. Companies such as Google,
Microsoft, Facebook, and Amazon now own or lease nearly half the
world’s undersea bandwidth. Companies could begin by securing
cable landing stations, while investing in technologies that detect
and deny undersea espionage. The executive branch could consider
tax incentives to spur these steps. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020)
Finally, the Trump administration should sound a louder alarm
on Huawei Marine. In order to reduce or prevent the exfiltration
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of data, telecommunications companies should be required to use
undersea infrastructure from verified suppliers. At the very least,
owners of data transmitted this way should be aware of the
undersea path their data is taking — and potential vulnerabilities.
Ultimately, undersea cables help keep Americans connected,
prosperous and safe. Protecting them from sabotage and espionage
is a vital national security interest of the United States. (Schadlow &
Helwig, 2020)
Navy

Large

Unmanned

Surface

and

Undersea

Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress
Although too large to summarize in this chapter, the author would
like to bring to attention a report to congress by Ronald O’Rourke,
Specialist in Naval Affairs entitled: Navy Large Unmanned Surface
and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, R45757.
It can be found at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf
(O’Rourke, 2020)
This report provides background information and potential issues
for Congress for three types of large unmanned vehicles (UVs) that
the Navy wants to develop and procure in FY2021 and beyond:

• Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs).
• Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs); and
• Extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs).

The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to
shift the Navy to a new fleet architecture (i.e., a new combination
of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed than
the Navy’s current fleet architecture. The Navy is requesting $579.9
million in FY2021 research and development funding for these large
UVs and their enabling technologies. (O’Rourke, 2020)
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify
the Navy’s acquisition strategies and FY2021 funding requests for
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these large UVs. The Navy’s proposals for developing and procuring
them pose a number of oversight issues for Congress. Congress’s
decisions on these issues could substantially affect Navy capabilities
and funding requirements and the shipbuilding
and UV industrial bases. (O’Rourke, 2020)
In addition to the large UVs covered in this report, the Navy also
wants to develop and procure smaller USVs and UUVs, as well as
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various sizes. Other U.S. military
services are developing, procuring, and operating their own types
of UVs. (O’Rourke, 2020) The O’Rourke is a treasure trove of USN
design, architecture, and strategic information.
Drone Sightings: The Actual Non-Hyped Numbers Analyzed
On Linkedin via sUAS News, a solid report by Jonathan Rupprecht
popped up on 5 August 2020 exposed the disinformation, double
counting and misinformation about drone sightings based on
analyses of six (6) years of reported data from FAA and local
government data / reports. It is an eye-opening report! (Rupprecht,
2020) Here is a summary of findings:
Background
For years and years, many have been talking about the FAA’s
drone sightings reports. The drone sightings reports have been
cited many times by the news media and elected officials who were
rather alarmed about the data. Others in the industry cite the drone
sightings as evidence of the greater need for the government(s)
to do something by creating regulations. Some counter-drone
companies have used it to show a need for their product. Others
say it is hype and the sightings data is greatly flawed and overblown
because after all, they are only sightings, not impacts.
Regardless of where you come from in the industry and your
motives, we need to accurately understand the drone sightings
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data. The report critically considers the growth of drone sightings,
where they typically are located, and whether the data is alarming
as many have said. (Rupprecht, 2020)
Quick Summary of the Drone Sightings:

• The reported drone sightings over time are NOT growing. They
are decreasing.
• The FAA has inaccurately reported on the drone sightings data
and this is proven by their own data they released(more on
that later).
• There are more drone sightings reported in populated areas
than unpopulated areas.
• There are more drone sightings reported in warmer months
than colder months.
• States with larger populations have more reported drone
sightings.
• There are more medium or large animal impacts with manned
aircraft than mere reported drone sightings.
• Any discussions we have on this topic should be using numbers
and not just percentages or words. (Rupprecht, 2020)

Basically, population and weather/climate are the determining
factors of when and where you will have drone sightings. The data
also shows that we are past a peak in sightings and they are
currently consistently decreasing. But how many of these sightings
are verified sightings of drones and not white balloons, seagulls,
etc.? (Rupprecht, 2020)
How many of these reported sightings are of drones actually
flying unlawfully, dangerously, or nefariously? Is there like a giant ?
face on the drone that tells you it is bad? A drone being flown by a
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good guy and one being flown by a bad guy are extremely difficult
to tell apart. (Rupprecht, 2020)
What Does the Word “Sighting” Mean?
Sightings are just that….mere sightings. A pilot, person on the
ground, law enforcement officer, etc. sees a drone and reports it to
the FAA. It gets logged. The drone could be lawfully flying, safely
flying, carelessly flying, or flying with criminal intent. It is all lumped
into one thing – a sighting.
“The accuracy of the reports cannot be verified. You could report
you saw a drone all you want. No one can check. It is literally a giant
hearsay list. And here is a very thought-provoking question….is
there any way we can prevent people who would stand to benefit
from higher drone sighting numbers from calling in false sightings?
Who is to stop the FAA employees, FAA contractors, people working
in counter UAS industry, or manned pilots from calling in more
sightings that cannot be verified? Who is to stop over reporting
where anything just gets reported as a drone?” (Rupprecht, 2020)
“Keep in mind that 18 U.S.C. 1001 makes it a criminal offense to
make false statements to the FAA so many will be deterred from
doing that. Some of the reports have identifiable information so
they are not really anonymous and less likely to false report. On the
other hand, the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General’s
Office does investigate FAA officials for illegal activity and police
arrest people all the time for fraudulent activity.” (Rupprecht, 2020)
“Provide what weight you will to the sightings. We are in a
predicament. There is no evidence to prove that any of those groups
reported falsely, but there is also no evidence to prove that
everyone reported truthfully AND accurately. We need to be
balanced in approaching this data.” (Rupprecht, 2020)
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The rest of the Rupprecht report analyzes data from multiple
FAA and LEO publicly available sources available from 2014. All the
resources are available for the reader to follow the threads so
engaged.
Skyborg and Boeing’s Loyal Wingman Drone Projects
Let us end our palate tasting with two of the newest CUAS Drone
programs from the USAF.
First up is Skyborg. It is USAF’s future AI fleet. According to
analyst Harry Lye, The US Air Force is flying at supersonic speeds
towards an AI-enabled fleet. Under project Skyborg’s direction,
future fighter jets will not be supported by a wingman, but by an
unmanned combat aerial vehicle. Harry Lye finds out more about
the unmanned wingman of the future. (Lye, 2019)
Finger four has been the dominant fighter aircraft formation since
the 1930s. The world’s most advanced fighter jet, the Lockheed
Martin F-35, costs around $100m per jet. Four of these in formation
means almost half a billion dollars of hardware in the air (not
including the per hour cost of flying them). Losing just one fighter
would be catastrophic for the US Air Force’s budget. (Lye, 2019)
The US Air Force’s (USAF) project Skyborg aims to address this
cost risk by replacing some of these expensive fighter jets with
more affordable unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) acting as
unmanned wingmen.
Teaming up with drones
Under the project, the Kratos-built XQ-58 Valkyrie drone will
team up with the F-35 and F-15EX, cutting the number of highly
valuable fighters in the air, as well as cutting costs and risk to human
life. See Figure 3.19. At a cost of a few million dollars per unit, the
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autonomous Valkyrie drones are more easily replaceable, and could
form a central role in the USAF’s air power. The F-35 is billed as a
force-multiplier; when partnered with a Valkyrie it could get a new
capability boost. (Lye, 2019)
Skyborg program manager Ben Tran explained the significance
of the program: “There is heavy investment by our near-peer
adversaries in artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy in general.
We know that when you couple autonomy and AI with systems like
low-cost attributes, that can increase capability significantly and be
a force multiplier for our air force. The 2023 goal line is our attempt
at bringing something to bear in a relatively quick time frame to
show that we can bring that kind of capability to the fight.” (Lye,
2019)
With Skyborg the manned aircraft is the center of the network,
with the drones augmenting around it. Think of the fighter as
Skynet and the Valkyrie UCAV as the T-100, only with added wings
and less Arnold Schwarzenegger. AI will govern the autonomous
wingman, reading telemetry, flight plans and weather, all the while
acquiring targets and supporting the manned aircraft. (Lye, 2019)
Cultural questions facing the air force
If an autonomous combat drone is to act as a wingman who pulls
the trigger? The US, UK, and Russia have pushed against the UN
trying to ban autonomous killing machines, which gives a clue to
where the Pentagon is currently leaning.
“With the adoption of autonomous systems becoming imminent,
armed forces will need to confront serious ethical issues. On the
one hand, it makes sense to give the drone trigger control. A pilot in
an F-35 performing counter-maneuvers to avoid an enemy fighter
may not have time to pull the trigger. On the other, if an AI system
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accidentally fires at a civilian site who is held accountable?” (Lye,
2019)
The pilot, of the networked fighter, or someone higher up the
staffing chain. The US Air Force has not said it plans to give the
Skyborg drones control of any weapons systems, but this could be
regarded as the natural evolution of the system in the future.

Figure 3.19 Kratos-built XQ-58 Valkyrie Drone
Source: (Lye, 2019)
Boeing Loyal Wingman Drone
Finally, we end this chapter with the Boeing Loyal Wingman
Drone. The Royal Australian Air Force has its first Boeing-built
drone-jet hybrid prototype, which will use artificial intelligence to
conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions to
supply fighter pilots with more information during a conflict.
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The company delivered its first “loyal wingman” prototype to
Australia this week (7 May 2020); it is expected to be used in tandem
with fourth- and fifth-generation fighters on the battlefield,
officials said in a release. See Figure 3.20. (Pawlyk, 2020)

Figure 3.20 Boeing Loyal Wingman Drone
Source: (Pawlyk, 2020)
It is also the first aircraft “to be designed, engineered and
manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years,” Boeing said,
adding that it is the company’s “largest investment in an unmanned
aircraft outside of the United States.” (Pawlyk, 2020)
The aircraft, which Boeing is co-developing with the government
of Australia, was unveiled at the Avalon Airshow last year. Australia
is investing roughly $40 million into the program, CNN reported.
The jet is 38 feet long and can fly more than 2,000 nautical miles,
according to its fact sheet. (Pawlyk, 2020)
It uses artificial intelligence “to fly independently or in support
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of manned aircraft while maintaining safe distance between other
aircraft, the fact sheet states. The first prototype was constructed
using digital engineering concepts, allowing developers to simulate
parts via computer models, according to the company.
The concept is similar to an ongoing U.S. military effort. The U.S.
Air Force has been working to develop its own “Loyal Wingman”
program,

featuring

unmanned

fighters

that

could

think

autonomously sent out alongside F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, for
example, to scout enemy territory ahead of a strike, or to gather
intel for the aircraft formation. In January 2020, the Air Force
conducted test flights of the XQ-58A Valkyrie drone at Yuma
Proving Ground, Arizona, taking the unmanned aerial vehicle, made
by Kratos Defense, to higher altitudes than previous tests. (Pawlyk,
2020)
Conclusions
We end our tour de force having traveled through a palate of air
and sea stories which should indicate to the student the diversity,
complexity, technological growth, and ubiquitous nature of the
unmanned industry. Definitely tip of the spear. No homework or
discussion questions. Build your own library of information “Bullets”
on UAS , UUV and UGT systems.
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4. Chapter 4 Underwater
Autonomous Navigation &
Other UUV Advances
[Mumm]
Student Learning Objectives
The student will gain knowledge of the concepts and framework
as it relates to how underwater vehicles navigate as well as explore
the current and proposed advances in the unmanned underwater
vehicle (UUV) arena.
The student will be able to:
• Understand the basic navigation techniques used to operate in
underwater environments
• Gain an overview of how UUVs can safely operate around ports
and manned vehicles.
• Consider new technologies being developed for use in UUVs
and how that may impact UUV future uses
• Examine the direction of UUV technology to assist in exploring
its intended and unintended uses and the consequences of
these uses on the ocean and humankind.
History of Undersea Navigation-What is it, and Why Does it
Matter?
The ability to navigate using roads, bridges coupled with maps,
Global Positioning System (GPS), and the ability to see where to go
are all modalities that are limited if not unavailable to underwater
vehicles. We take for granted that we can see and sense our
surroundings, even at night we simply turn on a light to illuminate
our path. Underwater environments do not enable the use of so
Chapter 4 Underwater Autonomous
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many modalities, and thus, submarines and UUVs are quite literally
navigating blindly most of the time. Unlike other forms of
transportation and movement, most submarines and UUVs do not
have windows. These vehicles must rely on sensors to guide their
path to and from a destination. Near the surface, sailors can use
a periscope, which was invented in 1902 by Mr. Simon Lake.
Periscopes “are long tubes that have mirrors inside. The mirrors
reflect images so sailors can see above the water.” (Joanne, 2019)
Modern-day submarines use a “fiber optic imaging mast (which)
sits in the sail outside the hull and sends electronic images to the
crew…No periscope makes the hull of the ship stronger because it
does not need to have an opening to poke through.” (Joanne, 2019)
Sonar, which is short for sound, navigation, and ranging, detects
undersea objects by transmitting powerful sound waves through the
ocean and interpreting the returning signals that bounce off objects.
Sonar systems have two modes, active and passive,
“In active sonar, the system emits a pulse of sound, and then the
operator listens for echoes. These sonar waves can be varied in
frequency and strength in order to allow it to distinguish targets of
interest, and sonar can be used as a means of identification of an
object as well as offering the submarine or UUV the ability to have
its own unique identifier. In passive sonar, the operator listens to
sounds emitted by the object one is trying to locate” (Discovery of
Sound in the Sea, 2020).
The challenge with active sonar is that by sending out continuous
signals through the water, the position of the submarine or UUV can
be easily determined. Passive sonar systems simply listen without
sending out active signals as “Ships, submarines, marine mammals,
and fish all make noise, and this noise can be used by passive Sonar
systems to locate them, in much the same way humans use their
ears to locate someone speaking in a room (Discovery of Sound in
the Sea, 2020).
Submarines and UUVs use “inertial guidance systems use
gyroscopes to track the sub’s motion from a fixed starting point.
These systems are accurate for up to 150 hours of operation. Then
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they must be realigned with surface navigation systems such as
GPS, radar, or satellite.” (Joanne, 2019). Figure 4.1 illustrates a typical
gyroscope used in inertial navigation systems.

Figure 4.1: Traditional Gyroscope
Source: (Joanne, 2019)
A gyroscope is a wheel or disk mounted to spin rapidly around an
axis that is free to turn in various directions. (Joanne, 2019).
A ships inertial navigation systems (SINS) can detect a change
in the submarines geographic position (a move east or north, for
example), a change in its velocity through the water (speed and
direction of movement) and a change in its orientation (rotation
about an axis). It does this by measuring the linear acceleration
and angular velocity applied to the system. Since it requires no
external reference (after initialization), it is immune to jamming and
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deception. (Navigating a Submarine: Time and Navigation-The
Untold Story of Getting from Here to There, 2020).
An inertial navigation system (based on Newton’s second law) is
made up of several gyros with accelerometers connected to one or
more computers. The initial coordinates (location on the planet) are
programmed in at dockside, and the inertial navigation systems is
aligned before the submarine is launched. Once the sub is launched,
the inertial navigations systems senses the acceleration and
movements and reports this information to the computer that can
calculate to within one to two nautical miles where the submarine
is at on the planet. Generally, an accuracy of 1–2 NM should be
acceptable with an accuracy of 1 NM (nautical mile) in 24 hours being
a reasonable navigational drift error rate. The submarine can also
surface to update its GPS fix or use any landmarks to correct its last
known position. (Nobahari, 2017).
USS Alabama has three navigations systems, as seen in Figure
4.2. The three systems are the “ship’s inertial navigation system
(SINS), a Loran-C receiver, and a Transit satellite receiver system
for correcting the inertial system. It has since been fitted with a
GPS receiver and the Trident II navigation system.” (Navigating a
Submarine: Time and Navigation-The Untold Story of Getting from
Here to There, 2020).
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Figure 4.2: Parts of the USS Alabama Navigation System
Source: (Navigating a Submarine: Time and Navigation-The
Untold Story of Getting from Here to There, 2020)
Minute errors in the measuring capabilities of the accelerometers
or in the balance of the gyroscopes can introduce large errors into
the information that the inertial guidance system provides. These
instruments must, therefore, be constructed and maintained to
strict tolerances, carefully aligned, and reinitialized at frequent
intervals using an independent navigation system such as the global
positioning system (GPS) (Inertial guidance system, 2020).
Current inertial navigation systems, such as those used on
commercial jetliners, booster rockets, and orbiting satellites,
calculate their turning rates measured by ring laser gyroscopes (see
Figure 4.3) or by fiber-optic gyroscopes. These laser gyroscopes
can be purchased on the open market for less than four thousand
dollars. (Inertial guidance system, 2020).
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Figure 4.3: Ring Laser Gyroscope
Source: (Inertial guidance system, 2020).
Active motorized precision laser ring gyroscope for inertial
navigation system (Laser Ring Gyroscope for Inertial Navigation
System , 2020)
Historically, there have always been navigational issues with
submarines and the underwater environment. UUV navigation has
been particularly hampered due to power requirements and the
overall difficulty of communication signals/wave forms traveling
through the water, in addition to interpreting caverns and signal
instability or interruption from ocean sea life. With the introduction
106 | Chapter 4 Underwater Autonomous Navigation & Other UUV
Advances [Mumm]

of smaller, more efficient inertial navigation systems, GPS “suitable
satellite

communications,

compact

antennas,

more

capable

underwater sensors, and powerful digital information processing,
many other barriers to implementing quite ambitious UUV
capabilities have fallen away” (Whitman, 2002). Some UUVs are now
using fixed acoustic transponders to assist in triangulating position.
A new acoustic navigation system was developed to determine
the position and speed of moving underwater objects such as divers
and underwater vehicles. The path of an object and its speed were
determined by the Doppler shifts of acoustic signals emitted by a
transmitter placed on the object and received by four hydrophones
installed at the periphery of the monitored body of water. The
position and speed measurements were affected by errors mainly
caused by acoustic reflections (returns) from the water body
boundaries and surface reverberations. (Ostrowski, 2020).
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracted with Penn State
Applied Research Lab to research and build enabling technologies
for sonar-based continuous subsea autonomous navigation for
manned and unmanned submarines. The joint effort is called the
Advanced Broadband Navigation Sonar System Future Naval
Capabilities program, and its main goals are to “improve undersea
position and velocity estimation using sonar to give Navy manned
submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) enhanced
navigational performance.” (Keller, 2019)
Navigation capabilities can also be improved with exteroceptive
sensors (optical or sonar) that identify specific landmarks in the
environment and use them to localize the UUV. If a map is available,
this approach is known as map-based localization. When no map is
available, AUVs can perform simultaneous localization and mapping
(SLAM), in which the vehicle concurrently builds a map of relevant
features and uses it to navigate. (Petillot, 2019).
The challenge facing UUVs is they will need to operate and
navigate autonomously; the data collected must be accurate,
reliable, and reusable. Using techniques such as SLAM “to help in
autonomous navigation, namely in unstructured environments and
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when the initial information is poor’ in this technique, the robot
constructs a coherent map of its environment while, at the same
time, determines its location within that same map.” (Ana Rita Silva,
2019).
This SLAM method can be used to inform and integrate into
“Terrain‐aided navigation (TAN), a form of geophysical localization
where physical features of the seabed are exploited to localize an
AUV within an a priori digital elevation model (DEM), or bathymetric
reference map.” (Salavasidis, 2019).
As the navigation of UUVs moves from past technologies and
techniques into the future, “The accuracy and reliability of
navigation information are one of the guarantees for AUV’s
successful execution…and the SINS/ Doppler velocity log (DVL)
integrated navigation method can provide continuous and accurate
navigation information for autonomous underwater vehicles”
(Wang, 2020). However, this navigation method may contain large
error or can be inaccurate when certain “beam measurements are
inaccurate or outages for complex underwater environment… a
novel tightly integrated navigation method composed of a SINS,
a DVL, and a pressure sensor (PS) is proposed, in which beam
measurements are used without transforming them to 3-D velocity”
(Wang, 2020).
The ability to navigate underwater was created for manned
systems. In the new frontier of UUVs, precision navigation by both
manned and unmanned systems must be able to operate
autonomously, alongside of and ultimately integrate with each other
resulting in a safe and exciting future.
Advancements in the UUV Arena
Previously UUVs had limited technology available to them, this
lack of advanced technology forced simplicity. With the focus now
on multiple autonomous systems working in concert with each
other and the integrated use of UUV with manned systems and
“the sophistication and complexity of these new technologies have
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attendant risks. Future strategic submarine navigation development
requires attentive observance to ensure that the real benefits of
affordability

are

realized

by

the

insertion

of

new

technologies” (Vajda, 1998)
In examining technology maturity models for the UUV arena,
the examination quickly reveals that the technology is truly in its
infancy state. As the model in Figure 4.4 indicates, simple
automation is step one, and this is now being demonstrated with
UUVs; however, UUVs are a long way off from being trusted
independent, self-governing, with minimal human intervention.

Figure 4.4: Levels of Autonomous Behavior
Source: (Mumm, 2019)
UUV advancements include such technology areas as propulsion,
precise navigation, acoustic communication, low-speed vehicle
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control, stealth, robotics, and mission control… both traditional and
non-traditional navigation technologies, with traditional navigation
encompassing improved inertial navigation, Doppler velocity sonar,
and data fusion, and non-traditional techniques including terrain
following, geophysical, and magnetic lines of position; acoustic
underwater communications technologies that feature a high data
rate and low bit error rate using channel equalization techniques;
low-speed hydrodynamic control that employs an adaptive,
nonlinear controller; and finally, command and control systems that
utilize an intelligent controller with such capabilities as planning,
re-planning, and fault tolerance. (Cancilliere, 1994).
One of the keys to the success of UUVs will be to mature the
navigation capabilities as “a profusion of emerging navigation
technologies enables us to further advance the strategic submarine
navigation system in a more affordable manner” (Vajda, 1998).
Several of these new navigation technologies are “based on a simple
concept of overlaying maps…what we are defining as the
“Geospatial Revolution “” (Kumar, 2014) as Geographic Information
System (GIS) “technology, which has long provided effective
solutions to the integration, visualization, and analysis of
information about land, is now being similarly applied to
oceans.” (Wright, 2013)
In 2012, Esri launched an Ocean GIS initiative in support of GIS
in both coastal and open ocean applications. The ability to map the
oceans and the environmental and human physical changes that are
occurring will be vital for autonomous UUVs to operate successfully
and navigate in the most efficient manner possible. Figure 4.5 offers
a glimpse of the layers of information that the Ocean GIS initiative
will be able to provide for mapping and navigational aids.
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Figure 4.5: The Ocean GIS Initiative
Source:(Kumar, 2014)
The Ocean GIS Initiative: Taking GIS Underwater (Kumar, 2014)
Esri’s Ocean GIS initiative is developing mapping and spatial
analysis tools, geospatial data with the ocean’s community in five
main areas:
• Research and Exploration- Seafloor mapping and sampling,
geomorphological studies, and tectonophysics
• Benthic habitat mapping for estimating species abundance,
identifying essential fish habitat, and ultimately conserving
sensitive or endangered areas
• Shoreline analysis, including calculation of rate-of-change
statistics from multiple shoreline positions to analyze
historical shoreline change
• Climate change, including measuring or simulating the
potential impacts of sea-level rise on shorelines and wetlands,
impacts of storms due to increasing ocean temperatures,
impacts to ecosystems due to increasing ocean acidification,
and global energy transfer
• Hazards, including the analysis of risk and potential loss of
buildings and infrastructure due to hurricane winds, coastal
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floods, tsunamis, and nearshore or onshore earthquakes.
(Wright, 2013)
Marine debris mapping and tracking is another area that GIS is
attempting to assist with small plastics and other debris as they are
not detectable with satellite imagery. In that past, it was not possible
to integrate all of this data “Over 90% of cargo is shipped via Ships,
and at least a hundred million people world over depend on the
oceans for their living. Oil spills and other disasters in the past could
not be modelled using GIS, but now we have the means to model
them.” (Kumar, 2014)
The different classes of UUVs is moving the industry from small
hobby and research size vehicles of just a few meters in length into
what is now known as an extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles
(XLUUVs) “which are among the largest unmanned submersibles
ever conceived, will be for long-endurance surveillance missions or
undersea cargo vessels to deliver other sensor payloads and other
UUVs.” (Keller, 2019). Figure 4.6 offers a glimpse as to how fast the
defense industry is moving towards XLUUVs. These large unmanned
undersea vehicles could be used as motherships to deploy and
recover smaller surveillance UUVs or be used to pair and team
with manned submarines in the open ocean or along coastlines and
inside harbors.
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Figure 4.6: World Large Autonomous Underwater Vehicles
Source: (H, 2019)
The Orca project is being built by Lockheed Martin and Boeing,
and it “is developing a delivery system for payloads that could
involve persistent-surveillance sensors, weapons, or other UUVs
and UAVs.” (Keller, 2019). The Orca is being designed with modular
construction

principles

and

“will

be

an

open-architecture

reconfigurable UUV with the core vehicle providing guidance and
control,

navigation,

autonomy,

situational

awareness,

core

communications, power distribution, energy and power, propulsion
and maneuvering, and mission sensors.” (Keller, 2019)
The advances in the UUV arena are notable from the control
theories that will offer a gradual movement towards full autonomy,
to the navigation, a real key to the ability for the UUV industry to
become more mainstream in the defense, logistics, and commercial
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arenas. The increasing investments in UUV technologies clearly
signal the overall market acceptance of this unmanned system. The
rapid escalation of both size and complexity of UUVs offers a
glimpse of the integration of UUVs into the overall autonomous
systems architecture and the emerging trust factor to team manned
and unmanned systems together for the mutual success of all
involved.
New Challenges Require New Thinking for Underwater Bases,
Ports and Inland Waterways
Underwater bases for UUVs simply makes sense, as surface ships
already operate in a known and agreed upon fashion in ports and
waterways throughout the world. Attempting to add in UUVs to
these already busy locations can add complexity that may create
safety and economic issues that are not tenable in many locations.
In the underwater domain … achieving interoperability is
currently impossible due to the lack of common standards and
protocols for wireless communication.
Almost all underwater vehicles or sensors currently use
proprietary interfaces and protocols for communication, especially
for wireless communication in water.
This implies that UUVs made by different manufacturers cannot
communicate with each other, even if they operate in the same area
and human operators afloat or ashore cannot control these UUVs
unless they use the control systems supplied by each manufacturer.
(Wilson, 2019).
Up to this point, UUVs have been relatively benign sensor
platforms; however, weaponization cannot be far behind. UUVs can
quickly become formidable tactical and strategic weapons. Current
UUV technology allows them to become a precision weapon that
can be used in many varied ways. They can be used at different
levels of warfare and eventually by either or both sides in a conflict.
The U.S. Navy’s top officer has ordered his staff to develop a
comprehensive strategy to field unmanned systems in the air, on
the water and under the sea over the coming years. Dubbed
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“unmanned campaign plan,” it looks to tie together all the disparate
programs into a coherent way forward, Chief of Naval Operations
Adm. Michael Gilday told Defense News in a July 16 [2020] interview.
“We’ve got … a family of unmanned systems we’re working on,”
Gilday said. “Undersea we’ve got extra-large, large and medium
[unmanned underwater vehicles]; on the surface, we have small,
medium and large [unmanned surface vessels]; and in the air, we
have a number of programs. (Larter, 2020)
At the lowest offensive conflict level, UUVs can be used to
blockade a port, close off a straight, shadow ships or submarines
or lie in wait around underwater bases. All these activities can be
done with or without conventional warheads. Defensively, UUVs
can provide a barrier to submarines, ships, and other UUVs. With
a slight increase of the conflict level, UUVs can detonate enemy
mines, eliminate enemy UUVs, and interfere with sonar systems on
enemy ships or submarines. Should a UUV passively interfere with
another vessel’s navigation system, this leaves the UUV blind to
possible submarine attacks. To save a lot of power and significantly
increase the potential danger to enemy ships and submarines, the
UUVs can also act like Remora fish and attach themselves to the
enemy vessel. Subsequently, the UUVs can detach at their leisure
to avoid capture and remain viable for the next vessel. In a more
combative action, the UUV could have a targeted minor collision
with a submarine’s propeller; this in turn could cause significant
increase in that submarine’s signature to passive sonar detectors.
Rogue nations and non-state actors could likely occupy the next
level of conflict by using UUVs to attack commercial shipping, oil
platforms, undersea communication cables, offshore wind turbine
power cables, undersea oil and gas pipelines or other defenseless
targets. In this new type of asymmetric warfare, there are
exponentially higher impact targets not traditionally defended.
Government organizations and commercial entities will need to
reassess how ocean assets are protected from this new threat.
Organizations need to consider it is not only the UUVs abilities but
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the UUVs host’s capabilities that need to be considered for threat
analysis.
In addition to the asymmetrical conflicts, there are also indirect
levels of conflict. Cyber, drones, and some types of bioweapons are
the current leaders in this arena. UUVs could soon be added to the
list. Weaponized UUVs can render regional and international port
facilities extremely vulnerable to disruption or even destruction.
Additionally, vehicle and rail bridges, critical infrastructure on or
adjacent to inland waterways could also severely disrupt the
transportation system should a weaponized UUV find its’ target.
Dams are difficult to attack from downstream. However, they are
potentially vulnerable to lakeside attack. In this case, the release
vehicle would be a boat or truck upstream of the dam leaving a
large vulnerable area. Drones could also be considered as a potential
release vehicle, however due to size, the drone would most likely be
detected before the release point.
Inland waterways are often essential sources of water for towns
and cities as well as to the commercial fishing industry and
irrigation. These items can render the population vulnerable to a
biological attack using a UUV as the release vehicle. These biological
attacks may not be chemical but have the potential to use natural
invasive species.
Direct Warfare Port Scenario
Direct warfare involves offensive and defensive operations
directly related to the enemy’s military and war-making capabilities.
UUVs would be relevant sensor platforms, offensive and defensive
weapons systems. Defensive operations would include not only
manned vessels but enemy UUVs. All combatants on the water or
under the water would become potential targets and would require
defensive capabilities to survive. A primary survival technique is
likely to be speed. UUVs generally lack the speed of military vessels.
Short UUV sprints by specifically designed attack UUVs could still
create some danger for those vessels or cause them to be fast and
noisy for easier detection by manned attack vessels.
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Imagine this scenario: as tensions between Taiwan and China
spike, U.S. intelligence reports that PLA Navy warships will soon
sortie from various Chinese ports. In response, U.S. submarines
discreetly place a set of large unmanned undersea vehicles — one
per port — on the seabed floor of the Taiwan Strait. Once settled,
each UUV waits for the order to release a half-dozen smaller craft,
each armed with explosives and non-kinetic effectors.
The order comes and the small craft deploy, maintaining
connections to a command module via acoustic and satellite links.
These tactical craft loiter just outside the ports, until one by one,
they detect the unique acoustic signature of their assigned Chinese
warship and break off to intercept it. Once in position, three feet
under a Chinese keel, each tactical UUV signals its status back
to a command center and awaits the order to immobilize its
target. (Frandrup, 2019)
Leveraging Underwater Bases
As the rest of the world watches the scenario unfold, nations
would establish underwater UUV bases to thwart these types of
attacks. These same bases could also be leveraged to address the
threat of quiet, cheap, manned attack submarines from rogue
nations or illegal commercial activities. Quiet diesel-electric and
fuel cell manned submarines could likely become a threat to coastal
areas or that of our allies. Underwater UUV bases would allow
continuous and routine UUV operations in the area. “The U.S. Navy
is developing an underwater charging station for its unmanned
undersea vehicles. The technology, which does away with cables,
will make it easier for drones to recharge at sea.” (Mizokami, The
Navy Is Working on Underwater Wireless Charging Stations for
Robot Subs, 2017) The UUVs could also use these remote recharging
stations

to

receive

new

mission

instructions.

UUVs

with

maintenance issues would be gathered up on a routine schedule by
surface vessels, repaired, and released back to the base.
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Figure 4.7: UUV Charging Station
Source: (Mizokami, Why Russia’s Unique Supercavitating
Torpedoes Are so Fast, 2019)
Underwater UUV bases similar to Figure 4.7 would become a
significant

force

multiplier

for

the

Navy.

Powering

and

communicating with these underwater bases have several technical
challenges. Power is potentially the easier issue to solve as there
are geothermal, current turbines and even nuclear options available.
Communications is often more challenging to achieve. For bases
near to shore, a buried cable could be established. For those bases
that are more remote, perhaps a dedicated UUV that surfaces
randomly away from the base to communicate with a scheduled
satellite link. Once the information is received from the satellite,
the UUV could return to the remote base and download the
information. Underwater optical links can be added if a distribution
source is nearby, such as a modified undersea communications
cable or a support ship.
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Figure 4.8: Optical Links for UUVs
Source: (Mohammad Ali, 2019)
Mission Planning with Swarming UUVs
The concept of swarming has been around for decades. Nature
has led the way in providing successful examples of swarms with
bees and ants. Part of the swarming theory is that no single entity
has enough information to carry out a complex mission; however
through mutual cooperation the swarm can successfully complete
complex maneuvers in a multitude of environments. The swarming
capability of unmanned systems has been demonstrated at
rudimentary levels. Swarming capabilities are maturing as several
UUVs are able to team with each other, as well as with manned
submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft. See Figure 4.8 for how
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UUVs could be linked together as a swarm. The capability for UUVs
to act on their own mission objectives, and as a collaborative set
with other UUVs to obtain a goal offers an almost limitless range of
abilities for this technology. An example of this is the SwarmDiver,
manufactured by Aquabotix Technology Corporation.
The Swarm Driver test vehicle can dive as deep as 600 feet while
working in synch with other UUVs submersibles. “The swarming
algorithm allows vehicles to communicate with each other to make
decisions as a group. This allows SwarmDiver to quickly and
accurately self-arrange in various swarm formations, as well as dive
simultaneously to collect synoptic data sets,” according to
Aquabotix (Wilson, 2019).
Curiously, the ability for multiple unmanned systems to be
assigned specific mission parameters as a single unit, and then
sense the need to swarm with other systems to successfully
complete a task is quite difficult to program. The technology to
act as a single unit, swarm, and then again as a single unit has not
been demonstrated to the level of confidence to believe that the
technology is ready for real world implementation.
Current UUV operations almost exclusively involve a single
vehicle performing a single task. In the future, UUVs will be able
to operate in groups or even swarms. Size, speed, and range of
UUVs coupled with the vastness of territory to be covered drive
many offensive and defensive UUV scenarios to leverage the swarm
theories. The possible exception to swarming is a category of very
large UUVs or small manned hybrid powered submarines.
Perimeter Protection Planning Considerations
Swarms can be made up of homogeneous or heterogeneous
UUVs. Unlike typical manned crafts where sensors, weapons, and
decision-making authority are collocated, UUVs can split these
functions up as required. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous
UUV types are useful; however, these functions use power, take up
space, and can be difficult to implement; this tends to drive the
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heterogeneous UUVs towards swarms. Where some UUVs are the
sensor platforms, some are the weapons platforms, and the decision
making is distributed and collaborative.
The primary sensors for these UUVs will most likely be a variety
of active and passive sonar coupled with cameras for close up
operations. There are several sonar techniques for single vehicles,
but when multiple vehicles are leveraged in the swarm environment,
the bi-static method becomes very useful. One UUV pings and the
others listen. The UUV that pings rotates in a preplanned manner
to best cover the area and provide additional data for processing.
Several sonar strategies will need to be developed for swarm
detection and engagement operations. Will the engagement be
active, passive, or bi-static? How many UUVs will commit to the
engagement? Will more than one UUV be actively pinging? Will
there be unique ping frequencies, or will a type of unique pulse
repetition be used like with radar?
The term “asymmetric threat” is now familiar in the lexicon, and
terrorist actions are a frequent occurrence. For naval forces, the
classical terms “blue water” threat and “major threat axis” no longer
hold the significance they once did. The threat environment has
moved from the “blue water” to “brown water,” or littoral regions,
placing emphasis on power projection, force protection, and
expeditionary operations in littoral areas. (Board, 2005)
Prior to the engagement, there must be several things to consider
including identifying what types of weapons the UUVs might use?
These weapons options can be divided into destructive and nondestructive. The destructive can be further decomposed into those
that have warheads, those that have an integrated directional
warheads but survive the attack to be reused, those that attach
the warhead and leave before detonation, and those that expend
ordinance from a distance that can be reused.
The first type of weapon may be a smart torpedo during the
attack phase. The swarm is either deployed from a ship, sub, or
underwater base and work as a team to acquire the target then
determines the tactics to destroy the target using one or more of
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the deployed UUVs. The next type of weapon would typically have
a shaped charge as its destructive mechanism. This is most useful
for eliminating mines, and it can also attack targets that are slow
compared to the UUV. The weapon with an attack shaped charge
warheads to targets are most useful in going after ships,

Figure 4.9: Supercavitating Bullet
Source: (Blain, 2019)
submarines, pipelines, or other stationary targets in a port
scenario. They can also place open ocean fiber optic cables,
pipelines, and oil rigs at risk. Each type can put these valuable items
at risk. The last type allows for expanded tactics set and can engage
targets faster than they are with enhanced success by operating as a
swarm. The most common solution for this type of UUV is one that
is large enough to deploy standard torpedoes. There are short and
long standard torpedoes. It would be more likely for the UUV to use
a shorter variety, but they could efficiently be designed for longer
torpedoes. A less common, but more compact solution for this set of
UUVs are the super cavitating weapons. These cavitating weapons
come in two types: bullets or rockets. Bullets have a shorter range
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and a smaller target set, but would be very effective against other
UUVs, USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles), and other small boats.
See Figure 4.9 as an example of a cavitating bullet underwater.
“Norway’s DSG has used the drag-reducing abilities of supercavitation to produce some truly extraordinary projectiles that’ll
hit submerged targets up to 60 m (200 ft) away, opening up some
interesting new mission capabilities” (Blain, 2019). The super
cavitating rockets would have a longer range and potentially an
extensive target set. The Russian VA-111 Shkval torpedo is a large
version of this type of weapon. Water creates a lot of drag and
typically limits torpedoes to about 50 knots.
Shkval solves this problem by diverting hot rocket exhaust out
of its nose, which turns the water in front of it into steam. As the
torpedo moves forward, it continues vaporizing the water in front of
it, creating a thin bubble of gas. Traveling through gas, the torpedo
encounters much less drag, allowing it to move at speeds of up 200
knots. (Mizokami, Why Russia’s Unique Supercavitating Torpedoes
Are so Fast, 2019)
One type of warhead was intentionally left out of the previous
discussion, and that is a nuclear warhead. This type of warhead
is unlikely to be used by the U.S. and its allies. However, it could
easily become a weapon of choice for terrorists or rogue nations.
It is not by chance, that many of the world’s economic centers
are located on coastal waters or major inland lakes and rivers. The
threat acknowledgement by these cities would increase the need
for new and different active defenses and additional channels for
intelligence collections.
Strategies and tactics for UUVs are only limited by the type of
UUV, the sensors, the weapons (if any), the target set, and the
mission planner’s creativity. It is expected that UUVs will expand
significantly in both numbers and capabilities in the near future.
UUV Policies and Governance for Consideration
The ability to create UUV navigation lanes and standard operating
procedures will require laws, policies, governance and leadership
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from many organizations, host nations and port owners around the
world. The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is
already tasked with providing geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) for
navigable seaways as part of the Maritime Safety Office. The mission
of the office is to “Provide global maritime geospatial intelligence
in support of national security objectives, including safety of
navigation,

international

obligations,

and

joint

military

operations” (Maritime Safety Information, 2020). Currently, there
are no discernable leaders at the intersection of GEOINT and
autonomous technology, security, and protocols — whether public,
private, commercial, or international. There appears to be minimal
government coordinated efforts that are actively examining the
entire unmanned architecture and its massive GEOINT data needs.
The amount of information that NGA will be required to supply
in the future is not well documented. NGA must capture future
needs and GEOINT collection requirements for navigational safety
in the new world of autonomous infrastructures. Spatial-temporal
anomalies will become the norm, and NGA must document and
engage

in

the

construction

of

autonomous

communal

infrastructures and what data is required to allow these
infrastructures to act and react accordingly for the safe operation
of all autonomous systems.
The current autonomous system framework is fragmented
without coherent oversight, direction, documented requirements,
and lacks defined authorities, “Unmanned undersea operations
continue to be limited by the complex, dynamic conditions of the
ocean environment and the unique operational constraints they
engender. Three critical capabilities – communication, energy, and
autonomy – will drive future developments in this domain” (Analysis:
Cyber in the Undersea, 2020). Advanced coordination and
collaboration endeavors must be focused to include determining
the responsibilities and authorities of an unmanned architecture, its
specific uses, exceptions, and allowances for robotics operations;
including studying the unintended consequences, future use, and
misuse of such technologies.
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Clear policies, laws, and governance are required as a danger to
the nation, and a global response to UUVs is becoming undeniable.
There is currently no single agency on a national or international
level in charge of this issue. Currently, there are no policies,
governance or doctrines in place for tracking or identification
capable of offering reliable defenses against teamed autonomous
systems. There is no single sensor type, defense posture, or reliable
countermeasure to stop this evolving threat, although “The Navy
also is moving forward with its new Unmanned Maritime Autonomy
Architecture (UMAA) program to evaluate levels of autonomy in
unmanned

submarines,

enable

commonality

of

autonomy

technologies, and reduce acquisition costs” (Wilson, 2019). This
program will take years to solidify and become a part of the modern
navy. The consequences can be catastrophic as asymmetric warfare
becomes more asymmetric should governments fail to take a more
pronounced leadership role in the autonomous arena.

Conclusions
UUV are an up and coming technology with many military and
civilian uses already being explored. The technology breakthroughs
that will allow UUVs to move towards their full potential will lag
behind other autonomous systems; however UUVs will be included,
integrated and connected to manned and unmanned systems within
the next few years. Without ongoing, real-time communication with
controllers, other vehicles and the framework to operate under
“operators unmanned undersea systems will rely heavily on
autonomy and artificial intelligence, and as operations increase in
sophistication, intensity and complexity, the greater will be the need
for trustworthy systems that can “OODA” (Observe, Orient, Decide,
Act) in a dynamic and challenging environment” (Analysis: Cyber in
the Undersea, 2020). The reliance on real time communication, the
need for AI in UUVs and the immature nature of the laws, policies
and governance for this unmanned technology (and all autonomous
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systems) that will be so fully integrated into the waterways,
economy and warfare in our world will slow the adoption of UUVs
into everyday marine life. This slowness of adoption does not appear
to be affecting the innovation, research and development and
employment of the technology at the rudimentary level.
Questions
1. What is the difference between the navigation requirements
for a manned submarine and a UUV?
2. What mission are UUVs best suited for in lieu of a manned
counterpart?
3. Does the UUV size and composition matter? Why or why not?
4. Describe examples of how a UUV could be used to protect a
port area?
5. Are optionally piloted submarines safer than deploying UUVs
on their own?
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5. Chapter 5 Autonomous
Maritime Asymmetric
Systems [Hood]
Student Learning Objectives
1. Students will be able to understand what asymmetric warfare
is and how autonomous underwater systems can be utilized to
conduct it.
2. Current applications for autonomous maritime vehicles.
3. Introduction to emerging AUV / UUV technologies and
programs that will allow the student to better understand the
potential for growing threats.
Asymmetry in Warfare:
War between belligerents whose relative military power differs
significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. This
is typically a war between a standing, professional army and
an insurgency or resistance

movement militias who

often

have

status of unlawful combatants.
Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the
resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle,
interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic
weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics
of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to
use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their
forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not
necessarily be militarized. (Stepanova, 2016) This is in contrast
to symmetric warfare, where two powers have comparable military
power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall,
differing only in details and execution. (Thomas, 2010)
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This chapter was written to expose the reader to current and
envisioned autonomous maritime technologies under development.
The likes of which could potentially be used in non-standard or
asymmetric methods. With the unspoken goal of possibly subvert or
attack US naval forces and the Department of Homeland Security.
Naval Asymmetric Warfare
The US Navy remains arguably the most powerful naval force
in the world. With the ability to project global power and reach
while influencing US foreign policy by its mere presence, potential
state and non-state adversaries continually seek ways to mitigate,
undermine or even attack US naval forces that pose a threat to their
regional interests. Cost effective autonomous underwater vehicles
have been identified by adversarial military and domestic criminal
organizations as a means to cheaply subvert US naval capabilities
and prowess.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
An autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) is a robot that travels
underwater without requiring input from an operator. AUVs
constitute part of a larger group of undersea systems known
as unmanned underwater vehicles, a classification that includes
non-autonomous remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) –
controlled and powered from the surface by an operator/pilot via
an umbilical or using remote control. In military applications an
AUV is more often referred to as an unmanned undersea
vehicle (UUV). Underwater gliders are a subclass of AUVs.
Until relatively recently, AUVs have been used for a limited
number of tasks dictated by the limited technology available. With
the development of more advanced processing capabilities and high
yield power supplies, AUVs are now being used for more dynamic
applications / tasks with current roles and missions constantly
evolving.
Applications
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Illegal Drug Trafficking:
Submarines that travel autonomously to a destination by means
of GPS navigation have been made and are currently in use by
illegal drug traffickers. This would limit the need for “go fast” boat
operators reducing overall cost, electromagnetic signature and risk
to personnel. Recent semi-submersible seizures by the US Coast
Guard in the Gulf of Mexico may be prompting criminal
organizations to shift to autonomous operations.
Air Crash and Maritime Search Investigations:
Autonomous underwater vehicles, for example AUV ABYSS, have
been used to find wreckages of missing airplanes, e.g. Air France
Flight 447, and the Bluefin-21 AUV was used in the search
for Malaysia

Airlines

Flight

370. (Mason,

2014)

Developing

technologies may soon provide a long endurance persistent
presence throughout vast swaths of open ocean that could be used
to detect downed aircraft or sinking / sunk surface / subsurface
vessels.
Military Applications:
The U.S. Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master
Plan (NAVY, 2004) identified the following UUV’s missions:
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
• Mine countermeasures
• Anti-submarine warfare
• Inspection/identification
• Oceanography
• Communication/navigation network nodes
• Payload delivery
• Information operations
• Time-critical strikes
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Recently, The Navy Master Plan divided all known UUVs into four
classes (Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 2015):
• Man-portable vehicle class: 25–100 lb displacement; 10–20
hours endurance; launched from small water craft manually
(i.e., Mk 18 Mod 1 Swordfish UUV)
• Lightweight vehicle class: up to 500 lb displacement, 20–40
hours endurance; launched from RHIBusing launch-retriever
system or by cranes from surface ships (i.e., Mk 18 Mod 2
Kingfish UUV)
• Heavyweight vehicle class: up to 3,000 lb displacement, 40–80
hours endurance, launched from submarines
• Large vehicle class: up to 10 long tons displacement; launched
from surface ships and submarines

Underwater Gliders
In addition to the list of standard UUV’s, the underwater glider
(UG) is a type of autonomous underwater vehicle that uses small
changes in its buoyancy to move up and down and uses wings to
convert the vertical motion to horizontal, propelling itself forward
with very low power consumption. (See Figure 5.1)
In 2004, the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research began developing
large gliders that were designed to quietly track diesel electric
submarines in littoral waters, remaining on station for up to six
months. (XRay)
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Figure 5.1 UUV US Navy Underwater Glider
Source: (NOAA, 2020)
Gliders are currently being used by NOAA to track oceanic data
to help with hurricane forecasting. NOAA hopes the data collected
from these gliders will help enhance our understanding of air-sea
interaction processes during hurricane force wind events. In 2020
a network of hurricane underwater gliders was implemented to
assess the impact hurricane force winds on upper ocean density
structure, and assess the impact of ocean profile data from
underwater gliders in operational intensity forecasts. (XRay)
Gliders remain a simple way to establish a persistent networks
of sensors at low cost that could potentially carry payloads for
various mission sets. They could then be used for tracking potential
adversarial threats, while presenting multiple dilemmas the enemy
would have to respond to at a very low cost compared to manned
vessels that only have a fractional durational use. As sea glider
technology

continues

to

mature,

communication

and

electromagnetic signature reductions for these suites will have to
be taken into consideration in order to maintain a low observable
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persistent presence. Figure 5.2 shows how sea gliders can be
deployed in formations to create a network of arrayed sensors.

Figure 5.2 Underwater Glider Deployment
Source: (NOAA, 2020)
US Navy’s NEMESIS Program
The US Navy is currently working to develop an advanced
electronic warfare program that uses drone swarms in the air and
sea to cooperatively fool a wide variety of sensors dispersed over a
large area. Known as “Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature
against integrated Sensors” or NEMESIS.
The Navy has spent the last several years developing and
integrating multiple types of unmanned vehicles, shipboard and
submarine systems, countermeasures, electronic warfare payloads,
and communication technologies to give if the ability to give it the
ability to project what is, in essence, phantom fleets of aircraft, ships
and submarines. These realistic-looking false signatures and decoys
have the ability to appear seamlessly across disparate and
geographically separated enemy sensors systems located both above
and below the ocean’s surface. As a result, this networked and
cooperative electronic warfare concept brings an unprecedented level
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of guileful fidelity to a fight. It’s not just about disrupting the enemy’s
capabilities or confusing them at a command and control level, but
also making their sensors tell them the same falsehoods across large
swathes of the battle space. (Tingley, 2020)
DARPA’s Ocean of Things
The name is a play on the Internet of Things and the aim is to
achieve persistent maritime situational awareness over large ocean
areas. While satellites can provide some information, DARPA project
manager John Waterson points out that there are gaps in their
coverage – optical satellites cannot see through clouds, radar
satellites only have limited coverage, and none of them can say
much about what is going on underwater. (Hambling, 2020)
Figure 5.3 Ocean of Things (OoT) Concept – floating sensors
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Source: (Hambling, 2020)

Chapter 5 Autonomous Maritime Asymmetric Systems [Hood] | 137

Ocean of Things concept of operations, as the float senses activity
on and under the water and passes back details via satellite – DARPA
image.
Floating sensors, known as floats, can gather far more detailed
information, and can remain at sea for months at a time. There is
a network of almost 4,000 Argo science floats around the world,
gathering data on ocean temperature and salinity. Waterson wants
to see much larger arrays of low-cost floats with more sensors,
floats which would carry out missions lasting up to a year before
scuttling themselves and degrading. The floats are environmentally
friendly, avoiding the use of toxic materials. (Hambling, 2020)
The cellphone industry has developed plenty of affordable,
miniature sensors, and the OoT is leveraging this technology. The
new contract was awarded at the end of July to technology
company PARC, whose 18-kilo, solar-powered glass float design
won out ahead of two others in the first phase. The floats are
sensor nodes which will pass data via satellite to a cloud network for
real-time analysis. The OoT will combine data from multiple floats,
seeing the whole picture rather than the single pixel gathered by
one sensor. (See. Figure 5.4)
Figure 5.4. The eighteen-kilo float houses a variety of sensors
and operates for up to a year on solar power
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Source: (Hambling, 2020)
A key element of the OoT is its hydrophone, a sensitive
underwater microphone or passive sonar which can pick up
engines, screws and other sounds from ships and submarines.
Floating sonobuoys dropped from aircraft have been used to locate
submarines since WWII, but these only operate for a few hours.
The OoT hydrophone has to operate for a whole year – and it has
to be affordable. In 2019, researchers from Scripps Institution of
Oceanography made a prototype high-fidelity hydrophone for the
OoT which they estimated could be mass produced for $100-$150.
(Hambling, 2020)
DARPA plans to carry out tests with thousand-float arrays in the
Southern California Bight and Gulf of Mexico later this year. Initially
they will be arranged at about one float per three square kilometers.
Waterson believes separation can be increased to one float per
twenty square kilometers while maintaining coverage. He is also
talking about much bigger arrays in future, of tens of thousands of
floats. (Hambling, 2020)
In addition to obvious military and border protection use – no
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vessel could slip through the dense field of OoT sensors, on or under
the water – the OoT will produce a mass of data of interest to
oceanographers, meteorologists and biologists, with plans to share
raw data online with researchers. The OoT may be able to monitor
marine mammal like whales, watch hurricanes form from the inside,
and track changes in ocean temperature. (Hambling, 2020)
In this context, Waterson says that people often mention Flight
MH370, the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 that disappeared in
Southern Indian Ocean in 2014. If there had been an OoT in the
area, a plane crash could have been detected and the crash site
located. However, DARPA’s main interest is likely to be in military
applications. (Hambling, 2020)
“The persistent coverage provided by dispersed sensors provides
round-the-clock coverage that other sources of data like an MPA
[maritime patrol aircraft] or a SAR [synthetic aperture radar]
satellite, which cover a given area for a certain amount of time
before moving on, cannot,” says Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, an expert on
sea power at the U.K. defense think tank RUSI. (Hambling, 2020)
Kaushal notes that as well as directly observing vessels and
aircraft, the OoT will be able to measure variables like temperature,
ocean salinity and ambient underwater noise, which are important
for calibrating sonar during anti-submarine operations. The OoT
will not be limited to any specific role; the variety of sensors,
coupled with powerful data-processing techniques, mean it might
be reconfigured to deal with emerging threats. For example, OoT
might form a defensive picket to detect, track and locate incoming
Russian Poseidon

nuclear

torpedoes so

they

could

be

intercepted. (Hambling, 2020)
“This fits into a wider concept of Mosaic Warfare creating a
system the components of which can reform and interact in
multiple ways rather than relying on a hierarchical system,” says
Kaushal. (Hambling, 2020)
In some ways the OoT parallels the network of surveillance
platforms China is building in the South China Sea, which are also
gathering scientific and military data. However China’s Blue Ocean
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sensors are tethered in place and appear to be mainly for radar and
optical observation; there are believed to be hydrophone arrays on
the sea bed. By contrast the OoT is much smaller and expendable,
and could be deployed anywhere that the U.S. requires detailed,
persistent observation of maritime activity, thousands of floating
eyes to see over, on and under the sea. (Hambling, 2020)
Conclusions
Autonomous underwater vehicle applications continue to grow
and expand as fast as emerging maritime technology allows. While
the United States maintains naval supremacy throughout the world
and the Department of Homeland Security continues to grow and
develop, potential adversarial and criminal entities will seek ways to
subvert and penetrate and exploit known and unknown weaknesses.
This could be done by overt air and sea attacks against maritime
vessels and infrastructure or most likely by low profile, low
signature and low cost autonomous systems. These autonomous
systems will be used to track surface and subsurface vessels,
providing potential adversaries a clear picture of how US naval
forces are arrayed. They will also be used to covertly strike by means
of delivering small payloads to specific targets while remaining
undetected.
As other advancing nations continue to conduct similar research
as DARPA, NOAA and the Office of Naval Research, the growth
of autonomous under water vehicles will remain constant for the
foreseeable future. The next new wave of technological advances
will be centered on how to effectively counter these AUV / UUV
systems before they can be effectively employed against US naval
and maritime assets across the world’s oceans.
Questions
1. Give an example of asymmetric warfare from recent world
events that would have benefitted from UUV technologies that
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DARPA and the US Navy are developing.

2. Which application in the text has the most potential for
successful employment against US interests?

3. What countermeasures would be indicated for Item 2?
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6. Chapter 6 UUV Integrated
Autonomous Missions &
Drone Management [Mumm]
Student Learning Objectives
The student will gain knowledge of the concepts and framework
as it relates to the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) missions,
including

military

and

civilian

uses

for

surveillance

and

reconnaissance, research, as well as offensive and defensive
employment of such technology. The student will be able to:
• Understand the historical nature of underwater missions and
why UUVs are becoming more important to the military and
industrial arena.
• Discuss the differences in manned versus unmanned
underwater vehicle deployment.
• Analyze and differentiate missions that are best suited for UUV
missions and which missions might be best served by manned
submarines.
• Explore the ever-increasing list of sensors and mission
packages available for UUVs, which allow UUV deployment
envelopes to expand and occupy more of the underwater
marketplace.

History-What is it, and Why Does it Matter?
This chapter explores the differences and similarities of how
manned and unmanned underwater vehicle technology is employed
for different mission sets and some of the challenges the industry
faces as UUVs become the norm, and manned submarines become
more focused on specialized missions, as well as tasking and
144 | Chapter 6 UUV Integrated
Autonomous Missions & Drone

integrating UUVs into existing manned architecture. UUVs come in
all shapes and sizes, starting from about a meter in length going
up to what is now known as an “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea
Vehicle” (XLUUV). The wide variety of sizes and shapes of UUVs
offers mission flexibility in an arena that is at its infancy stage.
The mysteries of the seas fascinate humankind. The vastness of
the seas with all of its wonders spawned ancient Greek religion to
believe in Poseidon; known as the “king of the seas…lord of the
sea-gods, as he dwelt in a golden palace on the sea bed with his
queen Amphitrite and son Triton” (Sea Gods, 2017). For centuries
sailors prayed to “Amphitrite, goddess who spawned the sea’s rich
bounty–fish and shellfish–as well as dolphins, seals, and whales”
(Sea Gods, 2017). Sailors also prayed to these deities for a safe
journey and a bountiful catch. Humankind’s desire to learn, conquer,
and use the sea for its betterment creates the need for technologies
and techniques to allow humans to obtain their goals.
As early as 1578, an “English mathematician and royal navy gunner
published a book that described his idea for engineering a
submarine” (Joanne, 2019). In 1620 the first working submarine
known as the Drebbel was invented by Cornelis Drebbel and was
propelled by oars that were under the vehicle. By “1623, Drebbel’s
watercraft carried 16 passengers under the River Thames in
London…staying underwater for about three hours” (Joanne, 2019).
Forty years later, the first submarine with an engine was created
known as the Diver. This submarine engine used compressed air.
The air was forced from a tank into a cylinder, and this air
movement pushed a piston that turned the propeller. John Philip
Holland improved the design and “engineered a submarine that
used battery power…batteries created electricity-powered a motor
to turn the propeller” (Joanne, 2019).
Submarine inventors took great risks even with their own lives as
they worked to perfect the ability to survive underwater for longer
time frames. In 1850 “Wilhelm Bauer built his first submarine… but
only narrowly escaped with his life after it sank in 50 feet of water
during a demonstration” (Andrews, 2018).Wilhelm Bauer would be
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undeterred by this setback as he received financial backing from
the Russian government and went on construct the “Sea Devil.”
The Sea Devil made more than one hundred and thirty successful
dives and “boasted several technological breakthroughs including
multiple ballast tanks for added buoyancy, a crude airlock and a
propeller that was powered by crewmen operating an internal
treadmill” (Andrews, 2018).
Early American Submarine Usage
For almost two hundred and fifty years, submarines have been
used as a wartime vessel. The first attempt to use submarines as
an attack vessel was during the American Revolutionary War; and
on “September 6, 1776, an American named Sergeant Lee tried to
attack a British ship using the Turtle. Lee drilled a hole in the ship,
but he ran out of air before he could attach the mine” (Joanne,
2019). In 1863, a privately funded venture in Mobile, Alabama, using
a recycled iron steam boiler ushered in the first successful primitive
attack submarine known as the H.L. Hunley. This attack submarine
offered new naval tactics to be introduced during the US Civil War.
Breaking the stronghold of the Union naval blockades allowed the
Confederacy to move supplies and keep the Union naval ships at
risk. The Hunley was known as the “peripatetic coffin”—and for good
reason. It sank on two occasions during its trial runs, killing a total
of 13 crewmen including its namesake, marine engineer Horace
Lawson Hunley” (Andrews, 2018).
Commissioned on October 12, 1900, the USS Holland became the
first US Navy submarine. Although the USS Holland was never
employed in combat, “The ship’s armaments consisted of a single
torpedo tube and pneumatic cannon known as a “dynamite gun.”
It was powered by a 4-cylinder gasoline engine for surface travel,
but also included a 160-horsepower electric motor to move
underwater” (Andrews, 2018).
World War I saw the introduction of the German U-boats, better
known as “undersea boats.” Built on production lines to allow for
economies of scale and training of its crew, the U-boats were
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introduced into the German fleet to attack enemy military ships.
Later, the U-boats were used to “attack merchant ships and
passenger liners. In just one day in September 1914, a German Uboat sank three British ships. Between February and April 1917, Uboats sank more than 500 merchant ships” (Joanne, 2019).
New technologies such as sonar and radar allowed submarines to
take an important leap forward in their importance in contributing
to military successes. Submarines became a key component to
WWII as “Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were major sea powers
during World War II by adding submarines to their surface fleets.
That combination remains the key to sea power today” (Wilson,
2019)
Submarines were used in the Gulf War (1990-1991) to launch landattack missiles, and submarines are currently used in the ongoing
War on Terror. The ability to be stealth and persistent allows
mission planners flexibility in employment, and UUVs will broaden
this flexibility envelope in future years.
Submarines and UUVs continue to illustrate their importance to
the world although “it is only in the last thirty years that progress
in propulsion; control, hydrodynamics, and sensor technology have
enabled the development of more broadly capable vehicles and free
the imaginations of naval planner to propose new and innovative
operational applications for them” (Whitman, 2002).
The ability to remove the human from a submarine and allow
the vehicle to be remotely operated by wire and later fully
autonomously is still in a formative stage, as illustrated in Table
1; however, the capability increase is being heavily funded and is
moving quickly to the forefront of the UUV arena.
Table 6.1: The Evolution of UUVs and Their Capabilities
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Source: (Petillot, 2019)
In the modern-day US Navy, it has taken nearly three decades of
development and experimentation in the unmanned systems arena;
however, “unmanned underwater vehicles are close to joining the
fleet in meaningful numbers and substantive roles…UUVs are
rapidly gathering momentum and critical mass of supporters”
(Whitman, 2002).
Submarine and UUV Current Military Missions
The primary roles and missions for the U.S. submarine force are
peacetime engagement, surveillance and intelligence, special
operations, precision strike, battlegroup operations, and sea denial
using naval or port blockades.
Keeping in mind that in the current global security environment,
naval forces have an ideal disruptive technology in UUVs that offers
“many challenges both in the form of asymmetric threats and
confrontations between peers” (Newswire, 2018) while allowing
human assets to stay out of harm’s way. UUVs will have “initial
emphasis on minefield reconnaissance, intelligence collection,
trailing, tagging, deception, and attack capabilities are potential
future options” (Whitman, 2002). These UUV capabilities will
include a range of command and control options including creating
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an optionally piloted submarine with the on the fly ability to
transition to near-total autonomy or full autonomy.
The US Navy published The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
(UUV) Master Plan in 2004 and then updated the plan in a February
18, 2016, Congressional report “using Sea Power 21 for guidance,
nine Sub-Pillar capabilities were identified and prioritized:
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
2. Mine Countermeasures
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare
4. Inspection / Identification
5. Oceanography
6. Communication / Navigation Network Node
7. Payload Delivery
8. Information Operations
9. Time Critical Strike” (The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
(UUV) . See Figure 6.1, US Navy UUV Systems Vision.

The UUV Master Plan identifies four basic signature capabilities
and provides an outline for the development of the underlying
technologies required to implement these signature capabilities for
littoral operations. The signature capabilities include:
• Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) – centers on the Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) functions, target
designation; launch and coordination of UUVs for battle
damage assessment; and intelligence collection.
Undersea Search and Survey (USS) – provides the ability to rapidly
survey selected areas through the use of networks of small UUVs,
performing functions
• such as mine hunting/neutralization, underwater object
location and recovery, and hydrographic/bathymetric surveys.
• Communication/Navigation Aid (C/NA) – provides a
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communication/navigation relay for other underwater
vehicles operating within the immediate area and is expected
to serve as a gateway for an autonomous underwater
communication/navigation network.
• Submarine Track and Trail (ST&T) – provides a mobile cueing
function, but could grow into a fully autonomous system
offering multiple levels of engagement (Wenli, 2000).
Figure 6.1: US Navy UUV Systems Vision

Source: (Clark, 2020)
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a difficult mission the Navy must
perform, and this is a good reason why the Navy should increase the
use of UUVs in the performance of ASW. Although sonars are used
to detect submarines; sonars have only a “fraction of the range and
precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above
the water. Unmanned aircraft could deploy sonobuoys or stationary
sonar arrays, and unmanned undersea or surface vehicles could
tow passive sonar arrays” (Clark, 2020). The integration of UUVs
with unmanned surface vehicles would allow the deployment of
“low-frequency active sonars like those carried by U.S. undersea
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surveillance ships that can detect or drive off submarines from
dozens of miles away” (Clark, 2020).
In a March 9, 2020 article by Lyle Goldstein titled “New UUSs:
China’s plan to ‘attack from the seafloor,” Mr. Goldstein explains,
“The robot submarine (and unmanned surface ship) era is now
nearly upon us. Chinese naval strategists have stated explicitly that
they intend to circumvent their long-recognized weakness in
submarine warfare by cultivating undersea AI and by developing
highly capable UUVs” (Goldstein, 2020).
In an August 2019 article published by Military & Aerospace
Electronics it was disclosed that
In 2018, China announced it was working on an AI-run underwater
base, equipped with autonomous submarines to extend its reach.
According to published reports, the submarines would deploy for
investigation and scientific surveillance missions, then return to the
unmanned base to download data and recharge. The base itself,
located on the ocean floor as deep as 36,000 feet, also would
conduct research on the immediate area, process and fuse all
collected data, and transmit the results to a surface ship or land
station (Wilson, 2019).
The Chinese government is also conducting an interesting
counter tactic to UUVs as “the secretive world of naval underwater
surveys rarely breaks the surface” (Sutton, 2020). The Chinese
government rewards its fishing industry when vessels are able to
capture (or report on) foreign UUVs operating near its coast
(international waters). “China has been holding the annual awards
ceremonies since 2016. This year 11 (2020), fishermen were
rewarded for handing over unidentified underwater vehicles which
they had found” (Sutton, 2020).
Submarine and UUV Civilian/Academic Missions
The academic and environmental research communities are
steadily increasing their use of UUVs as “interest in using UUVs
in private industry is growing simultaneously, and internationally,
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at least half-dozen firms have begun to commercialize UUV
technology developed in university and military laboratories”
(Whitman, 2002). Although oceans cover most of our planet,
humankind’s knowledge of its mysteries appears to be small in scale
as “only a fraction of these vast waters has been explored, and
much of the underwater world is little understood” (Loria, 2016).
The Aquarius Reef Base is currently the only permanent underwater
research laboratory in the world. It is operated by Florida
International University in cooperation with NASA, the US Navy, and
other research facilities around the world.
Poised for rapid growth, the list of commercial uses of UUVs
continues to increase. Some of these commercial and civilian
missions for UUVs include underwater tourism, logistical movement
of goods, infrastructure monitoring of bridges, oil pipelines,
underwater sea cables, undersea mining, and bottom mapping.
Additional missions are being explored, such as law enforcement
applications, long term monitoring of environmental issues, and sea
traffic management in shipping lanes.
As Mr. Stockton Rush explained in an April 17, 2017, Popular
Science Magazine article titled “Deep Sea Tourism Could Become
a Thing”, Humankind has explored only about five percent of the
ocean, and the federal government isn’t doing much to improve
that… There’s a huge demand for travel that’s different,” he says.
“People want to do something meaningful” (Fecht, 2017).
UUV technology, along with most submarine technology is
commercially available and sometimes can be used in unintended
applications such as human trafficking or illegal drug smuggling.
In November 2019, Spanish authorities captured a drug-smuggling
submarine and indicated that “This new attempt to use the narco
submarine to bring drugs into Europe in the first place is a much
more ambitious undertaking and appears to have largely succeeded
on a general technical level” (Trevithick, 2019). In 2010 a drug
smuggler was found in Africa building a $20 million submarine to
smuggle illegal drugs to the United States. As UUV technology
becomes more reliable and affordable, illegal uses are sure to
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increase as illustrated by international drug smugglers “it is a clear
indication that the use of narco subs in those activities may be an
increasingly viable tactic” (Trevithick, 2019).
UUV Markets
The majority of the Earth’s surface is covered by water, and
approximately “40% of the population living near coastlines, with
many energy resources found in the sea and with shipping being
the arteries of global commerce” (Newswire, 2018). the potential for
UUV manufacturing, parts, service, research and development, and
future uses is almost limitless.
Although the larger markets for UUVs is clearly the defense
sector, the private sector use will drive profitability of the
manufacturing and services support channels. Several mission
enhancements will boost these markets “in the fields of autonomy,
batteries

and

power

management,

telecommunications, underwater charging,

sensors,

underwater
and

most

importantly in Artificial Intelligence” (Newswire, 2018). The UUV
markets are poised for rapid expansion and growth. In 2018, the
international market value was estimated to be worth US $9.4
billion. This estimate was based on growing requirements,
availability,

manufacturing

and

other

industrial

indicators (Newswire, 2018).
Senior officials have a stated goal of pursuing a 355-plus-ship
fleet of manned vessels, but unmanned systems are “probably the
future of the Navy,” according to Robert Levinson, a senior defense
analyst at Bloomberg Government, during a recent webinar.
It is estimated that about $7.9 billion in the future year’s defense
program would support drones…An additional $2.2 billion would
be allocated toward unmanned surface vessels, or USVs, and $1.9
billion for unmanned underwater vessels, or UUVs. Navy plans call
for spending $941 million on USVs and UUVs in 2021 alone, a 129
percent increase over 2019 spending allocations (Harper, 2020).
Unmanned vessels are generally expected to be less expensive
to procure, operate, and maintain than manned platforms, which
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make them attractive as the sea service invests in new capabilities
(Harper, 2020).
The world’s economy and its’ ability to fund research and
development to expand markets and encourage innovations such
as UUV underwater tourism, UUV transportation of goods and
passengers, and undersea UUV bases will have a deciding impact on
the speed and overall success of the UUV industry. This global UUV
market is heavily influenced by political turmoil as the importance
of the seas cannot be understated. The South China Sea is a good
example where “Amid the growing push for decoupling and
economic distancing, the changing relationship between China and
the rest of the world will influence competition and opportunities
in the Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) market” (Research,
2020).
Teaming UUV with Manned Equipment
As UUVs become more capable and societies continue to seek
“bloodless wars,” the militaries of the world will work to integrate
“unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) as adjuncts to conventional
manned platforms in many of the submarine missions that arise in
expeditionary warfare” (Whitman, 2002). This transition will start
slowly

with

simple

minefield

reconnaissance,

intelligence

collection, and deception mission; however, as confidence in the
UUV rises, “attack capabilities are potential future options, with
command modalities that range from simple remote control to
near-total autonomy” (Whitman, 2002).
Optionally piloted UUVs will allow the expansion of manned and
unmanned teaming and will bring it into the normative technologies
for military and civilian missions alike. This teaming arrangement
will only work if the manned operator can understand and trust
what the unmanned systems actions are or will be during the
missions. Pre-planned missions will be the start of this relationship,
however as AI is introduced and the need for mission deviation
and flexibility is required, pre-planned mission execution will give
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way to AI goal seeking with extended mission capabilities. These
extended capabilities and teaming opportunities are being explored
as a “detection method for submarine oil pipeline leakage under
complex sea conditions by UUVs… the usual practice is to check
whether there is oil spill on the sea surface by chartering ships to
patrol the line regularly or in the event of leakage accidents” (Zhao,
2019).
Navy special forces conduct missions that require shallow-water
reconnaissance in support of amphibious landings and other
intelligence-gathering activities. The Navy is looking to pair manned
and unmanned systems for this type of an operation, and “small
UUV denoted the Semi-Autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance
Vehicle (SAHRV) has been identified as a leading solution” (Whitman,
2002).
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center is working on concepts that
would allow teaming to occur in a seamless way including have
“several very large, flatfish-shaped UUVs mated externally to a
“mother” submarine could provide a powerful and flexible adjunct
to the combat power of their host in off-board operations”
(Whitman, 2002) as seen here in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate the Notional MANTA concept
developed by the Naval Undersea Warfare Center that MANTA
vehicles

could

carry

significant

payloads

of

sensors

and

heavyweight weapons (Whitman, 2002).
Figure 6.2: Notional Manta Concept
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Source: (Whitman, 2002)
Figure 6.3: Notional Manta Layout Capabilities
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Sources: (Whitman, 2002)
AI and its Influence in the Future of the Integrated Architecture
of UUVs
Advances

in

sensor

systems,

hull

materials,

propulsion

technologies, and data science will drive the UUV missions to places
that have not even been considered at the moment. These
technologies will include all the subsystem level technology
developments allow for the increase in “survivability and adaptive
control of vehicles in complex/dynamic/tactical environments;
reduce communication and human supervision requirements;
enable cooperative, multi-vehicle operations with navigation aids
and communication relays; and provide increased levels of
situational awareness” (Wenli, 2000).Specific areas of interest in
autonomy include:
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• Planning and control architectures
• Path planning (including obstacle and dynamic threat
avoidance, adaptive route planning)
• Behavior development
• Mission planning/re-planning
• Multiple vehicle behavior and control
• Multiple vehicle imaging, localization, and data fusion
• On-board mapping of environmental variability, identified
objects and moving contacts
• Effective man-machine interface with a limited
communication capability.
(Wenli, 2000)
The traditional navigation pattern is depicted in Figure 6.4,
however, this scheme is limited, and it is being improved upon
through the use of a communication bridge which “allows vehicles
to send information from a distant operating area back to a remote
operator” (Lockheed Martin, 2017) as seen in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.4: The scheme of a navigation, guidance, and control
architecture for a UUV

Source: (Petillot et al., 2019)
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Figure 6.5: Depiction of an Undersea Communication Bridge

Source: (Lockheed Martin, 2017)
Figure 6.5 displays the ability for UUVs to autonomously create
a communication bridge in order to relay data back to the host
ship (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Collaborative Missions A
Decentralized Approach to Operating UUV Teams, 2017).
The underwater environment is not conducive to real-time
command and control, and this communication limitation makes
some form of AI use mandatory. UUVs are driving pioneering
research in artificial intelligence, unmanned swarming technology,
navigation, and underwater communications. The U.S. Navy is
seeking additional AI capabilities, especially undersea:
“As the current submarine force trusts mechanical and electrical
technology to execute the mission, the future force will need to
trust AI to extract and exploit actionable patterns among an ocean
of data,” the session says. “The advent of big data and deep learning
technology has rendered signal detection and classification an
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increasingly

automated

process.

Furthermore,

advances

in

autonomous navigation have enabled unmanned platforms to
operate alone or in swarms (Wilson, 2019).
Extending trust to AI systems is one of the goals of the DARPA’s
Explainable Question Answering System (EQUAS) Project. The
EQUAS Project will show users which data mattered most in AI
decision-making, and it was created “to build trust, we have to
give the user enough information about how the recommendation
was made, so they feel comfortable acting on the system’s
recommendation” (Wilson, 2019). The idea is that “We know why
humans may mess up a decision; there’s no intuitive way to know
when machines are wrong,” says Bill Ferguson, lead scientist at
Raytheon BBN Technologies” (Wilson, 2019).
DARPA is also working on the “Ocean of Things” Project that
will analyze information from thousands of float sensors in the
ocean. This project is targeting towards “affordable ocean sensing
at large scales and high resolution, the project’s analytics portion
seeks to provide detailed understanding of the ocean environment
to protect natural resources and enable the military to operate
more effectively on the high seas” (Keller, 2020). This information
can then be used to train UUV AI systems and allow for as close
to real-time updates as technically available in the oceanic
environment. Continuous information updates from the Ocean of
Things Project can move the UUV arena towards full autonomy with
the ability of on the fly mission deviations and re-tasking of the
UUVs as required as “only speed, endurance, and the adequacy of
onboard autonomous control and decision-making will limit what
UUVs can do” (Whitman, 2002). The Ocean of Things can build
capabilities that can become key to UUVs “because today’s naval and
commercial ships typically can use only their onboard sensors for
situational awareness” (Keller, 2020).
The future missions of UUVs is discussed at length at the U.S.
Post Naval Graduate School and it was the subject of a 2013 paper
titled “2024 Unmanned Undersea Warfare Concept”. Coupling AI into
this concept would allow UUVs to “remain one of the top priorities
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of the Chief of Naval Operations, as UUVs serve as effective force
multipliers, while greatly reducing
risk, in critical missions in A2AD environments” (Blandin, 2013) as
illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: 2024 UUV Concept of Operations

Source: (Blandin, 2013)
Figure 6.6 illustrates what undersea warfare might look like in
FY2024 and how forward operating UUVs would autonomously
function in hostile A2AD environments with multi-layered enemy
defenses including submarines, aircraft, ASCMs, ASBMs, and
mines. (Blandin, 2013).
The scalability of future missions and full integration of UUVs
into an operating architecture will require a several technologies
to mature at once and work in concert with each other for the
mutual success of all involved systems. AI is the component that
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will sew all of these technologies together and allow UUVs to reach
their full potential in the shortest amount of time. The security of
these systems, along with the laws, policies, and worldwide agreedupon governance of UUVs, is work that has barely even begun to
be tackled, and a much more concerted effort is required to move
forward on these fronts.
Personnel/Human Implications
The human aspect of UUVs should not be overlooked as the
training and re-training of personnel will affect the overall readiness
of seaborne operations. While this chapter is not focused on this
issue, it is an issue that must be factored into the current and future
mission planning cycles and technology refresh cycles for seaborne
operations, including UUVs. The psychological effects of turning
over a traditional manned mission to a robot and allowing that robot
at times to operate with more autonomy than allowed by manned
systems can create distrust and resentment within the workforce. A
March 30, 2020, Congressional Research Service report offered the
following:
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential
personnel implications of incorporating a significant number of
large UVs into the Navy’s fleet architecture. Potential questions for
Congress include the following:
• What implications might these large UVs have for the required
skills, training, and career paths of Navy personnel?
• Within the Navy, what will be the relationship between
personnel who crew manned ships and those who operate
these large UVs? (O’Rourke, 2020)
Additional thought must be given to issues such as liability
boundaries, acceptable losses of UUVs when the traditional
calculation is acceptable human losses. Environmental, economic,
and economic disparity must be considered in the personnel/
human implication of UUV missions and mission expansion.
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Conclusions
The UUV arena is still very much in its infancy stages. The ability
to transverse over, on top of, and under the vastness of the oceans
offers humankind learning opportunities that are boundless. As the
strategic importance of the world’s oceans continues to grow, so
will the desire to understand, control, and harness this importance.
The military aspects of UUVs are driven by the ability to use
the technology to carry out dull, dirty, and dangerous missions
without putting human operators in danger. The missions assigned
to UUV will grow exponentially as trust in the systems becomes as
commonplace as using a smartphone.
The advent of UUV underwater basing operations and the use
of AI in UUVs will usher in a new era in manned/unmanned and
optionally piloted submarines missions and uses for military,
commercial and academic research. The ability to team with these
systems with other manned platforms at sea as well as air and land
assets are already accounted for in future integration architectures.
As UUVs and all unmanned systems become trusted agents, their
utility, as seen in Figure 6.7, is almost limitless; the issue will become
one of laws, regulations, policies, and how different countries
deploy such technology against each other.
Figure 6.7: Teledyne Technologies portfolio of undersea
products, capabilities, and systems
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Source: (Teledyne, 2018)
UUV missions are only beginning to be discovered, the advent
of

underwater

tourism,

commercial

shipping,

commercial

transportation, and the academic support of UUVs all will keep pace
if not rival the missions assigned to UUVs by the world’s militaries.
Questions
1. List four advantages and disadvantages of using an
autonomous UUV and a manned submarine.
2. What are some of the integration challenges facing UUVs as
they integrate into the world’s military arena?
3. For surveillance and reconnaissance, does the UUV size and
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composition matter? Why or why not?
4. How would you position multiple sensors to surveil a given
area with a UUV?
5. Would you consider a UUV a military instrument or a civilian
research tool?
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7. Chapter 7 Principles of
Naval Architecture Applied
to UUVs [Jackson]
Student Learning Objectives
The student will understand the concepts of applying naval
architectural principles to the design of unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs).
The student will be able to:
• Gain an understanding of the design processes associated with
UUVs and the role of the naval architect.
• Be aware of the application of naval architectural principles to
the dynamics and control of UUVs.
• Examine the need for functional design tools to design UUVs.

Introduction
Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are categorized as two
types of drone (Button, 2009).

The first is the autonomous

underwater vehicle (AUV) and the second is the remotely operated
underwater vehicle (ROUV) (Department of the Navy, 2004). Both
types serve different purposes but are designed using the same
naval architectural principles (Pengelly, 1956). Multiple navies are
using these types of vehicles and include the United States of
America (US), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(UK), France, Russia, and China. Figure 7.1 shows a battlespace
preparation autonomous underwater vehicle (BPAUV) used by the
US Navy and manufactured by Bluefin Robotics Corporation. The
propeller is protected by a nozzle casing and two appendages are
seen in top of the craft, one being the bridge fin.
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Figure 7. 1. Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater
Vehicle (BPAUV) in use during a US Navy exercise.
Source: Courtesy of Bluefin Robotics Corporation (Copyright
belongs to Bluefin and used with permission
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BPAUVMP_from_HSV-.jpg).
Military applications of UUVs include collecting information,
timed strikes, oceanography, payload delivery, mine hunting,
network navigation modes, surveillance, anti-submarine operations,
reconnaissance, inspection, intelligence gathering, communications
enhancement and identification of foreign objects (Department of
Defense, 2011) (Department of Defense, 2012). Figure 7.2 shows the
Pluto Plus AUV used for mine identification and destruction by the
Norwegian Navy.
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Figure 7.2. Pluto Plus AUV for underwater mine identification and
destruction used by the Norwegian mine hunter, KNM Hinnøy. CC
BY-SA 3.0.
Source: Created by KEN (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:MiniU.jpg)
They are also used for civilian applications such as oil and gas
exploration (mapping the sea floor), research vehicles to monitor
movements of fish and inspect fauna such as reefs, drug trafficking,
air crash investigations, oceanography and many more uses. UUVs
are equipped with sensors such as sonars, thermistors, conductivity
probes and magnetometers. Biological sensors include chlorophyll
sensors, turbidity sensors and sensors that measure acidity, PH, and
the magnitude of dissolved oxygen.
Typically, UUVs lose their GPS signal quickly due to the
attenuation of radio waves in water, so they rely on dead reckoning
to navigate in water. Acoustic underwater position systems are
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based on long baseline navigation techniques that can be connected
to GPS by allowing the UUV to surface in order to establish its
position globally. Owing to the need for surfacing, UUVs are
equipped with brush or brush-less motors connected to a gearbox
that rotates a propeller that is protected by lip seals and a nozzle.
Rechargeable batteries are used and are typically lithium-ion or
lithium polymer. Larger UUVs are equipped with fuel cells, but the
latest trend is to combine different types of electrical power sources
to a supercapacitor.
Role of the Naval Architect
The role of the naval architect is complex and becoming quite
broad due to the effects of extreme weather and the minimization of
using the earth’s scarce resources (Rydill, 1994). The naval architect
will need to work more closely with natural scientists, such as
marine biologists and environmentalists, in order to design vessels
that work with nature to minimize the impact on the natural
world (Comstock, 1967). The role will continue to work with
engineers from other disciplines, project managers and business
administrators and we may see the development of new academic
programs that blend the principles of naval architecture with
business studies that includes the commercial aspects of naval
systems such as ‘naval systems architecture’ or ‘marine systems
engineering’ (Lewis, 1988) (Taylor, 2006). In addition to teaching
naval architecture from a systems approach, the development of
‘forensic naval architecture’ may provide the safety, reliability and
regulatory aspects of naval architecture with the information
needed to create naval architects whose design function is clearly
guided by knowledge gained from failures using incident/accident
reports of submarines that provide valuable data that are contained
in codes and standards that allows the design of UUVs that are fitfor-purpose. When designing UUVs, the naval architect must pay
special attention to hull shape and to the dynamics of control and
its effect on hull shape and associated dimensions.
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Naval Architectural Design of UUVs
The design of traditional underwater vehicles (submarines) are
based on vessel requirements, weight estimates, initial size, weight
and buoyancy balance, arrangements, longitudinal balance, vertical
balance and stability, speed and power, propeller, propulsion
coefficient, equilibrium polygon, and dynamic stability. The design
of UUVs are very sensitive to weight and buoyancy and the naval
architect must balance the cumulative weights with buoyancy of the
hull form. A standardized system is used to describe hull structure,
propulsion system, electrical system, command and surveillance,
auxiliaries, furnishings, armaments, margins and acquisition, and
loads (Hughes, 2010).
The use of software in the design of UUVs is prevalent especially
when one considers the interdependency of the various aspects of
design. Specialized modules of programs are designed to focus on
the hull, resistances, loads, and control aspects of the UUV. The
major features of a UUV include the control surface, hull, battery
pack, pressure vessel and stiffeners, the battery system, ballasting,
controllers, and the payload. Current designs of UUVs have variable
hull geometries based on torpedo shapes but some are rectangular
shaped that can be hydrodynamically very challenging.
The standard hull envelope for a UUV is axisymmetric having an
ellipsoid fore-body, a parallel mid-body and an aft-body shaped like
a parabola (Figure 7.3). This is known at the Jackson hull-form and
the diameter of the hull envelope (Eq. 7.1):
D = L / (L/D)

(7.1)

Where, D is the diameter of the hull envelope and L is the length
of the hull. The length of the fore-body, Lfwd, is a function of the
forward hull section length factor, Cfwd, and the diameter of the hull
(Eq. 7.2):
Lfwd = D.Cfwd = Cfwd . (L/(L/D))
(7.2)
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Figure 7.3. Jackson hull-form geometry.
Source: [Adapted from Openclipart Vectors by Pixabay (Public
Domain Image)]
Also, the length of the aft-body, Laft, is a function of the hullsection length factor, Caft, and hull diameter, D, (Eq. 7.3):
Laft = D.Caft = Caft. (L/(L/
D))

(7.3)

The parallel mid-body length, Lmid, (Eq.7.4)
Lmid=L-(Lfwd Laft )=L-{(D.Cfwd ) (D.Caft
)}=L[1-((Cfwd Caft ))/((L/D) )]

(7.4)

The sum of the forward and aft length factors must be less than
the length-to-diameter ratio. If it is equal, then the UUV will have no
mid-section. Ellipsoidal forward sections have a radial offset, yfwd,
from the centerline of the full length of the UUV body at a local
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distance, xfwd, measured from the aft component of the forward
body and the forward hull section curvature factor, nfwd (Eq. 7.5)
yfwd=D/2 [1-(xfwd/Lfwd )^(nfwd ) ]^(1/nfwd )

(7.5)

Paraboloid aft-sections have a radial offset, yaft, from the
centerline of the full length of the UUV body at a local distance,
yfwd, measured from the aft-component of the forward body and
the forward hull section curvature factor, naft (Eq. 7.6)
yaft = D/2 [1-(xaft/Laft )^(naft ) ]
(7.6)
The construction of tables of offsets allows one to calculate
principal characteristics in accordance with naval architectural
practices such as prismatic coefficient (Cprismatic), wetted surface
area (S), sectional area, and area of the UUV envelope (Veffective).
The resistance to motion is a function of the basic control surface
and its propeller. The calculated resistance allows the naval
architect to select the appropriate battery power for the UUV, so it
is important to calculate propulsion resistance.
The total ship resistance, Rtotal, is composed of a number of
collective resistances that are expressed as non-dimensioned
coefficients. The total resistance coefficient, Ctotal, is a function of
water density, ρ, the wetted surface area, S, and the velocity of the
UUV, (Eq. 7.7)
Ctotal = Rtotal/(1/2 ρSV^2 )
(7.7)
When the UUV is operating near to the air-water surface, the
resistance is dominated by wave-making resistance and viscous
resistance of the fluid. The wave-making resistance is a function of
the Froude number (Fr) and viscous resistance is a function of the
Reynolds’ number (Re). Froude number is a function of velocity, V,
gravitational acceleration, g, and length of the hull, L (Eq. 7.8)
Fr=V/√(g.L)
(7.8)
Viscous resistance is given by Re which is a function of velocity, V,
length of the hull, L, and the kinematic viscosity of water, υ, (Eq. 7.9)
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Re=(L.V)/υ
(7.9)
The total resistance coefficient, Ctotal, is a function of the Froude
number and the Reynolds’ number and is approximated as the sum
of the coefficients of wave-making and viscous resistances (Eq. 7.10)
Ctotal ≈ C(wave.) Fr + Cviscous.Re
(7.10)
It is noted that the wave-making resistance is work done by the
hull on the surrounding fluid to generate waves. However, there
is no resistance of this kind when the UUV is submerged three
diameters from the surface of the air-water boundary. Therefore,
at lower depths, resistance is purely viscous and is composed of
frictional and residual resistances (Eq. 7.11)
Ctotal = Cviscous = Cfriction+Cresidual
(7.11)
Frictional resistance in water is a function of Reynolds’ number
(Eq. 7.12)
Cfriction=0.075/(log10. (Re)-2)^2
(7.12)
Equation 7.12 is based on tank towing models and not full-scale
models. It is important to calculate empirical resistances that
approximate to a value that is similar to actual conditions of
submerged motions. Therefore, the following models provide an
estimation of total resistance of UUVs assuming that the hull form
is deeply submerged.
Bottaccini Model:
Ctotal=[(S.Cfriction)/(A.(L/D)^4 )].[(L/D)^4+1/2 (L/D)^3+6]
(7.13)
The hull form is deeply submerged in a viscous fluid operating
at small angles of motion. The maximum cross-sectional area, A, is
function of hull diameter, D, such that (Eq. 7.14)
A = (πD^2)/4 = π/4 (L/{L/D} )^2
(7.14)
The coefficient of total resistance is also considered to be a
function of the coefficient of frictional resistance, the geometry
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of the hull and the roughness of the surface of the UUV. This is
incorporated in the Gilmer and Johnson model (Eq. 7.15)
Gilmer and Johnson Model:
Ctotal = Cviscous+Croughness = {Cfriction [1+D/2L+3(D/L)^3
]}+Croughness

(7.15)

The Jackson Curve-Fit Model is a model that is a function of the
non-dimensional hull parameter, K (Eq. 7.16), which is based on the
length, L, diameter, D, and wetted area, S, of the UUV
K = (L/D)-(S/(πD^2 ))

(7.16)

And the coefficient of residual resistance is (Eq. 7.17)
Jackson Curve Fit Model:
Cresidual=0.0008/((L/D)-K)
(7.17)
Another model that accounts for the residual resistance is the
Jackson-Hoerner model that is a function of frictional resistance,
hull diameter and the length of the aft-body (Eq. 7.18)
Jackson-Hoerner Model:
Cresidual=Cfwd {[1.5(D/Laft )^1.5 ]+[7(D/Laft
)^3 ]}

(7.18)

Eq. 7.18 is used when the aft end of the UUV has a significant wake,
or a large effect on the form coefficient owing to the separation of
flows. The shape of the UUV in terms of its prismatic coefficient is
described by the Jackson Parallel-Mid Body model (Eq. 7.19)
Jackson Parallel Mid-Body Model:
Ctotal={Cfwd

(1+[1.5(D/Laft

]+[0.002(Cprismatic-0.6)])}+Caft

)^1.5

]+[7(D/Laft

)^3

(7.19)

And to include the effects of the forward and aft hull section
curvature factor of the UUV, the Martz model is used to account for
the effect of shape of the UUV (Eq. 7.20)
Martz Model:
Ctotal={Cfwd (1+(1/2(L/D) )+[3(D/L)^((7-nfwd-(1/(2naft ))) )
])}+Caft

(7.20)

Design algorithms incorporate the resistance models to predict
the total bare hull resistance of the UUV (Eq. 7.21)
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R(hull total)=0.5ρSV^2 [0.2(Ctotal )]
(7.21)
The appendages that are attached to the control surfaces produce
their own contribution to flow resistance of UUVs. The equation
accounts for hull geometry (length and diameter) and the wetted
surface area, S, (Eq. 7.22)
Cappendages = (L.D)/(1000.Sappendages )
(7.22)
The total appendage resistance is given by Equation 7.23
Rappendages=0.5ρSappendages V^2
Cappendages=(ρLDV^2)/2000

(7.23)

For the total control of the UUV, the lateral surface area must be
known (Equation 7.24)
A(control surface) = 0.028.A(control surface hull) =
8.A(control surface lateral area) (7.24)
The size of all control surfaces is important when specifying the
amount of power needed to move the UUV through the fluid and the
effective horsepower associated with the UUV is (Eq. 7.25)
Peffective = V(Rhull-Rappendages
)/550

(7.25)

For the set operating velocity, the shaft horsepower is that used
to provide the primary propulsion in the direction of travel, thus (Eq.
7.26)
Pshaft=Peffective/Cpropulsion
(7.26)
Once the amount of power is known based on the resistances
and the shape and size of the UUV, then an estimate of how many
batteries and the type of batteries to be used in the UUV can be
calculated.
Control and Dynamics of UUVs in Water
The shape of a UUV has significant effects on hydrodynamic
signatures and places limitations on the control surfaces relative
to the center of gravity. The shape can be changed by adding
appendages and the positioning of rudders and spaces for
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hydroplanes, which usually affects the dynamics and control of such
vehicles when submersed. This also changes the amount of power
required to provide thrust (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). The
motion in the six degrees-of-freedom is usually referred to as heave,
yaw, sway, roll, surge, and pitch (Figure 7.4).
EQUATIONS OF MOTION FOR UUVs
The equations of motion describe the axes that are aligned to
UUVs such as longitudinal, vertical, athwartships that allow the UUV
to move in three dimensions in hydrospace, the center of which
is set by the center of the geometric center of the UUV, or the
center of gravity (Mollard, 2013). The following equations describe
the equations of motion in accordance with the convention shown
in Figure 7.4.
Surge equation:
mu ̇=X
̇ P+XU+XM+XA

(7.27)

The surge equation describes the mass of the UUV multiplied
by its acceleration being equal to the sum of its forces acting in
the longitudinal direction, where XP is the propulsive thrust force,
XU is the hydrodynamic resistance force, XM is the drag force due
to lateral motion and XA is the hydrodynamic force due to lateral
acceleration.
Horizontal plane equations:
m(v ̇+
̇ rU)=YV+YV ̇ +YR+YControl
(7.28)
And
Izzr ̇=N
̇ V+NR+NR ̇ +NControl
(7.29)
Equation 7.28 represents the action of mass of the UUV and its
sideways acceleration through the horizontal plane of motion and
Equation 7.29 describes the product of rotating inertia about the
vertical axis through the center of gravity and its angular
acceleration in yaw to the sum of horizontal moments of
hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull of the UUV.
Vertical plane equations:
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m(w ̇+qU)
̇
= ZW+Z+Zθ+ZControl
(7.30)
And
Iyyq ̇=M
̇
W+MQ+Mθ ̇ +MControl
(7.31)
Equation 7.30 represents the action of rigid mass of the UUV and
its acceleration in the vertical plane of motion to the sum of the
hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull and Equation 7.31 describes
the product of rotating inertia about the horizontal axis through the
center of gravity and its angular acceleration in pitch to the sum
of vertical moments of hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull of
the UUV, supplemented with a restoring moment due to movements
away from the horizontal (Rydill, 1994).

Figure 7.4. Freedom of motion for UUV.
Source: [Adapted from Open Clip art Vectors by Pixabay (Public
Domain Image)]
Roll equation:
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IxxΦ =Kv+KR+KΦ
(7.32)
The roll equation (Eq. 7.32) describes the product of rotating
inertia about the longitudinal axis and its angular acceleration in
roll to the sum of athwartships moments acting on the hull due to
hydrodynamic restoring moments owing to movements away from
the vertical axis. Control forces are those that account for rigid
body forces and those considered control forces owing to motions
in vertical, horizontal, and longitudinal directions. Hydrodynamic
forces should also be considered as they are considered to be
directly proportional to small changes in velocity when UUVs depart
from initial straight-line motions. They are known as derivatives
owing to those small changes from the straight-line path of
motion (Lewis, 1988).
HYDRODYNAMIC DERIVATIVE FORMS
Y^’v= YV/(0.5ρUL^2 )

(7.33)

The derivative form is dimensional and as an example, Equation
7.33 is dimensionless owing to its constant characteristic of the
UUV’s geometry. In its dimensioned form, hydrodynamic derivatives
are dependent on the square of the velocity of the UUV.
STABILITY AND CONTROL IN THE HORIZONTAL PLANE
When the derivative approach is applied to the equations of
motion and adapted to include control terms appropriate to the
rudder’s deflection to the angle, δ, the linear equations is sway
velocity, v, and yaw rate, r, are defined (Eq. 7.34 and 7.35).
Equations in derivative form:
m(v ̇+rU)=Y
̇
̇ rr+Yδ
v v+Yv ̇ v ̇+Y
(7.34)

δ
And

Izzr ̇=
̇ Nvv+Nrr+Nr r ̇+N
̇ δδ
(7.35)
Equations 7.34 and 7.35 show two unknowns, v, and r (sway
velocity and yaw rate), as a function of the control term, δ. For
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dynamic stability, it is assumed that the UUV is moving in water on
a straight path with no control input (δ=0).
Dynamic stability:
v ̇(m-Y
̇
v ̇ )=Yv v + r(Yr-mU)
(7.36)
And
r ̇(I
̇ zz-Nr ̇ ) = Nv v+Nr r
(7.37)
The equations shown here can be solved using transformations
into a single linear equation for either v and r. The general form
of equations can be expressed in real or imaginary terms and tend
to indicate whether the UUV is stable or unstable along its path of
motion. The control effectiveness of the rudder can be understood
by analyzing steering motions as function of rudder force (Lewis,
1988).
Steering motions:
Yvv+(Yr-mU)r+Yδ δ=0

(7.38)

And
Nvv+Nr r+Nδ δ=0

(7.39)

And
r/δ = Yδ/((Yr-mU) ) (xv-xδ)/(xr-xv )
(7.40)
Here, it is understood that all terms associated with derivatives
are omitted and we are left with constant velocity terms. Equations
7.38 and 7.39 can be solved to give a steady state turn, r, as a function
of rudder deflection, δ, (Equation 7.40). The equation tells us that
the rudder should be placed aft of the body as far as possible in
order to gain the best control of the UUV due to the sway of the
hydrodynamic forces on the hull (Comstock, 1967).
STABILITY AND CONTROL IN THE VERTICAL PLANE
For vertical control of the UUV at velocity, w, and pitch angle, θ,
the rate of change of pitch angle is needed. It is also required to
know two sets of control surfaces with two deflection angles of δf
on the forward and aft hydroplanes (Eqs. 7.41 – 7.43).
Chapter 7 Principles of Naval Architecture Applied to UUVs [Jackson] | 181

Equations in derivative form:
m(w ̇+rU)
̇
= Zw w+Zq q+Zδfδf+Zδa
(7.41)

δa
And

Izzq ̇=M
̇
w w+Mqq+Mθ θ+Mδfδf+Mδa δa
(7.42)
Mθ=W.(BG) ̅
(7.43)
The hydrostatic restoring moment in Equation 7.42 is associated
with the pitch angle that indicates a preferential motion in the
vertical plane. The UUV can be considered moving along a straight
line with no input from the rudder (δf and δa = 0), which leads us to
define dynamic stability.
Dynamic stability:
(w ̇-qU)=Z
̇
ww+Zqq
(7.44)
And
Iyyq ̇=
̇ Mww+ Mwq +W.(BG.θ)
̅

(7.45)

Equations 7.44 and 7.45 are simplified forms of the equations of
motion and have three roots that will be dependent on the speed of
the UUV. When the control surfaces are operating in response to
rudder motions, Equations 7.46 – 7.50 apply. The combined effects
of control forces are shown in Equation 7.46.
Motion control with surfaces operating:
Zαα+Zδcδc=0

(7.46)

Mαα+Mθθ+Mδcδc=0

(7.47)

And
Equation 7.46 allows us to derive the vertical velocity as the
function of control surface angles of deflection (Eq. 7.48).
α = -(Zδcδc)/Zα

(7.48)

Here (Eq. 7.48), the vertical velocity is related to the control force
and the hydrodynamic resistance of the UUV in vertical and
horizontal directions. Using the solution from Equation 7.46 to feed
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into Equation 7.47, the pitch angle is a function of angles of
deflection of the control surfaces (Equation 7.49):
θ = (Zδc δc (xα-xc ))/Mθ
(7.49)
Where xc=(Mδc)/Zδc and xa=Mα/zα
(7.50)
Equations shown in 7.50 are the effective locations of control and
heave forces, respectively. The equations shown in this section are
used to control pitch and plane setting in UUVs and are critical
when coupled with the shape of the hull to reduce flow signatures.
It is noted that hull form and shape and appendages are critical
aspects of control dynamics, so much analysis is performed by the
naval

architect

to

perfect

the

design

of

UUVs

prior

to

construction (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019).
Structural Integrity
Once the shape, form and control aspect of the UUV is accepted,
the structural integrity of the UUV is calculated by understanding
the structure of materials and how they can withstand hyperbaric
pressures at known depths (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019).
External hydrostatic pressures are calculated for each control
surface and materials are selected by understanding the three
primary failure modes (Lewis, 1988):
• axisymmetric yielding of the shell between stiffening frames
characterized by elastic-plastic collapse (concertina effect);
• shell buckling between stiffening frames characterized by
buckling forming inward and outward bulges of the shell; and
• Instability that occurs between bulkheads and frames and
results in elastic buckling of the frame-shell of the hull.
Knowledge of materials are required to select the best material for
the UUV shell. This means that design factors such as buckling
pressure, yielding pressure at the frame, yielding pressure at midbay, general instability, frame instability buckling pressure, frame
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hoop stress and total frame hoop stress for the structure need to
be calculated (Hughes, 2010). The current ABS Rules governing the
design of UUVs considers the following structural design factors:
• Stiffener strength;
• Buckling strength;
• Longitudinal frame strength;
• Inner stiffener strength;
• Local stiffener flange buckling strength;
• Local stiffener web buckling strength; and
• Combined stiffener and shell moment of inertia.
Stiffener and web spacings are calculated to avoid the three modes
of failure based on the strength properties of the material(s)
selected for the UUV shell (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019).
Discussion / Conclusions
The detailed information generated by the naval architect to
design the hull shell and its appendages according to its mission in
the water is used to allow the architect calculate how much battery
power is needed for the UUV (Rydill, 1994). The selection is based
on the propulsive and static loads needed to move the UUV and its
apparent and real volume. Batteries need to be carried on board, so
the size related to their energy density is critical. Typically, lithiumion batteries are used because they have such a large energy density
(~1300 HP.min/ft3), whereas lead-acid batteries are typically not
used because of their low energy density (~160 HP.min/ft3). It
should be noted that current battery technology severely limits
the naval architect who is responsible for the design of UUVs.
Advances in the field of fuel cells and associated systems such as
supercapacitors are long awaited.
Questions
1. What is a naval architect and how does it affect the design of
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UUVs?
2. Describe the shape of a UUV and how its shape can affect how
it operates.
3. Explain the differences in the flow resistance models and how
they are incorporated into the design procedures for UUVs.
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PART III

SECTION 3 UNMANNED
VEHICLES FOR GROUND &
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Section 3 Unmanned Vehicles for
Ground & Land Operations &

8. Chapter 8: Unmanned
Logistics Operating Safely &
Efficiently Across Multiple
Domains [Lonstein]
Student Learning Objectives:
Increasingly exposed to the reality that automation, artificial
intelligence, and unmanned technology, many of us become
simultaneously captivated and concerned by the velocity of new
products and technologies introduced daily. Students must prepare
to function in a world of near-total connectivity. What happens
on the ground and in water, above below, requires a homogenous
technology ecosystem? The interaction of humans, machines, and
the environment will be a critical concept for students to consider
in a world where man, machine, and technology operate in concert
safely and economically. That interaction will not only require
interaction between humans and machines but will also require
interaction between humanoids, humans, unmanned technology,
and other intelligent technologies operating at different levels.
Students will explore how subterranean automation will impact
what may happen in space and at each level of our atmosphere.
Once Completed Students Should:

• Understand that automated technology needs to communicate
effectively with its primary control systems and other
technology, both manned and unmanned, within the same
domain.

Chapter 8: Unmanned Logistics
Operating Safely & Efficiently Across

• Include in their assessment or design of Unmanned Systems,
both commercial and military, significant consideration of the
interaction of Unmanned technology within a particular
stratum of operation and other systems and humans operating
at different levels of the physical world, be it underground, on
surface waters, underwater, on land in air, space as well as
virtual environments.

• Appreciate that the global reach of automated technology will
not only require local and national communication and
interoperability; they must also function globally and in space
where the environment will have a similar, simultaneous
operation by manned and unmanned technology from other
nations, commercial entities, non-state actors and individuals.

• Plan for and address the inevitable conflict between civilian,
commercial, military, or unknown or undetectable unmanned
systems.

Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
This chapter is a product of the lessons learned from co-author
Dr. Hans Mumm. In his writings, teachings, and lectures, Dr. Mumm
stresses the importance of robust multi-directional command,
communication, and control between manned and unmanned
technology operating on land or under it, in the air, on water or
under it as well as in space. He refers to the concept known by many
as Connectivity and automation in transport (“CAT”). Safe Uniform
Traffic Management (“UTM”) systems must allow for autonomous
vehicles and other intelligent systems such as humanoids to
communicate instantly and seamlessly. (European Commission,
2017) As we continue to examine the past, current, and future of
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unmanned logistics, it is essential to remember Dr. Mumm’s
cautionary words.
Commercial delivery by drone is now a reality in many parts of
the world. Companies ranging from Fed Ex to United Parcel Service
to Amazon and Walmart in the United States currently have or are
planning to use autonomous logistics as an essential part of their
operations. While in China, food and light package UAV delivery
has been in use by companies including SF Express, JD.com, and
Ele.me. Similar light package and food delivery by Drone services
are underway or anticipated in over 26 different countries globally.
Table 8.1 is a partial list of the ongoing and planned parcel and food
delivery by drone globally, as compiled by. (Unmanned Aerospace,
2019)
Table 8.1 Partial list of the ongoing and planned parcel and food
delivery by drone globally
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Country

Operator/
project
leader

Type of operation

For more information

Australia

Project
Wing

October 2017, first trials of goods
deliveries by drone to rural
Australian customers.
Operations later extended to
suburban Canberra.

https://www.unmannedair
alphabet-project-x-deliver

Canada

Drone
Delivery
Canada

August 2018, Transport Canada
approves testing of X1400 cargo
delivery drone.

https://www.unmannedair
regulator-approves-drone-

China

Ele.me

May 2018, Ele.me starts food
delivery by drone in Shanghai.

https://www.unmannedair

China

JD.com

2015 – Rural drone deliveries
start.

https://www.unmannedair
rakuten-and-jd-link-to-pro

March 2018 – SF Express secured
China’s first provisional drone
operating license to begin
deliveries of food within the
https://www.unmannedair
country’s pilot zones approved
chinas-sf-express-given-li
by the CAAC.

China

SF Express

Dubai

Costa
Coffee

September 2017 – First trials of a
coffee drone delivery system

https://www.arabianbusin
379426-costa-coffee-tests-

Estonia

SESAR GOF
program

Parcels deliveries between
Helsinki and Tallin planned as
part of the SESAR network of
demonstrator programs.

https://www.urbanairmob
imminent-gulf-of-finland-

Finland

SESAR GOF
program

Parcels deliveries between
Helsinki and Tallin planned as
part of the SESAR network of
demonstrator programs.

https://www.urbanairmob
imminent-gulf-of-finland-

Finland

Sky ports
and
partners

March 2019 – K-Maret deliveries
to customers in Vantaa

https://www.urbanairmob
drone-delivery-trials-start

DPD

In January 2018 trials of drone
deliveries were announced for
https://www.unmannedair
launch between
special-report-delivery-dr
Saint-Maximin-La-Sainte-Baume
and Pourrières.

France

192 | Chapter 8: Unmanned Logistics Operating Safely & Efficiently Across
Multiple Domains [Lonstein]

February 2019 – Trials began
delivering pizza and industrial
parts by drones Wurzburg
(Germany)-based
drone-technology company
Emqopter.

https://www.unmannedair
germanys-emqopter-delive

Germany

Emqopter

Iceland

Aha and
Flytrex

Ireland

A Post and
Sky Tango

Indonesia

JD.Com

Drone delivery trials began with
JD.com.

https://www.unmannedair
chinese-retailer-jd-com-st

Japan

Rakuten

January 2019 – Drone delivery
packages in rural Japan.

(https://www.unmannedai
rakuten-start-drone-packa

Commercial drone delivery
flights began in Reykjavik from
2018, by operator Aha and
Flytrex.
In July 2018 – A Post starts trials
of off-shore drone delivery
flights.

February 2018 – Airbus Skyways
Singapore parcel delivery drone
makes first flight.

Singapore

Airbus
Skyways

Singapore

March 2019 – the two companies
Airbus and
start shore-to-ship drone
Wilhelmsen
deliveries

South
Korea

Korea Post

Mercedes
Zurich
Switzerland
Matternet
and siroop

https://www.unmannedair
flight-drone-least-risky-pa

https://www.unmannedair
irelands-post-autonomous

https://www.unmannedair
airbus-skyways-singapore-

https://www.urbanairmob
airbus-wilmhelmsen-start-

Remote mail deliveries to start in https://www.unmannedair
2021.
korea-post-develops-utmSeptember 2018 –Mercedes
Zurich drone delivery program
starts.

https://www.unmannedair
mercedes-zurich-drone-de

UK

Vodafone

Strat of 4G mobile phone
delivery trials in Scottish islands.

https://www.unmannedair
vodafone-makes-uks-first-

USA

Flirtey

March 2019 – BVLOS drone
delivery flight trials start in
Reno.

https://www.urbanairmob
flirtey-to-conduct-bvlos-d
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August 2018 – in Virginia, Project
Wing starts BVLOS urban area
drone delivery trials,

USA

Project
Wing

ttps://www.unmannedairs
project-wing-starts-bvlos-

USA

Flytrex

October 2018 – drone deliveries
to King’s Walk Golf Course in
Grand Forks, North Dakota

https://www.flytrex.com/

USA

FAA
Integration
Pilot
Program
(IPP)
project.

Herndon, VA – the program will
facilitate package delivery in
rural and urban settings.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/

USA

FAA
Integration
Pilot
Program
(IPP)
project.

Loveland, OH – Workhorse
Group Inc.’s Horsefly
truck-launched Autonomous
https://www.faa.gov/uas/
Drone Package Delivery System
is now making package deliveries
to homes in the Cincinnati area

USA

FAA
Integration
Pilot
Program
(IPP)
project.

for Holly Springs, North Carolina
– goods deliveries to resident
backyards

https://content.dji.com/
drones-for-good-drone-de

USA

FAA
Integration
Pilot
Program
(IPP)
project.

Memphis-Shelby County Airport
Authority, Memphis, TN:
inspection of FedEx aircraft and
package delivery.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/

Source: (Unmanned Aerospace, 2019)
While there are many reasons for optimism based upon
unmanned logistics’ initial global adoption, as we can see in Table
8.1, widespread implementation of autonomous technology in the
supply and delivery chain remains in its infancy. Challenges such as
payload capacity, environmental considerations, UTM, and overall
CAT technology are a few of the challenges which must be met
before widespread automated logistics operations can become a
reality of our everyday lives.
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Yesterday
The noted Scientific Historian James Burke wrote in the 1978 book
“Connections: Alternative History of Technology” that “When you
read a book, you hold another’s mind in your hands.” “Why should
we look to the past in order to prepare for the future? Because
there is nowhere else to look.” (Burke, 1978) When introducing new
technology to society, there is always a significant dose of wonder,
futurism, and promise, which helps drive adoption. Once the
theoretical starts its metamorphosis into reality, there will
inevitably be challenges and consequences that were not envisioned
but need resolution to achieve adoption at scale.
In book one of this series, we examined the delicate balance
between innovation and regulation, too much of one can negate the
other’s value and vice versa.
“Unlike the introduction of the railroads in in the 1800’s,
automobiles presented a greater challenge. Trains and trolleys were
limited to travelling on rails, which made the design of
infrastructure and regulation of operation less challenging. By 1920
it was clear that affordable automobiles were the conveyance of the
future. People were migrating away from the mass transit staples
of trains, busses and trolleys, and opting instead for personalized
on-demand, motorized transportation.” (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein,
Ryan, & and Carter, 2018)
When considering the widespread introduction of autonomous
transportation, the challenge of maintaining order, safety, reliability,
and efficiency become far more complex. While they were all
incredibly disruptive and transformational technologies, the
automobile, mechanically powered sea transport, submarine,
subterranean, air and space travel were not simultaneously
introduced into day-to-day life. When it comes to unmanned
operation we are witnessing the near-simultaneous introduction of
technology at every level of our environment and beyond.
One If by Land or beneath it
In his 2008 book Fighting Traffic, Peter D. Norton conducted an
extensive analysis of the many considerations which contributed
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to the development of rules and regulations for the operations of
automobiles on streets previously used for pedestrians and animaldrawn traffic. Almost immediately accidents and death soared
largely due to the fact in the early 1900’s there were few or no laws
for regulating motorized ground transport, many pedestrians were
caught by surprise due to the noise, speed and a general public
unfamiliarity with the automobile. Norton observed the tension
caused by the introduction of this new technology.
“Most historical studies in the social construction of technology
examine distinct artifacts that can be produced in quantity and that
need not be shared. Streets are different. A mother cannot conceive
of a street as a playground for her children while a motorist thinks
of it as a path for driving at speed—at least not for long. The
incompatibility of different constructions of a shared technology
raises the stakes for relevant social groups. In a shared system,
when a new construction becomes dominant, one group cannot
easily secede from the prevailing denomination into a dissenter
group where the minority construction is preserved.” (Norton,
2008)
Over the last 125 years, the automobile has gone from something
that was primarily for the elite to a ubiquitous technology that most
adults in developed nations can either own or access regularly. It
has become a staple of modern life. When Henry Ford introduced
mass assembly lines in the early 1900s, automobiles became more
affordable, and so the number of vehicles operating on roadways
grew exponentially. With increased volume came more significant
interaction between vehicles, pedestrians, animals, and the
environment.
With more frequent operation came more interaction, more
mishaps, accidents, and sadly deaths. In the 1950s and ’60s, it
became apparent something had to change if “a car in every garage”
was to become the American dream instead of a nightmare.
1963 and 1964 represented a tipping point of traffic management
and automobile safety in the United States. In just one-year
automobile, fatalities rose and astronomical ten percent to 47,700
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deaths. In response, the Highway Safety Act of 1966 was passed
by Congress. Significant safety enhancement followed as Figure 8.1
depicts, between 1966 and 2013 the fatality rate per 100 million
miles went from over 5 to just over 1 in 2013. (Federal Highway
Administration, 2017)

Figure 8.1 Vehicle Fatality Rate per 100 Million miles Travelled
Source:(Federal Highway Administration, 2017)
The success achieved in terms of vehicle safety is impossible to tie
to any particular strategy, practice, or regulatory scheme. Instead,
it is a multidisciplinary approach that allowed a vast reduction in
automobile-related

fatalities.

The

Four

E’s

of

Engineering,

Education, Enforcement, and Emergency response is primarily
credited with the overall success and are essential components
of Uniform Traffic Management. (Federal Highway Administration,
2017)
Land-based autonomous transportation is limited to automobiles,
busses, and trucks; many new technologies continue to develop,
revolutionizing land-based locomotion. Currently, in China, an
Autonomous Rail Transit (ART) system began operations in 2018.
According to reports, the ART system operates on long-lasting,
quick charging batteries and can travel up to 25 miles at up to
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43 mph. The ART system can charge at stations along the route
or the end of the line in approximately 10 minutes. It also runs
on rubber wheels and virtual pathways using sensors so that no
fixed rails or tracks are needed, and flexibility of routing can be
dynamic. ART’s are seemingly the “next big thing” in metropolitan
transportation. (Railway-News, 2019)
Autonomous rail systems are not merely limited to inner-city
commuter transportation.

Figure 8.2 Rio Tinto – Hitachi Autonomous Freight Train
Source:(Hitachi Corporation, 2020)
The first large-scale autonomous freight rail system commenced
operation in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The Rio Tinto
Railway System, in collaboration with Hitachi Corporation,
developed what they call the Auto-Haul™ System. According to
its Case Study, Hitachi & Rio Tinto claim “more than 7.5 million
train kilometers operated fully autonomously – without the need for
an onboard driver – all while increasing safety outcomes.” (Hitachi
Corporation, 2020)
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Recently a new reality has begun to evolve where an autonomous
technology operates below the earth’s surface. Earlier in 2020, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency organized and
conducted the Subterranean Challenge Urban Circuit (SubT).
According to DARPA:
“The SubT Challenge Systems and Virtual competitions aim to
create community of multidisciplinary teams from wide-ranging
fields to foster breakthrough technologies in autonomy, perception,
networking, and mobility for underground environments. The
Tunnel Circuit took place in August 2019. The Cave Circuit is
planned for August 2020, and the Final Event incorporating all three
underground environments is targeted for August 2021.” (Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2020)

Figure 8.3 Prototype DARPA SubT
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Source: (Carnegie Mellon University, 2019 )
Another autonomous technology is operating in the subterranean
space in the mining and tunnel construction industries. One recent
example can is in Mali, Africa. According to AZO Mining, the Syama
Mine has engaged in a three-year partnership with Sandvik to
provide:
Syama with its full suite of proven autonomous equipment and
digital solutions, some of which include their full fleet of Sandvik
TH663i trucks, DL421 autonomous drills, and fully autonomous
loaders. Syama will also utilize Sandvik’s OptiMine®3D Mine
Visualizer, which will provide Resolute Mining workers with a realtime

three-dimensional

(3D)

model

of

the

entire

mining

environment that can be accessed from remote locations. One of
the key advantages associated with the visualization system is that
users can effectively analyze and immediately respond to events
occurring in the mining environment. The system also allows users
to efficiently plan future mining activities and operations,
investigate problematic areas of the mine and track the
development of the mine over time.” (Cuffari, 2019)
Maritime traffic management has also seen a historical arc where
a once non-existent and mostly an ad hoc reaction to disasters
cost thousands of lives. History is replete with maritime disasters,
like the Fleet of Kubla Khan, The Spanish Armada of the 1500s and
the R.M.S. Titanic in 1912, related to the sea and environmental
conditions or the inability of the crews to navigate, or ships to
withstand the conditions. (Marine Insight, 2019) Others, such as the
S.S. Andrea Doria, M.S. Stockholm, and the SS Admiral Nakhimov,
sank due to collisions with another surface vessel. Finally, the
Submarines USS Gatto and the U.S.S.R. K-19 collided approximately
200 feet below the surface. Both survived but were severely
damaged. (Mizokami, 2017)
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Figure 8.4 R.M.S. Titanic Sinking 2012
Source: (National Geographic)
Most of us are familiar with the R.M.S. Titanic’s ill-fated maiden
voyage in April of 1912, where over 1500 passengers and crew died
in icy waters of the North Atlantic. While the reality is awful,
Hollywood has, over the years, both romanticized and dramatized
the events on that fateful night. Why did the new ship need to set
a speed record? Why had none of the greatest maritime engineers
in the world discovered the fatal design flaw of having watertight
compartments in its hull, which could be sealed off in case of
damage to the hull and thereby making the vessel theoretically
“unsinkable.” Sadly, in reality, a design flaw did not account for
the fact that seawater after a hull breach could flow over the
compartments, into the next thereby making the ship extremely
vulnerable to sink in the event of a collision. (Bassett, 1998)
The disaster left the world in shock and immediately calls for
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investigation and regulation grew. As a result, the International
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”) became law. SOLAS
is currently under the aegis of the International Maritime
Organization who has modified the Convention numerous times
in the century following the sinking to the Titanic. (International
Maritime Organization, 2020)
Numerous other maritime disasters have occurred over the years,
many of which involved collisions between vessels or environmental
obstacles such as icebergs, pack ice, the seafloor, and reefs. As the
seas grew crowded, vessels became larger, faster, and ports, canals,
and navigational straights became congested, the risk of disaster
grew. To that end, Robert Frump, author of “until the Sea Shall
Set Them Free,” and Pulitzer Prize nominee, said, “Changes occur
only when there is a meaningful disaster.” “I think that most people
will tell you that changes in marine safety are almost exclusively
disaster-driven,” agrees Dr. Josh Smith, a professor at Kings Point
and interim director of the American Merchant Marine Museum.”
(Keefe, 2014)

Figure 8.5 Panama Canal Backup
Source: (Today Panama, 2015)
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Like the automobile, regulation of nascent technology can be a
painfully slow process, not only in terms of time but also in the
cost of human lives and the environment. History of regulation
shows that with time, technology, and safety improvements, and to
that end, common-sense regulation is the best way to protect the
public, crews, and the environment while allowing for technology to
advance. Students should note that the history of maritime safety
and traffic management closely parallels that of the automobile.
Both technologies vastly improved with the advent of mechanical
propulsion and the advances made during the early to mid-1900s.
While subterranean automation is just becoming a reality,
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles have a long history of functioning
beneath the waves. In 1957 the Applied Physics Lab of the University
of Washington developed the Special Purpose Underwater Research
Vehicle (SPURV). The SPURV was controlled remotely by acoustic
communication. (Gafurov, 2015)
Three if by Air or in Space
A few short years ago, this section would be limited to air
traffic. It is now clear that autonomous technology is and will have
an increasing role within and beyond Earth’s atmospheric airspace.
In Chapter 2 of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber
Domain, I wrote extensively about the history of the regulation
of new technologies such as automobiles and aircraft. (Nichols,
Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and Carter, 2018) While autonomous
vehicles continue to rapidly improve and evolve, so too does traffic.
What was once considered acceptable UTM in controlled and
unregulated airspace has now become less efficacious given the
increasing proliferation of UAS in global airspace.
While autonomous vehicles continue to improve and evolve
rapidly, so too does traffic. What was once acceptable UTM in
controlled and unregulated airspace has become less efficacious
given the increasing proliferation of UAS in global airspace.
As a case in point, the issue’s complexity has become and why
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regulation alone will not ensure that safety or reliability comes from
personal experience. On June 29th, 2019, as a passenger on United
Airlines Flight 1849 from Newark, New Jersey, to Atlanta, Georgia.
Shortly after takeoff and well below 10,000 feet in altitude I noticed
an odd and irregular series of maneuvers far different than those
many travelers are familiar with as noise avoidance maneuvers and
operation at major metropolitan airports. (Port Authority of New
York & New Jersey, 2020)
It was a sunny summer day with mostly clear skies and a bit of
the haze associated with metropolitan airspace. Since the airspace
is complex and crowded with three of the busiest airports in the
nation nearby, I like to film takeoff and landing since one never
knows what you will see. Towards the east, I saw a small Drone in
between my flight and the aircraft depicted
further to the east, just at the time, the odd maneuver occurred.

204 | Chapter 8: Unmanned Logistics Operating Safely & Efficiently Across
Multiple Domains [Lonstein]

Figure 8.6 Photograph of departure from Newark Airport June 29,
2019
Source: (Lonstein, Takeoff Photo Newark to Atlanta June 29, 2019,
2019)
I recounted the event in a Forbes.com article entitled “Are DroneAircraft Collisions a Real Threat to Airline Passengers and Crews?”
in August of 2019. (Lonstein, Are Drone-Aircraft Collisions A Real
Threat To Airline Passengers and Crews?, 2019)
Merely suggesting the risk of small, unregulated UAVs operating
in skies where other commercial traffic also operates is a recipe
for collision did not sit well with the “hobbyist,” or consumer drone
manufacturers. The article’s central premise was to point out that
even if there are laws and regulations in place to deal with traffic
management of unmanned aerial vehicles, it does not necessarily
equate that operators will obey the laws much less be aware of
them. This more significant challenge today is that the barriers to
individual ownership, such as price, availability, and difficulty of
operation, served as a natural limitation no longer exist.

Figure 8.7 Major League Drone Delay
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Source: (Fox Sports, 2020)
The trend of smaller and smaller UAS also presents a more
significant regulatory issue. On August 4, 2020, a Major League
Baseball game between the Minnesota Twins and the Pittsburgh
Pirates was delayed due to a drone’s appearance over the stadium.
It is the first known baseball “drone delay.” (Fox Sports, 2020)
While controlled airspace and large public venues are a daunting
challenge, unmanned aerial traffic management is not strictly
limited to the earth’s atmosphere. According to a 2019 report from
the United States Defense Intelligence Agency entitled Challenges
to Security in Space, many instances are cited where near-collisions
and actual collisions between manned and unmanned space vehicle
and debris. According to Appendix “A” of the report:
“Between 1998 and 2017, the International Space Station, which is
in LEO, has maneuvered at least 25 times to avoid potential orbital
collisions. With an expected increase in large constellations of
satellites and space debris, there is higher potential for satellite
collisions, particularly in LEO.” (United States Defense Intelligence
Agency, 2019)
Are we prepared for Autonomous Logistics?
The answer lies with all of us. Many of today’s students
will find themselves confronted with the challenge, which has
confounded many technologists over the past few centuries. What
is sufficient to handle today’s technological requirements may be
outdated tomorrow, and by “tomorrow,” that means the next date
on the calendar. The speed with which autonomous technology
develops seemingly leads to new products and discoveries each
day. What was an acceptable form of military defense on August 5,
1945, was obsolete the next day? What changed? That was the day
that the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. (British
Broadcasting Company, 2020)
What should be done?
Following

the

suggestions

of

Dr.

Mumm

to

ensure

an
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interconnected Multi-Domain across autonomous technology
platforms makes much sense. A World that relies upon MultiDomain

Autonomous

systems

is

currently

evolving.

When

considering how best to manage such complex systems, the key
to understanding how best to maximize safety and efficacy is
communication.
As with much autonomous technology, the military is often a
driver of innovation in no small part based upon its need to function
on short notice anywhere in the world. In a recent White Paper by
Martin Kahn and Sean Thatcher on behalf of Lockheed Martin, the
authors summarized the design as follows:

Figure 8.8 Lockheed Martin JADO
Source: Collaboration Strategy (Kahn, 2020)
“Lockheed Martin’s Integrated JADO Collaboration Strategy
provides a JADO architectural framework for future combat
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operations in a joint and coalition environment. Our approach is
an open architecture solution designed to incorporate existing
systems and new technologies. Spectrum dominance capabilities
provide undetectable communications in the HCE as well as a fused
common operating picture.” (Kahn, 2020)

Figure 8.9 Multi-Domain Traffic Management
Source: (Canstock Photo, Inc., 2020)
Transitioning from the battlefield to static civilian environments
provides an opportunity to create Multi-Domain Autonomous
Logistical systems, which will allow for commerce to benefit safely
208 | Chapter 8: Unmanned Logistics Operating Safely & Efficiently Across
Multiple Domains [Lonstein]

and effectively from automation. In recent years, the debate on
how best to accommodate autonomous vehicles on highways has
narrowed, at least for the time between two models. The first,
known as Self Reliant Vehicles (SRV), uses sensors to create
awareness of its operating environment. The sensors include
technologies such as “Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) and
Radio Detection and Ranging (RaDAR) sensors that provide visual
and locational data to the car, and possibly to other similarly
equipped cars.” Recently, the focus has shifted to technology that
does not solely rely upon in-vehicle sensors alone; rather, it relies
upon the Vehicle to Infrastructure regime or (V2I). (Ray, 2019)
While some might think it makes sense to build a communication
and traffic management system for all forms of autonomous
transport, very little Multi-Domain technology exists. A significant
amount of study needs to occur with adequate foresight into how all
autonomous systems can communicate.
That means new roadways, airports, seaports, and other
infrastructure must be capable of supporting the autonomous
operation; they must also be pre-fitted with the necessary
technology to allow data and communication flow on, above and
below simultaneously.
Only having traffic management for UAV’s will quickly prove to be
inadequate and dangerous as soon as multi-domain vehicles enter
service. UAV’s which are capable of operating on land and in the
sky is already a reality. If there is no way to communicate, navigate,
and safely operate on land, sky, and water in a safe, efficient, and
commercially

viable

manner.

The

promise

of

autonomous

technology may never be a reality. As this chapter is written,
SpaceX, NASA, and similar technology are repeatedly proving the
efficacy of unmanned vehicles operating in multiple domains.
Traveling from land to Low Earth Orbit transitioning back into the
earth’s atmosphere and landing on the sea or land is now a reality.
With the success of SpaceX and others, the seas, skies, and space
may quickly become much more crowded and require traffic
management in order to achieve commercial viability. On August 7,
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2020, a Falcon-9 Unmanned Rocket took off from Cape Canaveral,
Florida, and successfully deployed 57 Starlink™ internet-beaming
satellites. After delivering its payload, the rocket successfully landed
in the sea. One mission, five domains, Land, Air, Space, then back to
Air, finally landing at sea.

Figure 8.10 SpaceX Falcon 9 Takeoff August 7, 2020
Source: (space.com, 2020)
Conclusions
While the SpaceX mission enjoyed the luxury of governmental
authorities maintaining adequate traffic control, when thousands
of unmanned logistical activities are co-occurring, the challenge
becomes exponentially more challenging. Multiple domains,
multiple nations, and multiple autonomous vehicles must function
in harmony with each other, manned and human traffic in each
domain, not to mention the weather and environmental interaction.
With subterranean and underwater automation, the challenge
seems daunting. Uniform traffic management systems for effective
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logistics must work across the globe in multiple languages and with
security. Any network is vulnerable to attack. Network design is far
too broad and complex to examine in this chapter; however, it is a
subject that must be in the front of all of our minds if the promise of
autonomous logistics is to come to fruition.
Questions for students to consider
1. In the event of war, terror attack, dispute, embargo or other
what is your vision to best mitigate the risk of calamity should
the global UTM system lose functionality?

2. What type of UTM network would you design in order to
minimize to the greatest extent possible security flaws and
inevitable DDOS and other attacks? Assuming the success of
such attacks how would you harden the system and provide for
multiple redundant capabilities not dependent on each other
to function?

3. Should the global UTM system be operated by nations
individually under agreed upon rules, or operate under a
multinational body such as the United Nations or a similar
organization?

4. Who will pay for this massive infrastructure investment? If
paid for solely by governments and private companies using
the technology are profiting from it, how would you recoup the
investment?
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5. If, after much study, planning and debate individual nations
decide to establish their own independent UTM systems, will it
be possible to reliably and safely operate autonomous logistics
between nations? If so, how would the system operate
secretive or repressive nations such as North Korea and Iran?
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9. Chapter 9: Chinese
Advances in Stealth UAV
Penetration Path Planning in
Combat Environment
[Nichols]
Student Objectives
The task of planning a flyable, safe, paths for stealth UAVs to
penetrate the US or allied forces Air Defense Systems (ADS) is
considered. Students will gain a fundamental knowledge of path
planning in terms of computer modelling of the path objective
functions and cost of paths from node to node in a network.
Constraints of collision avoidance, maneuverability, control, torsion,
2D /3D, communications, kinematics, SCADA are interwoven in
the coverage of modeling goals. Special emphasis will be on the
advances reported by Chinese researchers in improving the
standard path planning models by including model-based predictive
control and multi-step search methodology to increase the threat
effectiveness for penetrating an ADS using stealth UAVs.
Introduction
In our previous books on UAS and CUAS, the authors covered
a

huge

range

of

topics:

UAVS,

threats,

vulnerabilities,

countermeasures, radar, IFF, DEW, AI, autonomy, advanced systems
technology, stealth design, safe flight activity in the NAS, legal and
regulatory considerations, cyber taxonomies, INFOSEC, INFOWAR,
SCADA, SWARMS, acoustical defenses, US ADS, ADS-B, GPS
spoofing, Chinese New Silk Road Land and Sea Strategic advances,
and more. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019)(Nichols R. K., et al., 2020)
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The authors were concerned with the Counter- UAS Problem (see
below). (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) Essentially, the authors were
reactive in dealing with hostile UAS penetration of US ADS
networks. What the authors did not cover was the path planning for
a stealth UAV in static or dynamic civilian or combat environment.
This chapter explores some of computer models and methodology
to plan strategic UAV penetrations into a host civilian or combat
complex environment.
The treatment is cursory as our students do not need to be
aviation engineers or Red / Blue team members. They do need to
be familiar with the behind the scenes technology. This chapter
starts off with the C-UAS problem and attack on the Abqaiq Oil
Facilities by Houthi terrorists. It then morphs into questions of how
the Houthis ’succeeded where they had failed in the past; what the
Chinese technology addition did for them; how this attack could be
modelled / enacted with advanced UAV path planning techniques;
and what elements are common to the modelling of such dynamic
environment for UAS / UAV penetration.
What Is the Counter -UAS Problem?
The risk of successful terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense
Systems (ADS) via sUAS/UASs is greater because of improving
commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones,
capable

of

carrying

sophisticated

imaging

equipment

and

significant payloads, are readily available to the public. A range of
terrorist, insurgent, criminal, corporate, and activist threat groups
have demonstrated their ability to use civilian drones and gather
intelligence. How does the (or any) country defend against a
growing UAS threat? This is also known as the counter – UAS
Problem. General James D Mattis, SECDEF summed up the Problem
succinctly: (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019)
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“Unmanned

Aircraft

are

being

developed

with

more

technologically systems and capabilities. They can duplicate some
of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/
reconnaissance and attack missions. They can be small enough and
/ or slow enough to elude detection by standard early warning
sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly
forces.” (Chairman, 2012) The Saudi Arabian government has
incorporated / purchased many of the US and Israeli ADS
technologies into its own ADS.
Implications from Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields
On 14 September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed their
attack

on

the

Abqaiq

and

Khurais

oilfields

in

Saudi

Arabia. (Gallagher, 2019) The effect was to temporarily take out 5%
of the global oil production capacity. (Gallagher, 2019) Houthi rebels
claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that 10 drones (mixed
origins) and 17 missiles were deployed. (Lister, 2019) Ballistic missile
attacks by the Houthis have been previously deployed using old
Soviet and Iranian “Scud” SRBMs. No prior attack, since the Yemen
conflict began four years ago, has interrupted oil supplies.
The Houthis have sent dozens of drones and short-range ballistic
missiles against Saudi Arabia in the past two years. Many have been
intercepted by Saudi Air Defenses; others have fallen harmlessly.
Very few have caused limited damage and casualties. (Lister, 2019)
The Abqaiq oilfield is 800 miles from Houthi-held parts of Yemen.
The drones used were from North Korean Iranian and Chinese
technology origins. (Lister, 2019) The Iranian drones were dubbed
the UAV-X and have a range of 740 – 930 miles. This is a step up
from the SRBMs that were based on North Korean technology with
a maximum range of 186 miles. (Lister, 2019) The Chinese drones
have several names: “Qaseth-1” (“Striker-1”), a rebrand of the Iranian
Ababil-2 UAV and the “Mirsad-1” used by Hezbollah until
2018. (Gallagher, 2019) The step-up in the conflict game is the Iranian
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clone, KH-55 with a range of 1,550 miles. These were reportedly used
in the Saudi Arabian oil field attacks. (Gallagher, 2019) The Iranian
clone uses Chinese path planning stealth penetration technologies.[1]
The take-away from this attack is not just the loss of global oil
processing capacity and H2S stabilization processing facilities[2]
but the vulnerability and exposure of the Saudi Arabian Advanced
Air defenses. Most of the Saudi Arabian ADS are designed to defend
against traditional threats and are ill-equipped to tackle the
asymmetrical aerial threats such as drones. The vulnerability is
enhanced when so many essential oil-related infrastructure parts
are concentrated in a small area: storage, processing, compressor
trains and distribution. (Lister, 2019) Threats and vulnerabilities of
US ADS were covered in (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) and apply to the
ADS used by Saudi Arabia (SA) Over the last two decades, SA has
purchased many of their ADS from both US and Israel.
Think of this problem more globally. China, North Korea, and
Iran [referred to as CNKI technology cooperation] are aggressively
cooperating on drone technologies for use by terrorists against a
major oil production region. The technology is cost-effective as well
as human capital efficient. Drones substituting for manned aircraft.
Drones penetrating the SA ADS.
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Figure 9-1 Shows A haze of smoke is seen from the attacked oil
plant in Saudi Arabia
Source:

(Sheena

McKenzie,

2019)

https://www.cnn.com/

middleeast/live-news/saudi-oil-attack-dle-intl/
h_1ab7e8469e98525f887c3a4e588dde8a
Let us expand the threat. Refer to Figure 9-2. Note that the Strait
of Hormuz lies between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Bahrain, Qatar,
UAE, and Oman in the sandwich. Between the Gulf of Oran and
the Persian Gulf, about 20% of the global oil movement / supply
travels through the Strait of Hormuz. (EIA, 2019) The US 5th Fleet
currently protects this oil flow. There have been several clashes
between Iranian vessels and US Vessels. Drones cross over the US
Fleet every day and test its patience.
Remember, payloads can be anything: CBRN deployment devices,
drugs, surveillance packages, shaped charges, lasers, super
resolution cameras, weather instruments, GPS/GNSS cyber
weapons, missiles, etc.
The problem is twofold: what is the risk assessment for CNKI
drone technologies cooperation acted on either target (US 5th Fleet
or Saudi Oilfields -both in range of

KH-55’s) and what
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countermeasure technologies are available to counter the threats
presented and to mitigate those risks and system vulnerabilities?
Previous

works

have

covered

the

topics

of

conventional

countermeasures against SUAS / UAS and aggressor countercountermeasures specific to UAS deployment – SWARMS. (Nichols
R. K., et al., 2020)
Figure 9-2 Strait of Hormuz

Source: (Stratfor, 2019)
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What else did the Chinese give the Terrorists besides the
advanced KH-55 Missiles and Drones?
The answer is they taught the terrorists how to use the drones
more effectively by showing them how to computer model and
plan the penetration paths for their stealth UAVs in a combat
environment.
Chinese Advances in Rapid Path Planning for Stealth UAV in
Complex Environment with Bandit Threats
In a recent paper slated for publication in the International
Journal of Aerospace Engineering, Drs Zhang, Wu, Dai, and He,
presented computer modeling results from their research into the
subject of low altitude combat. Their paper addresses “a novel
algorithm for stealth UAV to realize the rapid penetration path
planning, which aims to devise a penetration strategy based on the
improved A-Star algorithm to address problems of path planning
and planning (sic) for stealth UAV in the complex dynamic
environment. The proposed method introduces the kinematic
model of stealth UAV and detection performance of netted radar
in the process of low altitude penetration. Combined with the
prediction technique and path planning algorithm, the multi-step
search strategy is developed for stealth UAV to deal with POP-UP
[3]threats and complete the planning (sic)of the path in different
scenarios. Furthermore, the attitude angle information is integrated
into

the

improved

A-Star

algorithm,

which

reflects

the

characteristics of the dynamic radar cross-section(RCS) and
conforms to the actual flight requirements for the stealth UAV.
Finally, the improved A-Star algorithm, learning real-time A-Star
algorithm(LRTA-Star), and dynamic A-Star algorithm(D-Star) are
respectively adopted to settle the problem of penetration path
planning for stealth UAV in three different threat scenarios.
Numerical simulations are performed to illustrate that the proposed
approach can achieve rapid penetration path planning for stealth
UAV indifferent dynamic threat scenarios and verify the validity of
the improved A-Star algorithm.” (Zhang, 2020)
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Novelty
The Zhang paper presents a novel addition to the A-Star
algorithm for path planning in a dynamic combat environment with
“POP-UP” / Bandit threats. The novelty is an upgrade from the
standard EW training on radar systems and Air Defense Systems
(ADS). (Adamy D. -0., 2015) (Skolnik, 2008) The optimization
techniques and computer algorithms (in present day computer
programming languages) have been well researched and are not
novel. (Reklaitis G. R., 1983) (Horowitz, 1978)
What is novel about the authors’ paper is the real time dynamics
and predictive control applied to stealth UAV path planning via
computer modelling. It results in a computationally multi-step
search pattern. The non-exclusive but mathematically necessary
goals of flyable paths, collision avoidance, computational efficiency
and reduced RCS are ably met with the authors’ improved A Star
algorithm. This gives us an insight into how far ahead the Chinese
may be in the field.
Keep in mind that UAVs at low altitude rarely have IFF capability
due to SCADA constraints and that Counter UAS (CUAS)
technologies can bypass stealth features in combat and civilian
UAVs. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) The
validity of the algorithm is demonstrated in known mathematical
bounded datasets with cases for single, dual, and networked radar
surveillance systems. No real flight data is used. To many students
in UAS, the above material is like jumping out of plane without a
parachute.
UAV Path Planning
Time to take a stroll down cooperative path planning for UAVs
in various environments. Then maybe we can recycle back to the
Zhang paper with just enough knowledge to get a sense of the
novelty of the technology about to be published by the Chinese
researchers. The clearest reference on the subject of Path Planning
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of UAVs is by Tsourdos, White and Shanmugavel. (Tsourdos, 2011)
We will draw heavily from this fundamental textbook. [4] There
are other fine textbooks on this subject to enhance the student
knowledge: (Angelov, 2012), (Austin, 2010), (Barnhart, 2012), and
(Dalamagkidis, 2012)

Path planning is a complex problem, which involves meeting the
physical constraints of UAVs, constraints from the operating
environment and operational requirements. Paths must be flyable.
Flyable paths meet kinematic constraints of the UAV. Satisfaction
of this constraint means that the motion of the UAV stays within
bounds on maneuver curvature. Paths must exhibit CA for threats,
obstacles, and other UAVs. Minimum fuel, energy conservation,
and shortest distance come into play for an efficient and better
performance path. (Tsourdos, 2011) Path planning algorithms
produce one or more safe flyable paths for the UAVs. Path length,
limited range, survey area, and flying direction all make a difference.
The UAV trajectory must comply with speed and maneuver
constraints; deployment of several UAVs in a coordinated manner
which involve CA and simultaneous arrival at one or more locations.
Lastly the algorithm that optimizes all these conditions must be
computationally efficient, work in real-time, re-plan its trajectory if
needed and with no significant delay. (Tsourdos, 2011)[5]
Path Planning Formulation
The primary aim of path planning is to provide structured
mobility and to facilitate moving or flying multiple UAVs from one
location to another. Several locations may mean several paths
before reaching the final destination. On any known or partially
known map /area there may be several points of interest (POIs).[6]
The UAV has a specific attitude, which combined with its location
to give the UAV pose[7] P(x, y, z, θ, Ψ), where x, y, z, is the UAV
location or waypoint and (θ, Ψ) are the horizontal and vertical
angles , respectively. (Tsourdos, 2011)
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Consider a UAV moving from one starting pose, Ps to another,
finish Pf . Path planning involves producing one or more flight paths
r(q) connecting Ps and Pf represented as
r(q)
Ps ————>Pf

(9.1)

Where r(q) is the resulting path, and q is defined as a path
parameter. This parameter can be a lengths variable (0 < q < s) for a
straight-line path or an angle variable (0 < q > θ). The choice of the
path variable depends on the path formulation.
Equation (9.1) is re-written for a single UAV as:
r(q)
Ps (xs, ys, zs, θs, Ψs) ————>Pf (xf, yf, zf, θf, Ψf)

(9.2)

Extending for N UAVs, where each pair of poses are connected by
paths ri (q):
ri(q)
Ps (xsi, ysi, zsi, θsi, Ψsi) ————>Pf (xfi, yfi, zfi, θfi, Ψfi)
(9.3)
Where I =1,…..,N.
Equation (9.3) connects a pair of points by a path. This also
represents route planning for one or more nodes of a network.
The UAV route is usually defined by a set of waypoints joined by
straight-line segments. However, these may not be flyable because
UAVs cannot turn instantaneously through each waypoint. This is
why waypoints require orientation for each segment to match –
essentially a common tangent to produce a continuous path.
(Tsourdos, 2011)Thus, some segments might be curved or curvylinear to meet the common tangent condition. SAA sensors for
ISTAR missions must be pointed in specific directions for effective
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detection and identification. (Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations, 2020)
Path Planning Constraints
Various constraints are involved in path planning. There are two
general types: UAV-specific and those arising from obstacles in the
environment. (Tsourdos, 2011) Violation of these constraints (i.e.
communication failure) may lead to the complete loss of the UAV
or sensor platform. Safety is a consideration for the mission. Turn
radius also dictates which paths are flyable.

Figure 9.3 Simple Block Diagram Approach to Path Planning for
UAVs
Source: Author drawn 07252020
Turn radius also dictates which paths are flyable. Paths must
balance safety and flyability. Flyable paths meet kinematic or
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motion

constraints

and

dictate

maneuverability

of

the

UAVs. (Tsourdos, 2011) Let Џ represent constraints. So (9.3) is
written to include constraints (9.4). We now have enough
information for a simple Black Box representation, Figure 9.1.
The inputs to Figure 9.1 are the poses, with additional constraints,
uncertainties, and measurements. The feedback loop senses the
measured states of the UAV and feeds back the success in terms of
meeting the constraints to the path planner. (Tsourdos, 2011)

Џ ri(q)
Psi (xsi, ysi, zsi, θsi, Ψsi) ————> Pfi (xfi, yfi, zfi, θfi,
Ψfi)

(9.4)

Figure 9.4 Autopilot and Guidance Control Loops
Source: Author drawn, 07252020
Paths need to meet the dynamic constraints of the UAV . They are
influenced by the motion of the UAV. Essentially we have a SCADA
control system. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) Refer to Figure (9.2) which
shows autopilot and guidance control loops.
The inner feedback loop is the autopilot and the outer feedback
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loop is the guidance system. The guidance system provides lateral
acceleration commands to keep the UAV on path. The autopilot
controls the UAV elevator, ailerons, and rudder to achieve the
required lateral acceleration. (Tsourdos, 2011)
UAV dynamics include the aerodynamics, which produces forces
and torques on the airframe. (Durham, 2013) Newton’s third law
of motion dictates that forces and torques produce lateral,
longitudinal, and rotational accelerations. The accelerations are
usually expressed in UAV body axes and these provide the link to
kinematics. (Tsourdos, 2011) Kinematics is produced by integrating
the UAV lateral and rotational acceleration vectors to obtain the
UAV velocity vector. The attitude angles and current UAV position
in the inertial frame give the UAV’s translational and rotational
velocity. The 2D path planner uses the kinematic model in equation
(9.5a-b):
ẋ = / v / cos (θ)

(9.5a)

ẏ = / v / sin (θ)

(9.5b)

where v is the UAV velocity and (θ) is the horizontal heading angle.
(Tsourdos, 2011)
Whether a given path is flyable is determined by the curvature
of the path. The path planning algorithm has to produce a path
r(q) that meets the dynamic turn rate constraint of the UAV, which
is translated into the kinematic curvature constraint in 3D. It is
determined by both the curvature and torsion. (Lipschutz, 1969) The
curvature at any point on the path must be less than the maximumcurvature constraint of the UAV because it is proportional to the
lateral acceleration. (Lipschutz, 1969) A curve segment of zero
curvature is just a straight line and a curve segment of a constant
curvature is an arc of a circle. At any given speed, v, the lateral
acceleration a is proportional to the curvature k such that:
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/ a / = / v2 / k ∞ k

(9.6)

Figure 9.5 Curvature and Torsion
Source: Author drawn
Where a is the lateral acceleration vector, k is the curvature, v
is the velocity vector and ∞ is a vector operator. For a constant
speed, the acceleration vector a is normal to the velocity vector v.
This ensures that the velocity vector rotates without changing its
magnitude. Refer to Figure 9.3where the velocity vector is aligned
with the tangent vector t and the acceleration vector is aligned with
the normal vector n. (Tsourdos, 2011)
Maneuver Coordinates
All maneuvers ca that coincide with the path tangent vector. n
be defined by reference to a set of coordinates. 2D path planning
confines the maneuvers to a plane. If the plane is horizontal, this is
equivalent to flying at a constant altitude. In 3D space, flyable paths
need to accommodate both curvature and torsion in their design.
Curvature defines the turn radius of the path in 2D, which is defined
as a rotation about an axis normal to the maneuver. Torsion is
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defined as a rotation about an axes. See Figure 9.3 Note that positive
curvature and positive torsion are defined as being clockwise along
the appropriate axis viewed from the origin. For a UAV, in terms
of body axes, curvature is equivalent to yaw rate turn and torsion
is equivalent to a roll rate turn. In practice, UAVs will perform the
turn by rolling to a fixed bank angle and then using the elevator to
produce a maneuver normal to the wings. [8] (Tsourdos, 2011)
Generation of Safe Paths
The second important constraint of path planning is safety. Safety
is measured by the ability of a UAV to avoid fixed and moving
obstacles, and other AC or UAVs. Safety is represented in terms of
a constraint that maintains flyability and collision avoidance. It is
represented by Џsafe and is used to modify path planning equation
(9.4). Џk considers the curvature constraint:

Џsafe Џk ri(q)
Ps (xsi, ysi, zsi, θsi, Ψsi) ————>Pf (xfi, yfi, zfi, θfi, Ψfi)
(9.7)

Other constraints could be added to the above equation. For
example, communication constraint on UAV separation distance
could be represented by Џcomm. (Tsourdos, 2011)
Collision Avoidance (CA)
Collision avoidance between two flight paths r1(q) and r2 (q) can
be represented by:
r1(q) ∩ r2 (q) = 0
(9.8)
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This equation captures the condition required to be satisfied for
CA. A cooperative path planning of multiple UAVs for CA can be
formulated as producing flight paths {r1(q), r2(q),….,rn(q)} subject to
the following constraints:
Џ = Џk,

k ≤ kmax; and Џτ, τ ≤ τmax; and Џsafe ri(q) ∩ rj
(q) = 0

i≠j

Such problems are solved by optimization algorithms which
involves heavy computation. In many cases the problem is broken
down into phases / stages. (Tsourdos, 2011) Here we have our first
intersection with the Chinese improvements on the A star algorithm
for path planning. (Zhang, 2020)
A huge amount of work had been done in optimization algorithms
to solve UAV and other problems. The best reference on the subject
is Reklaitis. (Reklaitis G. R., 1983) Of interest to the reader are three
optimization path finding algorithms: A-Star, D-Star, and improved
A-Star with predictive control. Focus will be on what makes them
different / useful for UAV path planning rather the details of the
algorithms which can be found in Zhang. (Zhang, 2020)
A-Star Algorithm
The A-Star algorithm is a heuristic search algorithm, which is
widely performed to various agents in the path planning problems
to various agents. The main thrust of the A-Star algorithm is as
follows. First, select the appropriate heuristic function, estimate the
generation value of the extensible search points in the target search
area, comprehensively. Compare the different cost values of each
point. Consider the operation time and distance cost of the track
point search. Last, find an optimal path. (Wikipedia, 2020) A-Star
selects the path that minimizes:
f(n) = g(n) + h(n)

(9.9)
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where: h(n) is the heuristic function, the estimated distance from
next node n on the path to the goal node; and g(n) is the cost of the
path from start node n to the goal. F(n) is the path cost function.
At each iteration of its main loop, A-Star needs to determine
which of its paths to extend. It does so based on cost of the path and
an estimate of cost required to extend the path all the way to the
goal. (Wikipedia, 2020)
A-Star has some disadvantages: A) only the position information
of the stealth UAV can be obtained in the path, and the dynamic RCS
characteristics and attitude information of the stealth UAV cannot
be obtained; B) unknown path cost estimation cannot be accurately
calculated in path planning, the final path cannot guarantee to be
globally optimal[9]; and C) performance improvements include
search validity, real-time performance in face of unknown threats
and the expansion of track modes. (Zhang, 2020)
D-Star Algorithm
D-Star algorithm is a variation of the A-Star algorithm suitable
for solving path planning problems in unknown environments. The
main idea of the algorithm is to search the reverse path from goal
to the origin when a new obstacle is found in the path. The path
between the target location and the path node within the range of
the new obstacle will not change due to the appearance of the new
obstacle, but the path between the UAV and the node within the
range of the obstacle will change during flight. The whole path is
only partially re-planned. The heuristic expression for the D-Star
algorithm is given by:
f(X, E) = h(X) + g(X, E)

(9.10)

where: h(X) represents the actual journey cost from goal to state
X and g(X,E) represents the estimated journey cost from the state X
to the current position of the stealth UAV. (Zhang, 2020)
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Chinese Improved LRTA-STAR Algorithm
Zhang describes the learning real-time A-Star algorithm (LRTASTAR) as a heuristic search algorithm which satisfies the
requirements of real-time planning in a dynamic environment by
establishing and updating the evaluation cost from each state to the
target point. However, the flight path planned by the single step
search is composed of a series of broken lines. The maneuverability
of the UAV is limited so that there is some difficulty to achieve
accurate flight path tracking control. Search results are prone to
traps in local dead loops, leading to failure of path planning. Zhang’s
team overcame these issues by combining LRTA-STAR with two
big improvements: 1) model-based predictive control (MPC) and
2) multi-step optimal search method. (MSSM) Zhang’s team
extensively compared all the variations and the improved LRTASTAR algorithm performed exceedingly well in a simulated combat
scenario using stealth UAVs! Clearly they are thinking about
penetration of allied ADS, something the military should take note
of if not already.
MPC
Model-based predictive control is an optimization control
method, which includes model prediction, rolling optimization, and
feedback correction. MPC is described in detail by Zhang. (Zhang,
2020) MPC optimal control law for a multi-step prediction is given
by:
N

W
J = ∑ qi [ yp (k+i) – yr (k+i)]2 + ∑ δj
[u(k+j-1)]2

i=1

(9.11)
j=1

where: N = length of the prediction domain; W is the length of
the control domain; qi is the output prediction error, and δj is the
weighting coefficient of the control variable. (Zhang, 2020)
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Multi-Step Search Method (MSSM)
MSSM is a further refinement on the LTRA-STAR algorithm. It is
novel search strategy based on multi-step optimization to achieve
re-planning for a stealth UAV in a dynamic environment. In MSSM,
the track cost of each predicted track is considered as a cumulative
value of N predicted track nodes. The objective function of UAV
flight planning can be obtained according to the optimal control law
of the MPC system. The cost of the predicted flight path in N steps
from the kth node is given by: (Zhang, 2020)

k+N

k+w

J(k) = ∑ [ b1T ( j/k) B1b1 ( j/k) +
( j/k)
j=k

εj Pnet ( j/k) + ∑ δj uT ( j/k) u
(9.12)
j=k

Conclusions
This chapter has touched on a premier concern of ADS systems –
path planning for stealth UAVs in a combat or civilian environment.
Chinese researchers appear to have a novel approach to penetrating
US ADS systems with stealth UAVs.[10] Their “improved LRTA-STAR
algorithm presents a new solution for path re-planning control of
stealth UAV in complex network radar environments with Bandit
threats.
The improved A-STAR algorithm is based on a multi-step search
strategy designed by model-based predictive control and LTRASTAR algorithm. The attitude angle information of the stealth UAV
is added to the calculations. This demonstrates the variation
characteristics of dynamic RCS. [11] Kinematic analysis of the stealth
UAV and detection performance analysis of netted radar, the
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original paths and the re-planning paths can satisfy the actual flight
requirements. (Zhang, 2020)
Discussion Questions
How would you implement the Chinese improved A-STAR
algorithm in onboard UAV computers? The calculations are
computer / storage intensive. Could part of them be done by
ground stations and the intermediate results be communicated up
to the UAV in real-time? How about on missiles? Rockets? A really
helpful reference on this question is by Dr Tewari. (Tewari, 2011)

References
Adamy, D. -0. (2015). EW 104 EW against a New Generation of
Threats. Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2001). EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare.
Boston, MA: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2009). EW 103 Tactical Battlefield Communications
Electronic Warfare. Boston, MA: Artech House.
Adamy, D. (2015). EW Against a New Generation of Threats. Boston:
Artech House.
Adamy, D. L. (2004). EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare.
Boston: Artech House.
Adamy, D.-9. (1998, Jan). Lesson 4: the basic link for all EW
functions. (electronic warfare)(EW Reference & Source Guide).
Journal of Electronic Defense, Jan 1998 Issue.

Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path Planning in
Combat Environment [Nichols] | 235

Alford, L. (2000). Cyber Warfare: Protecting Military Systems.
Acquisition Review Quarterly.
Angelov, P. (2012). Sense and avoid in UAS research and
applications. Hoboken: NJ.
Army, U. (1992, November 23). US Army Field Manual FM 34-40-7.
Communications Jamming Handbook.
Austin, R. (2010). “Design for Stealth”, Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UAVS Design Development and Deployment. New York: John Wiley
and Sons.
Barnhart, R. K. (2012). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
New York: CRC Press.
Beaudoin, L. e. (2011). Potential Threats of UAS Swarms and the
Countermeasures Need. ECIW.
Dalamagkidis, K. V. (2012). On Integrating Unmanned Aircraft into
the National Airspace System, 2nd edition. Denver, CO: Springer.
DoD-01. (2018). JP 1-02. Retrieved from Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf
DoD-02. (2018). Information Operations (IO) in the United States.
Retrieved from JP 3-13 : http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/
jp3_13.pdf
DoD-03. (2015). Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2013 to 2038.
Retrieved from DTIC: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a592015.pdf
DTRA. (2019, October 18). Private Communication re Aviation
Vulnerabilities.

(Nichols,

Interviewer)

Retrieved

from

https://www.dtra.mil/
Durham, W. (2013). Aircraft Flight Dynamics and Control. The
Atrtium, Chesterton, UK: Wiley.
EIA. (2019, June 20). The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most
important oil transit chokepoint. Retrieved from EIA – US Energy
Information Administration: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=39932
Eshel, T. (2019, September 14). AFRL to Test a Drone-Swarm Killer

236 | Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path
Planning in Combat Environment [Nichols]

HPM.

Retrieved

from

Defense

Update:

https://defense-

update.com/20190923_hpm.html
FAA. (2018, February 1). Part 107 Rule for sUAS. Retrieved from
Fly under the Special Rule for Model Aircraft: https://www.faa.gov/
uas/getting_started/model_aircraft/
Filbert, F. &. (2014, (July – August). Joint Counter Low, Slow, Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Test. Fires PB644-14, no 4. Washington:
DoD.
Fitts, R. (1980). The Strategy of Electromagnetic Conflict. Los Altos,
CA: Peninsula Publishing.
Gallagher, S. (2019, September 16). Missiles and drones that hit
Saudi oil fields: Made in Iran, but fired by whom? Retrieved from
Arstechnica.com: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/
missiles-and-drones-that-hit-saudi-oil-fields-made-in-iran-butfired-by-whom/
Hartman, K. a. (2013). The Vulnerability of UAVs to Cyber Attacks
– An Approach to the Risk Assessment. 2013 5th International
Conference on Cyber Conflict . Tallin: NATO CCD COE Publications.
Horowitz, E. (1978). Fundamentals of Computer Algorithms.
Potomac, MD: Computer Science Press.
Howard, C. (2019, June 21). What is the Strait of Hormuz, where
Iran shot down US Navy drone? Retrieved from Fox News:
https://www.foxnews.com/world/whats-the-strait-of-hormuziran-shot-us-navy-drone
Kania, E. (2017, July 6). Swarms at War: Chinese Advances in Swarm
Intelligence. China Brief Volume: 17 Issue 9. China Brief Volume: 17
Issue 9.
Kaye, T. a. (2001, September 30). ACHIEVING INFORMATION
DOMINANCE:. Retrieved from DODCCRP-Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center San Diego: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/
2002_CCRTS/Tracks/pdf/026.PDF
Kim, A. G. (2012, June). Cyber Attack Vulnerabilities Analysis for
Unmanned

Aerial

Infotech@Aerospace.com:

Vehicles.

Retrieved

from

https://www.researchgate.net/

publication/
Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path Planning in
Combat Environment [Nichols] | 237

268571174_Cyber_Attack_Vulnerabilities_Analysis_for_Unmanne
d_Aerial_Vehicles
Lipschutz, M. (1969). Schaums Outline for Differential Geometry.
NYC: McGraw-Hill .
Lister, T. (2019, September 16). Attack is a game-changer in Gulf
confrontation.

Retrieved

from

CNN:

https://www.cnn.com/

middleeast/live-news/saudi-oil-attack-dle-intl/
h_3e647100fa720927c962d7643472b12d
Marshall, D. M. (2016). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
2nd Edition. New York: CRC Press.
Moir, I. a. (2006). Military Avionics Systems. New York: Wiley
Aerospace Series.
Monahan, K. (2004). The Radar Book: Effective Navigation and
Collision Avoidance. Anacortes, WA: Fineedge Publications.
Myer, G. (2013, May-June). Danger Close Definition. Retrieved from
US Army Magazine: www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/
issues/2013/May-June/Myer.html
N/A. (2020, July 25). Cambridge Dictionary on line. Retrieved from
dictionary.cambridge.org/us/: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
us/
NASA. (2018). Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the
National Airspace System (NAS) Project. Retrieved from NASA:
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/autonomous-systems
Nichols, R. K. (2008, September 05). Counterintelligence &
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility . (SCIF) Needs –
Talking Points.
Nichols, R. K. (2019, March 14). Hardening US Unmanned Systems
Against Enemy Counter Measures. 7th Annual Unmanned Systems
Summit. Alaxandria, VA, USA: PPTX presentation , self.
Nichols, R. K., Mumm, H. C., Lonstein, W. D., Ryan, J. J., Carter,
C. M., & & Hood, J. P. (2020). Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Technologies & Operations. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #31.
Nichols, R. K., Mumm, H. C., Lonstein, W. D., Ryan, J. J., Carter,
C., & and Hood, J.-P. (2019). Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber

238 | Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path
Planning in Combat Environment [Nichols]

Domain, 2nd Edition. Manhattan, KS: NPP eBooks. 27. Retrieved from
www.newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27
Nichols, R. (Nov 28-30, 2006). Cyber Terrorism, Critical
Infrastructure, & SCADA Presentation. In R. Nichols (Ed.), Defense
Threat Reduction Agency Conference. Shirlington VA: Utica College,
Utica NY.
Nichols, R., Ryan, J., Mumm, H., Carter, C., Lonstein, W., & Hood,
&. J. (2020). Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and
Operations. Manhattan, KS: New Prarie Press #31.
Nichols, R., Ryan, J., Mumm, H., Lonstein, W., Carter, C., & &
Hood, J. (2019). Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain:
Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition. Manhattan, KS:
New Prairie Press #27 .
Nichols, R.-0. (2016, March 29). NCIE UAS SAA Final Rev 4. 2016
INFOWARCON conference presentation April 4-7, Nichols, R.K. et.
al. (3-29-2016) Presentation to INFOWARCON April 4-7 on NCIE
UAS SAA Final Rev 4, presented to 2016 INFOWARCON conference,
Memphis TN. Available as PPTx presentation download from author
or in CANVAS. Memphis, TN, USA: INFOWARCON16.
Nielsen, P. E. (2012). Effects of Directed Energy Weapons.
Middletown, DE: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Osborn, K. (2019, October 15). Swarm Hell: Can the U.S. Army Stop
Hundreds of Drones Armed with Explosives? Retrieved from National
Interest: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/swarm-hell-canus-army-stop-hundreds-drones-armed-explosives-88206
Randall K. Nichols, D. J. (2000). Defending Your Digital Assets
against Hackers, Crackers, Spies and Thieves. New York: RSA Press.
Rani, C. M. (2015). Security of unmanned aerial vehicle systems
against cyber-physical attacks. The Journal of Defense Modeling and
Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology.
Reklaitis, G. R. (1983). Engineering Optimization: Methods and
Practices. Boston: Wiley.
Reklaitis, G. R. (1983). Engineering Optimization: Methods and
Practices. Boston: Wiley.
Sheena McKenzie, M. W. (2019, September 17). Saudi attacks send
Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path Planning in
Combat Environment [Nichols] | 239

oil prices soaring. Retrieved from CNN: https://www.cnn.com/
middleeast/live-news/saudi-oil-attack-dle-intl/
h_1ab7e8469e98525f887c3a4e588dde8a
Singer, P. W. (2010, February 25). Will Foreign Drones One Day
attack the US? . Newsweek.
Skolnik, M. (2008). Radar Handbook, 3rd Edition. Boston: McGraw
Hill.
Sood

A.K.

&

Enbody,

R.

(2014,

December

19).

https://www.georgetownjournalofinternau-s-military-defensesystems-the-anatomy-of-cyber-espionage-by-chinese-hackers.
Retrieved

from

georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/

online-edition:
https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/onlineedition/u-s-military-defense-systems-the-anatomy-of-cyberespionage-by-chinese-hackers
Stratfor.
Retrieved

(2019,

October
from

20).

strait-of-hormuz-chokepoints.
https://www.stratfor.com:

https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/wv_small/
public/strait-of-hormuz-chokepoints.jpg?itok=xSgx6Hhi
Tewari, A. (2011). Advanced Control of Aircraft, Spacecraft and
Rockets. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Tsourdos, A. &. (2011). Cooperative Path Planning of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles . Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronotics and
Astronautics, Vol #235.
Wikipedia. (2020, July 26). A* Algorithm. Retrieved from Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A*_search_algorithm
Wiley, R. G. (1993). Electronic Intelligence: The Analysis of Radar
Signals, 2nd ed. Norwood, MA: Artech House.
Wilson, M. (2012). The Use of Low-Cost Mobile Radar Systems for
Small UAS Sense and Avoid. Sense and Avoid in UAS Research and
Applications.
Yu, X. &. (2015). Sense and avoid technologies with applications
to unmanned aircraft systems: Review and prospects. Progress in
Aerospace Sciences, 74, 152-166.
Yunmonk Son, H. S. (2015, August 12-14). Rocking Drones with
240 | Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path
Planning in Combat Environment [Nichols]

Intentional Sound Noise on Gyroscopic Sensors. Proc. 24th Usenix
Security Symposium. Washington, DC: USENIX. Retrieved from
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technicalsessions/presentation/son
Zhang, Z. W. (2020). Rapid Penetration Path Planning Method for
Stealth UAV in Complex Environment with POP-UP Threats.
International Journal of Aerospace Engineering, TBA.

Endnotes
[1] Chapter solely represents author’s conclusion based on his
research into Chinese weapons / technology.
[2] H2S is a problem for transportation of oil in tankers. It must
be reduced from the raw oil so that the vapor pressure in the
containers is stable. Unstable vapor pressure = explosion. Abqaiq
facilities are the largest H2S desulfurization facilities in the Middle
East (ME).
[3] The author identified the use of the term ”POP-UP” as a major
descriptive flaw. Almost every age group in society would use this
term to describe the irritating browser pre- or post-fetch interrupts
on their PC covering a slew of offensive subjects / offers /
ransomware / invitations / fraudulent requests, etc. We do not
think “POP-UP”. We think “Bogie or Bandit.” Aircraft threats that
are suddenly painted by radar well inside the radar’s range that were
not seen earlier at a greater range are called BOGIE or BANDITS
not “POP-UPS”. Bogies are radar or visual contacts whose identity
is unknown but not necessarily unfriendly. Bandits are aircraft
identified as enemy, in accordance with theater identification
criteria. Both Bogie and Bandit terms are based on criteria as
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defined elements within ROE to protect friendly ADS from hostile
aircraft.
[4] Tsourdos takes the discussion into 2D, 3D, Dubins paths, clothoid
paths, Pythagorean hodographs, guidance geometry, torsion
variations, and Frenet-Serret frames on 3D surfaces. These
mathematical devices although interesting are way beyond the
scope of this chapter.
[5] The computer modelling algorithms described in this chapter
are elegant, efficient, and complex requiring advanced knowledge
of optimization techniques, coding, differential geometry, and
Pythagorean hodographs. Only the results or final equations that
can be digested will be discussed.
[6] AKA waypoints. Same meaning for boat navigation
[7] Pose = 1) Present or constitute a problem , danger, or difficulty or
2) to move into a particular position, in order to be photographed,
painted, recognized, etc. (N/A, 2020)
[8] This is known as a bank-to-turn maneuver.
[9] It may also be computationally inefficient.
[10] It is not mere speculation that such advanced path planning
modelling may have been tested in the Abqaiq attacks. The UAVs
were successful in reaching their target with only loss of ~3 drones.
[11] The Radar Cross Section (RCS) and radar detection probability
methods are covered in many references. (Adamy D. , 2001) (Adamy
D.

L.,

2004) (Adamy

D.

,

2015) (Alford,

2000) (Monahan,

2004) (Skolnik, 2008) Derivations were not included in this chapter.
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Student Learning Objectives
The student will obtain an understanding of how the federal
regulation of UAS operations by the FAA, are affected by current
Fourth Amendment, privacy laws and their interpretation at
national, state, and local levels. Earn an understanding of how
privacy laws have been applied to UAS and the common
technologies

they

carry

in

their

payloads.

Develop

an

understanding of layered system of FAA regulation, matched with
state and local level UAS legislation.
Key Concepts
1. Understanding the creation and evolution of the UAS
legislative and regulatory operating environment, both
federally and locally.
2. Understand the relationship between the CoViD-19 pandemic
and UAS systems, their diverse technical payload and freight
carrying abilities.
3. The ability for UAS to enable a “Surveillance State”, facilitating
fear and the potential ‘over-regulation’ which could hinder and
undermine continued UAS industry growth in America.
4. Application and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
privacy laws, and why they matter to UAS operators and
industry.
5. FAA Regulations v. State Laws: Which is better for the
continued growth and progression of the UAS industry and
public privacy rights as a whole.

Chapter 10 UV, Social Networks &
Covid-19 Defense [Shay] | 245

A Recent Rise in UAS Operations, Privacy Concerns and A
Pandemic
The recent novel coronavirus (CoViD-19) pandemic has been a
black swan event which has brought many modifications to our
local, national, and global societies and norms. (Taleb, 2007) Many
of these required changes, such as those related to the desire for
increased usage and relaxed regulation of unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) will likely have the intended effect of increasing UAS usage
but may the unintended consequence of affecting the interpretation
and application of constitutional law.
The UAS industry with the rapidly evolving technologies it
employs, is by definition a disruptive technology. According to
Margaret Rouse on WhatIs.com, “A disruptive technology is one that
displaces an established technology and shakes up the industry or
a ground-breaking product that creates a completely new industry.”
(Rouse, 2016) This disruption of legacy industry will continue and
gain momentum, as UASs increasingly make their way into the
average American experience.
These flying robots are natural candidates to perform pandemic
related tasks categorized into the “three Ds”: dull, dirty, or
dangerous. (Diab, 2014)

Until recently, the Federal Aviation

Administration’s (FAA) regulatory framework governing UAS and
their industry was evolving at a slow, methodical pace. With the
onset of the pandemic, UAS regulation has loosened to allow more
industry partners to help the government combat the disease. Due
to the ever-growing list of payloads and tasks UAS can and do
perform, their new uses have made some citizens nervous and
rightfully concerned about their privacy. As with all innovation and
change, the UAS disruptions will have pros and cons. UAS sensors
and payloads have the potential to capture, record, and upload huge
amounts of data to their corporate owners and sponsors in near real
time. Whether you are a willing part to this collection or not, there
are privacy concerns regarding the collected data and for what it
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can and will potentially be used. The Fourth Amendment protects
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and
their property. (Smentkowski, 2020) Whether or not the data
collected and used by UAS, that pertains to individuals and their
activities in both public and private locations, is protected by our
Fourth Amendment rights or not is a brewing debate and one that
could delay this disruptive technology’s contributions to our society
and economy.
As UAS use continues to grow without specific legislation or
regulation protecting privacy, a legal conflict will likely ensue. This
conflict and its outcome will undoubtedly affect the interpretation
and application of constitutional law. We will look at the changes in
the FAA’s regulatory environment applicable to UAS, the court cases
most likely to be referred to as precedence when UAS operation
affects privacy concerns, any current cases in the federal system
with potential to become or change the legal precedence for UAS’
impact on Fourth Amendment rights[1], and the pros/cons of UAS v.
‘Public Privacy’ being regulated at the national level by the FAA or by
a more Federalist approach at the local and state levels.
Background to the FAA’s Regulatory Environment
To examine an environment and the effects a new technology
has on that environment, we first need to understand how the
environment was created and existed prior to the new technology.
It is important to understand why the FAA and not the legislative
bodies, have the authority to regulate private and commercial UAS
operations within the national airspace (NAS). Congress grants this
regulatory authority to ensure experts with aerospace experience
are making the decisions concerning the safety and accessibility
of the NAS. When Congress mandated the FAA establish rules for
the regulation of UASs, they started with drafting new rules for
private and commercial operators to establish CFR Title 14, Part 107.
Commercial operators who wanted to carry freight via UAS would
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also be regulated by meeting the applicable requirements in CFR
Title 14, Part 135, which all air carriers must comply with.
To appreciate the different roles of the FAA and state legislations,
as they pertain to UAS, and their effects on public privacy, it helps
to review an online press release dated 20 July 2018, from the FAA.
The title of the web page is, “Press Release – FAA Statement–Federal
vs. Local Drone Authority.” (FAA, 2018) The primary purpose of the
press release is to remind readers what gives the FAA its authority
over the entire NAS, and allows it to preempt state and local
governments from legislating UAS operations; EXCEPT for areas
traditionally governed by state or local legislation i.e. land use,
zoning, privacy, trespass[2], and law enforcement usages. (FAA,
2015)
There are two congressional laws which encompass most of the
federal legislation pertaining to UAS; the FAA Extension, Safety, and
Security Act (FESSA) of 2016, and the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018 (H.R. 302). There are others, such as the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2017, which makes it legal for the Department
of Defense to shoot down UAS over certain areas, but these only
have small or single sections pertaining to UAS. (Rupprecht J. )
The FESSA provided one key article of particular importance to
this chapter; the article which streamlined the FAA process for
approval of interagency teams to use UAS in emergency situations.
(U.S. Senate, 2016) We’ve included a summary of the Part 107 and
135 changes made by the FAA to address the CoViD-19 pandemic
in Appendix C. In short, the FESSA was exactly what the FAA used
when it issued the emergency changes at the beginning of the
pandemic to rules established under the direction of H.R. 302. (FAA,
2020)
As stated, most of the relevant legislation Congress has passed
pertaining to UAS was included in H.R. 302. For reference, we’ve
included a summary in Appendix A. The primary UAS result of
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H.R. 302 was the FAA’s establishment the regulations in the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 14, Part 107 requirements. The
operating environment created by H.R. 302 can be summarized by
the following: operators of UAS must obtain a certification from the
FAA, must be operated below 400’, must be operated within visual
sight of pilot, a pilot can only operate one UAS at a time, cannot
be operated over people, and cannot be operated at nighttime. For
reference, a summary of the complete set of CFR 14, Part 107 rules
pilots or UAS operators must follow is located in Appendix B. Since
the establishment of the Part 107 rules, any operators who wish to
deviate outside these rules is required to request a waiver through
the FAA.
To review the legal operating environment created by the H.R.
302, and its impacts on privacy, a few sections of the law, and the
deliverables required by those sections, are of particular importance
to this study. The first of these is Section 357, titled “UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PRIVACY POLICY UAS.” The summary of this
section is quite brief but clear, “UAS operations shall be carried out
in a manner that respects and protects personal privacy consistent
with the United States Constitution and federal, state, and local
law.[3]” Although this statement in the law appears to be quite
vague, it ensures the state and local authorities will have a say in
how UAS operations and their effects on privacy will be litigated.
The next applicable area of H.R. 302, Section 358, and titled “UAS
Privacy Review” mandates a deliverable from the Comptroller
General of the United States National Telecommunication and
Information Administration. The deliverable is a report to congress
from the Comptroller General because this is the office of
government that has been working on a review of federal, state, and
local statutes, meant to address UAS impacts on personal privacy.
The Comptroller General’s office was originally tasked with this
review by President Obama in his Presidential memorandum
“Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy,
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Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems,” dated February 15, 2015. (Obama, 2015) This
report was originally due to Congress 180 days after the signing of
the law, around April 2019, and has not been produced or delivered
according to the authors’ research.
The final section of H.R. 302 pertaining to this study is Section
378, titled “Sense of Congress.” The purpose of this section is to
require anyone who operates UAS for hire, except the media, to
have a written privacy policy which must be made available to
customers and the public. This policy is required to disclose the
collection, storage, use(s), destruction, and sharing of any data
collected during the UAS operations. (Zoldi, 2020)
It should be pointed out concerns over the changes made to UAS
regulation by the FAA have not created a wild west free for all of UAS
activity in the U.S. The changes made to the FAA’s regulations were
largely administrative. (FAA, 2020) There is an increasing amount of
UAS operating companies working to get into the CoViD-19 fight.
Here are examples of newly approved applications for waivers to
operate UAS during the pandemic:
• March, Wing begins making home deliveries of dry goods and
medicines to homes in Virginia during CoViD-19 induced lockdown, through FAA approved trial (Summers, 2020)
• April 27, UPS and Matternet get approval to support a
quarantined retirement community with UAS deliveries from a
local CVS pharmacy (Bonifacic, 2020)
• May 27, the FAA granted Zipline an emergency BVLOS waiver
to fly medical supplies in North Carolina. The flights will cover
20-30 miles and carry up to 4 lbs of medical personal
protective gear and supplies (de León, 2020)
• July 14, UPS and Matternet approved to deliver time and
temperature critical medicines and PPE to medical facilities in
N.C.(McNabb, Matternet and UPS Expand Hospital Delivery
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Network, 2020)
• July 28, Cotton Bowl is first outdoor stadium to use UASs
spraying disinfectant in an effort to combat CoViD-19 and
support sporting events. (Davis, 2020)

How Previous Case Law Concerning UASs or the Technology
They Carry, Has Been Applied Toward Privacy and Fourth
Amendment
To begin the examination of cases involving UASs, privacy
concerns and the Fourth Amendment; we will start with a relatively
recent case, Brossart v. North Dakota (2015)[4]. The following is
a summary of the case and its related features to our study. The
case involved local law enforcement requesting a UAS from the U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol to take photographic evidence when
local authorities were confronting Brossart over allegations of cattle
theft. This is the first known incidence in the U.S. where evidence,
collected by a UAS, without a warrant, was used against an American
citizen. Brossart looked to dismiss the charges due to his belief his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the UAS invading his
privacy.
His defense cited support from a SCOTUS decision in Kyllo v.
U.S. (2001)[5]. In this case SCOTUS ruled to throw out evidence
obtained by infrared technology without a warrant. The North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled the evidence from the UAS was
admissible due to the precedence set by SCOTUS in the ruling
of California v. Ciaraolo (1986)[6]. In this case SCOTUS ruled an
individual’s privacy and Fourth Amendment rights are not violated
when their actions can be observed from an aircraft in navigable
airspace, in this case, from 1000 feet above ground level (AGL).
With these decisions by the North Dakota Supreme Court, Brossart
was the first American citizen to serve federal prison time, due to
evidence obtained with a UAS. (Bomboy, 2014)
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To further examine the issue of UASs and privacy, it is sometimes
necessary to form a scenario using a very particular set of
assumptions. This was precisely the case made by David Sella-Villa
in his work, Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy. We
will look at just how a UAS would affect privacy within the set of
assumptions he describes in his paper, and what happens when you
alter the assumptions. Let us start with a UAS being operated with
a simple visual light spectrum camera. The visible light spectrum
simply put is light or images visible to the naked eye.[7] Further
we are only looking at scenarios where the UAS are being operated
and piloted legally. Finally, it is important to know the author’s
definition of privacy, which is “privacy simply means freedom from
unwanted visual observations in and about the home.”[8] (Sella-Villa,
Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy, 2020)
Another key condition to be noted concerning this paper and the
author’s view point is the statement and reference that UAS flights
beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS), “have been reserved exclusively
for military and search-and-rescue operators.”[9] Although this
may have been true at the time of his writing and publishing, the
UAS industry has been moving towards BVLOS flights as being
absolutely necessary for UAS delivery and other commercial uses.
(Seeking Alpha, 2019) Within these viewpoints and assumptions,
the author examines and makes a convincing argument that UASs
outfitted only with visual light spectrum cameras do not
significantly challenge the jurisprudence[10] of privacy law in the
U.S. However, the author does concur that UASs are significantly
able to exploit traditional assumptions about privacy and trespass as
defined in our legal system. (Sella-Villa, Drones and Data: A Limited
Impact on Privacy, 2020)
The most significant contribution of Mr. Sella-Villa’s paper to this
chapter’s study is his break-down of why UASs outfitted with visual
light spectrum data collection devices alone, will not challenge our
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Fourth Amendment rights, as the laws are currently written. Much
of his legal reasoning for this has to do with the precedence of
“Third Party Doctrine”.

The basis of this concept has been

established through several cases heard and decided by the
SCOTUS, and “maintains that one cannot assert a privacy interest
over something that has been knowingly shared with a third
party.”[11] The two primary ideas behind this premise according to
the author’s listed assumptions, are; the UAS is operated legally,
without trespass and the UAS’ image capture software stores images
remotely. This is almost always true because of the how UASs share
what they are ‘seeing’ in near real time with their operators. (SellaVilla, Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy, 2020)
Additional examples of how UAS and their technologies
potentially impact privacy concerns can be found in products of the
Congressional Research Service, which prepares and drafts reports
for Congress[12]. One particular we will examine is titled, Drones in
Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications
and Legislative Responses, by Richard M. Thompson II, a Legislative
Attorney. His report specifically looks at and addresses the use
of UAS by law enforcement to conduct surveillance both with a
warrant and without one. Key points highlighted in this report are
how a UAS is essentially a data collection device, and that without
its high technology payloads, should not be considered a threat
to Fourth Amendment rights or privacy laws. The author suggests
that many of the known high-tech payload capabilities of UAS (keep
in mind this article was written in 2013) have been addressed
sufficiently in federal or state laws. In the conclusion however, the
author concedes that where the capabilities of a UAS and its payload
is headed, could be a place that will stretch our current privacy
and Fourth Amendment protections to their limits. (Thompson II,
Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment
Implications and Legislative Responses, 2013)
A second report from the Congressional Research Service, also
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written by Thompson, but slightly later in 2015, is titled Domestic
Drones and Privacy: A Primer. This report, its cited sources, and the
author’s legal perspective provide a comprehensive understanding
of the complexities surrounding UAS and our current legal
framework’s ability to contain the privacy invasion concerns and
unlawful search threat posed by the potential of UAS payloads.
(Thompson II, Domestic Drones and Privacy: A Primer, 2015)
Technologies of the Digital Age and the Fourth Amendment
Further study of the existing legal and regulatory landscape and
the dangers of its lack of specific privacy protections, can be found
in The Sky Police: Drones and the Fourth Amendment, by Jessica
Dwyer-Moss. Her work is a fairly comprehensive examination of the
wide array of technologies UASs can bring to domestic authorities’
surveillance methods. Applicable legal cases, pertaining to the
individual technologies and their impact on the Fourth Amendment
are also reviewed. This work uses many of the case studies we
have discussed previously to show how dated these references are
compared to the twenty first century technologies UASs will
present to test them. An important case she brings to the
discussion is Carpenter v. United States[13]. This case was not
decided by the time of her publishing, but she correctly included
it due to its topic being cell phone location records being used
without a warrant, in the conviction of a robbery suspect. Shortly
after she published her article, SCOTUS decided the case. In their
decision it was determined that cell phone location data is constant
and should be considered from the legal standpoint like GPS data, as
protected by the Fourth Amendment, requiring law enforcement to
obtain a warrant for its sharing and use as evidence. This is seen as
a win for privacy advocates and a blow to the Third-Party Doctrine’s
coverage of modern electronic data. (Dwyer-Moss, The Sky Police:
Drones and the Fourth Amendment, 2018)
Another case highlighted by this work is Riley v. California[14]. In
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this case SCOTUS had to decide if law enforcement could search
an individual’s cell phone upon arrest. The court in its decision
made particular note that the main reason an officer is allowed to
search an individual under arrest is to preserve evidence and ensure
safety of the officer and person under arrest. SCOTUS concluded
digital data could not harm an officer or help the individual escape,
a warrant was required in order to search a cell phone. (DwyerMoss, The Sky Police: Drones and the Fourth Amendment, 2018)
This ruling could be immensely important to UAS operators and
companies, since the primary thing UASs will “deliver” in the near
future is data.
Dwyer-Moss also examines the rulings in cases where aerial
observation was a key component, although Brossart v. North
Dakota was not among them. Dwyer-Moss is an Assistant General
Counsel at the Department of Defense whose extensive areas of
practice include but are not limited to, Privacy Act, Privacy and Civil
Liberties, and Intelligence Oversight. (Dwyer-Moss, Jessica DwyerMoss’ Profile, 2020) Her knowledge, opinions, and expertise in
subjects discussed in this chapter has been immensely helpful in
establishing the current environment and upon where it can be
improved.
An important legal construct to understand when we look at how
UASs and the data they can collect effect privacy and the Fourth
Amendment is known as the Miller Doctrine or Third-Party
Doctrine. This extremely important concept in Fourth Amendment
law came from two decisions, Smith v. Maryland[15] and United
States v. Miller[16], by SCOTUS in the 1970s. These two decisions
both referenced SCOTUS’s decision in Katz v. United States[17].
In the Katz decision SCOTUS ruled that Fourth Amendment
protections not only applied to an individual’s tangible things but
also to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. United
State v. Miller’s decision helped to frame and contain this
expectation by establishing that no reasonable expectation of
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privacy can be expected when one uses the services of a third
party, in this case the phone company, to contact (dial numbers)
another party. The conversation between yourself and the party
you contact is protected and would require a warrant for authorities
to access[18], but the number you dialed, the time you dialed it, and
the connection made, were ruled to be business records of the third
party, and therefore could be subpoenaed[19]. In Smith v. Maryland,
a similar decision was handed down stating that records such as
deposit slips, and checks used by an individual to perform business
with the bank were not protected by the “reasonable expectation of
privacy”[20] outlined in Katz because the customer was voluntarily
sharing and disclosing their business with a third party[21]. All these
decisions taken together have come to be known as the Third-Party
Doctrine. This doctrine and its application to twenty-first century
technology is highly applicable to the subject matter of this chapter.
(Thompson II, The Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine, 2014)
Examinations of Technologies on UASs due to CoViD-19
An examination of all the individual technologies UASs are capable
of carrying and collecting data with, is beyond the scope of this
chapter. In an effort to discuss these technologies in a relevant
perspective, we will discuss one cutting edge technology and how
it is being used in the CoViD-19 pandemic. This technology was
selected to be the example of how new technologies can raise
privacy and Fourth Amendment concerns. The technology is a new
form of bio-identification. A recent study of this new technology
demonstrates just how capable UASs have become at being private
data collection devices. The recent research study proved how
UASs can pick-up and monitor the cardiorespiratory signals from
multiple individuals while flying at 200 feet AGL. (Al-Naji, 2017)
This type of progress and advancement in a potential payload’s
abilities are the kinds of advancements, once unleashed on society
‘for its own good’, are very difficult to discontinue or legislate after
the fact. Although, as we will discuss in a later section, efforts to
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legislate this type of UAS data collections have been proposed and
argued in state capitals.
Another work to study modern technology and its impact on
the Fourth Amendment, is a short but important contributor to
this chapter. The article is Drones and the Fourth Amendment by
Robert E. Smith and published in the May 2017 edition of Privacy
Journal. In his work, Smith concentrates on the implications of the
government’s use of UAS equipped with surveillance technologies.
His first point is how there is an established precedence for the
government to use visual camera-based surveillance both with and
without warrants. These instances without a warrant require
certain circumstances to exist such as “possible destruction of
evidence, escape of a suspect, danger to the police or public.”
However, any video surveillance that includes audio recordings
must have a warrant. This is due to established requirements in
the federal electronic surveillance laws. Smith boils down the two
most important cases, in his opinion, for UAS surveillance by the
government. These are Kyllo v. U. S., due to the use of thermal
imaging equipment; and Jones v. U.S. and its use of GPS tracking
data. The final point to stress from this article is the one Smith
makes by including words from the late Associate Justice Anton
Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in both cases. In the
majority opinion of Jones v. U.S., Justice Scalia wrote;
“This court has to date not deviated from the understanding
that mere visual observation does not constitute a search…It may
be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to
answer that question. We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing
problems’ in some future case where a classic [physical trespass]
is not involved.”
Associate Justice Anton Scalia, (2012)
In another fairly prophetic portion of the major opinion, Justice
Scalia also noted, “the transmission of electronic signals without
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trespass” falls under Fourth Amendment restrictions. (United States
v. Jones, 2012) (Smith R. E., 2017) To date, from the author’s research,
no further decision by the Supreme Court has addressed the
potential of electronic signals to be included in or excluded from
Fourth Amendment protections.
Federalism or Federal Regulation of UASs
To better understand the role of Federalism in UAS and
privacy legislation and regulation, we will look at both the proFederalism view, and the con-Federalism (or continued FAA
regulation) view. Available academic materials were heavily sided
toward the pro Federalism argument of UASs and their abilities
being regulated at a local level. The con arguments cited are
predominately articles from economic advocacy groups.
Pro Arguments
To begin the look at the “Pro” side of the argument, an essay by
Margot E. Kaminski titled Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and
the Things they Carry, was reviewed. Her essay is rooted in the
belief that there are two basic areas of UAS privacy legislation, UAS
use by law enforcement, and UAS use by civilians. She notes the
FAA’s regulations have specifically allowed law enforcement to use
UAS technology since the Congress’s original UAS legislation[22]. A
common theme throughout this essay is the regulation and control
of UASs and their payloads is best legislated by local authorities
because of their “experience regulating other forms of civilian-oncivilian surveillance.” Perhaps the most notable argument for local
authorities to regulate the privacy concerns around UASs, is one
where she points out that an overarching and preemptive bill by
Congress or omnibus privacy regulation by the FAA would, to be
effective, be too restrictive in nature and run the real risk of
infringing on UAS operators First Amendment rights. The essay
also points out the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(112 Congress, 2012) does not mandate the FAA take up the issue
of privacy, and suggests the reason for this is likely the tradition
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of states and local governments enacting privacy controls at their
levels. Her conclusion has a focused warning against Congress
getting in too big of a hurry to control the budding UAS threat, and
to allow the state and local authorities address the issue in their
own jurisdictions. (Kaminski, 2013)
The next work doesn’t so much argue for the states to regulate
UASs as it assumes their control by local authorities is what is
best for the growth potential of the UAS industry as a whole. In
their report, Which States Are Prepared For the Drone Industry,
Brent Skorup and Connor Haaland from George Mason University
study which states have prepared themselves to take advantage of
the economic benefits the UAS industry can bring. The basis of
their work is the assumption that states can best be ready to reap
these benefits by creating “drone highways-aerial corridors directly
above public roads.” The authors research which states have the
appropriate legislative conditions to enact UAS highways. They do
this documenting and grading all 50 states on their preparedness in
5 factors for UASs and enacting UAS highways. The factors are: an
airspace lease law on the books, an avigation easement law, a law
vesting air rights with landowners, some sort of aviation advisory
committee at the state level, and a look at the number of UAS jobs
(per 100,000 residents) in each state. Of note, North Dakota was
ranked #1, Arkansas #2, Vermont #3, Kansas #32, and S. Carolina
#50. The ‘air’ highways described by Skorup & Haaland are one
of the concepts proposed that would make the UAS industry more
palatable to property owners concerned about their privacy and
is a novel way for states to enact similar legislation to maintain
an economically even playing field. Whether this legal construct
for UASs catches on and is enacted or not remains to be seen. (B.
Skorup & Haaland, 2020)
The final piece of pro-Federalism research comes from a guest
article published by Dronelife.com, but written by Jonathan Hayden,
Esq. It is titled Why the Drone Community Should Not Embrace
Chapter 10 UV, Social Networks & Covid-19 Defense [Shay] | 259

Exclusive FAA Control of Drone Regulations. In this article, Mr.
Hayden begins by setting the scene twenty years into the future.
He assumes that many of the FAA’s UAS regulatory arm members
and experts are former employees from the larger of the companies
within the UAS industry. This is not an uncommon or unlikely
occurrence since other federal regulatory bodies are currently
made up of such professionals. The problem Mr. Hayden foresees
with this is if the FAA has complete regulatory control, this can
create an environment where the large corporations, who are
primarily concerned about profit, will have too large of a voice in
the regulatory process. An idea which has been demonstrated in
other industries on multiple occasions. This could even create a
reality where landowners are prevented from flying UASs over their
own property because they may interfere or endanger commercial
UAS activity in some scenarios. The best possible answer to this
is for the states and local governments to have control over their
jurisdictions. (Hayden, 2020)
Con Arguments
The first argument against a federalism approach to UASs, privacy
and the Fourth Amendment is a revisiting of The Sky Police: Drones
and the Fourth Amendment, by Jessica Dwyer-Moss. As a backdrop
to the overall concerns from UASs on privacy in her paper, Ms.
Dwyer-Moss opens her work with the following quote, “In the far
distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for
an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.”
(Orwell, 1949) The majority of her paper examines a collection of
case law which can and will be used as precedence to decide UAS
and high technology legal disputes in the near future. The problem,
as the Dwyer-Moss sees it, is that precedence can be overturned by
a new subjective definition of societies “reasonable expectation of
privacy” and regulations can be changed by an agency submitting
a proposed change and allowing it to be committed on before
changing it. The only sure way for Fourth Amendment protections
to be guaranteed is for Congress to take up the matter and legislate
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visual and electronic surveillance norms.

She sums up her

argument by stating that “A national approach is ideal, but in the
absence of federal legislation, some states have begun to regulate
drones for themselves.” (Dwyer-Moss, The Sky Police: Drones and
the Fourth Amendment, 2018)
An additional argument against the state and local governments
controlling UASs is presented in States Rush to Regulate Drones
Ahead of Federal Guidelines, by Sarah Breitenbach. This article uses
what the states have already tried to do in their legislation to make
the argument that Congressional law and Federal regulation will
be the best way to protect privacy without stifling the natural
innovation of this disruptive technology.

In 2015 California’s

Governor vetoed a law that would have made it illegal for any
commercial or private UAS to fly less than 350 feet AGL over private
property without consent. Had this legislation been enacted, UAS
delivery in California would have been severely set back. An
interesting point in this article is when the author notes the ACLU
has not requested tighter regulation of UASs due to their belief that
most privacy concerns posed by UASs are covered by laws already
on the books. In a further comment, the ACLU attorney, Chad
Marlow suggested state laws limiting UAS activity can actually harm
society by preventing the filming of illegal activity. (Breitenbach,
2015)
A Look at UAS Federalism in Action
In order to understand what state legislative responses
have been to disruptive UAS and the technologies they carry; we
will review state legislation whose primary purpose was to address
UAS or their technologies specifically. A comprehensive review of
all the state legislation pertaining to our topic is beyond the scope
of this textbook. To ensure a more accurate accounting of state
UAS laws, two web sites were used to create the collection of laws
represented in this chapter. The first was the site of the National
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State

Legislative

Council.

(National

Conference

of

State

Legislatures, 2020) This site was extremely thorough with its list
of UAS impacting legislation and resolutions, up to and through
2019. This sight included laws that addressed newer technology
privacy laws in its list, knowing that UAS could or would be outfitted
with increasingly sophisticated payloads. The second site was a
site dedicated to monitoring state and local governments, called
Governing.com, and their adaptation to current events and national
cultural trends. One article on this site in particular looked at how
state and local governments were using UAS technology as an
answer to the CoViD-19 pandemic. (Smith C. , 2020) This article and
its included database have been kept current through the writing of
this chapter.
State Laws Pertaining to Privacy and UASs Before CoViD-19
In the effort to understand the different approaches state
legislatures took to regulating UAS and their potential to impact
privacy, the author first went to the website for the National
Conference of State Legislatures[23] (NCSL). This site lists and
tracks by each year (from 2013-2019), all state legislatures who
introduce UAS law, and each of them that end up enacting UAS
laws. A review of all state level UAS laws introduced that pertain
to privacy is beyond the scope of this Chapter. Particular attention
will be paid to those laws that address privacy concerns in all 50
states. The following is a list of state laws concerning UAS and
their impact on privacy or the Fourth Amendment, and their
summaries. (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020)
Table 1. State Laws and Resolutions pertaining to UASs, their
administration and Wildlife (National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2020)
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Table Footnote 1-Virginia was the first state to pass a piece of UAS
legislation, with the passing of HB2012. This defined what a UAS
legally is.

The Table 1 above contains a list of all the state UAS laws and
resolutions which pertain to the administration of UASs, with a
final column showing the states with laws concerning the use, or
prohibition of use, of hunting and fishing with UASs. The inclusion
of the laws pertaining to UAS affecting the privacy of hunters/
fishers or the rules pertaining to using UAS while hunting and
fishing demonstrates a unique look at the priorities of state
legislatures as the introduction of UAS technology is growing. The
table listed below is a look at which states addressed UAS and their
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impacts on personal privacy, either through their physical presence
or the data they collect.
Table 2. State Laws and Resolutions pertaining to UAS, their
impacts on law enforcement, personal privacy, and
wildlife (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020)

Due to the ever-changing landscape of laws and resolutions at the
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state level, a second source listing these laws was used. Automated
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) maintains a site of
state and local laws that affect UASs, autonomous ground vehicles
and unmanned maritime vehicles. (AUVSI Advocacy, 2020) The
information on the AUVSI website was reviewed and found to be
more comprehensive, as in there were UAS and robotic bills found
on this site, but all bills found on the NCSL were verified on the
AUVSI site.
Federal and State Laws Pertaining to Privacy and UAS After
CoViD-19
Since the CoViD-19 pandemic’s dominance of societies attention,
the methods and instruments used by society to deal with and
attempt to contain the disease have not only been addressed by
each citizen, but our federal legislative and regulatory bodies as
well. The FAA was quick to realize the constraints their regulations
were placing on the UAS industry in the name of safety, were
needlessly preventing the potential of UASs to be a key tool in the
fight against the virus. With this realization, the FAA was quick[24]
to put out extensions on any knowledge requirements with the
SFAR. The biggest changes made by the FAA to help get UASs into
the fight against CoViD-19 has been an effort to quickly return
approved waiver requests for BVLOS flight, night flight, and other
requests by UAS operators and pilots.
There have been 58 State Law concerning UASs proposed so far
this year with only one of them being directly contributed to the
CoViD-19 pandemic. (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2020) The number of UAS laws to actually be enacted by states so
far this year is only 6. Below is a chart to show the status and topics
of state UAS laws pertaining to privacy. For consistency of method,
the author made note of how many states continue to address UASs
being used in hunting or fishing.
Table 3. Status of 2020 State UAS Legislation (Governing.com,
2020)
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Table Footnote 1-New York was the first state to draft UAS &
CoViD-19 specific related legislation[25]

Conclusions
UASs are becoming more prevalent in American society and the
industry is expected to grow exponentially once BVLOS commercial
flights become a reality. In July 2020, it was reported the use of
the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC)
has significantly increased in so far in 2020. In the first 6 months
of 2020, a third of the 320,000 LAANC authorizations (it’s been
operating since Oct 2017) were submitted by UAS operators and
granted by the FAA. (McNabb, LAANC Use Accelerates: Kittyhawk
Reports All-Time Record Levels of Activity, 2020) Further evidence
of increased UAS activity during the pandemic, the numbers of FAA
registered UASs and certified pilots continues to grow. On 10 March
2020 we checked the numbers on the FAA’s “UAS By the Numbers”
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website. We checked the site again on 28 July 2020. Only 138 days
have passed.

Table 4. Registered UAS & Certified Pilot growth during the 2nd
quarter of 2020 Invalid source specified.Invalid source specified.
With healthy growth of the UAS industry even during the
CoViD-19 pandemic, the importance of understanding how UASs
will affect the Fourth Amendment and the privacy rights attached
to it are even more important. Since the beginning of the pandemic
there have been multiple nations around the world using UASs in
their fight against the CoViD-19 virus. (Chen, 2020) Some appear
to be using the pandemic to push forward their own desires to
increase their surveillance state. (Maynes, 2020) Americans see
these situations and naturally fear UASs and their capabilities will
facilitate a similar environment here. (Tuccille, 2020) During the
chapter, we have reviewed an immense amount of material to study
concerns about UAS and their effects on our privacy laws. Many of
these references have shared deep concerns UASs will impact our
privacy and Fourth Amendment protections. Dissenting views were
more difficult to come by but made strong focused arguments our
current laws are sufficient for the current level of technology used
by UAS. (Sella-Villa, Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy,
2020)
As pointed out previously, the changes to UAS laws so far during
the pandemic have largely been administrative. Without the blanket
approval of BVLOS flights, night flights, or commercial freight
licenses, there hasn’t been an overwhelming number of UAS taking
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to the sky and therefore there has been no need for knee-jerk
reactions by the Congress or the state legislatures.
The slow and fairly methodical spread and management of UAS
delivery introduction appears to be exactly what is necessary for the
current environment. The FAA’s focus on safety and free efficient
economic mobility in the U.S. NAS, while leaving the issues of law
enforcement use, zoning, and privacy to be governed by that state
and local authorities (FAA, 2018) appears to be the best mix of
Federal oversight and Federalist control for the UAS industry, at
the moment. This patchwork approach has been proven for other
transportation focused industries such as the automobile industry
and maritime industry. We shall see of this remains true for UAS.
Student Questions

1. What has been the impact, if any at all, of the CoViD-19
pandemic related regulatory changes to increase UAS use
during the U.S.’s pandemic response?
2. Do these changes create an environment where UAS and their
payloads can further infringe upon or hamper individuals
Fourth Amendment rights?
3. Can you name benchmarked and precedence establishing
court cases concerning UAS and the technologies used in their
payloads?
4. What situations can you see where privacy and Fourth
Amendment rights can be endangered or negated by UAS and
their payloads?
5. When it pertains to privacy and UAS, do you think a national
approach to regulation, or a Federalist approach is better for
the UAS industry? For public privacy protections? For
advancing and protecting both?
6. Were your answers to the previous question different? Why?
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11. Chapter 11 UV &
Disinformation /
Misinformation Channels
[Ryan]
Preamble
Much of this book is devoted to technology and its application
within specific domains. This chapter will explore the use of
unmanned vehicles as conduits of information and the varying
purposes to which those conduits can be put.
Student learning objectives
After reading this chapter, students should be able to do the
following:
1. Describe the components of communications
2. Define misinformation and disinformation
3. Describe the types of problems that can result from deceptive
information in automated systems.

The Ruses of War
The concepts of misinformation and disinformation come from
the practices of adversarial competition. In fact, they are only
useful in adversarial competition.

In collaborative endeavors,

misinformation and disinformation can be not only problematic but
downright dangerous. Think about a team of medical professionals
working together to perform a surgery, or a team of operators
working with remote unmanned systems to execute a mission. Any
problems

with the clarity and common

understanding

of

information could be disastrous. When working with another party
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towards a common goal, it is paramount that all parties understand
the goal, the steps, and the strategies clearly. Any mistakes in
information, whether originating from the sender or by faults in the
transmission or misinterpretation by the receiver, causes friction in
relationships. That friction slows down the effectiveness and speed
of collaboration, because clarification must be sought, sometimes
multiple times. A savvy competitor uses such friction to gain an
advantage. An aggressive competitor creates and promulgates such
friction to undermine and damage abilities to interpret, analyze, and
strategize.
In competition, it is sometimes useful to increase the friction
rather than decrease it. As the Earl of Chesterfield observed in
1749, “without some dissimulation, no business can be carried on
at all.” (Breuer, 2001, p. viii) In warfare, the practice falls under a
category known variously as stratagem, deception, diversion, ruse,
or camouflage (Whaley, 2007). Disinformation can be considered
as “the most important single broad category of ruses … fed into
another’s information system in order to deceive him” (Whaley,
2007, p. 8). The practice of disinformation has spanned all of
history (Breuer, 2001) (Whaley, 2007) and has been observed in the
animal kingdom as well (King, 2019). As noted by Breuer (2001),
“force and fraud have been the two cardinal principles of warfare
since Sun Tzu, the Chinese warlord who conquered huge expanses
of Asia, recorded his military theories in 550 BCE: ‘undermine the
enemy, bewilder and confuse him, strike at his morale, then his army
will fall to you.’” (Breuer, p. 1) As such, it is prudent to understand
both effective communication and how that process can be
subverted or perverted.
Understanding Effective Communication
In order to understand the subversion of communication, it is
necessary to understand what communication is and what
distinguishes effective communication. There have been many,
many, many tomes written on effective communication, but for
the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the complexities
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of communicating from person to person through the lenses of
effective listening techniques and a model of communicative
elements.

The Elements of Communications
There are several different elements of communication that are
important to understand. The most common way of referring to
these elements is as ‘signal’ and ‘noise’. However, that type of
nomenclature obscures the subtleties associated with deception.
For the purposes of this discussion, the ‘signal’ is described in four
categories while ‘noise’ is treated through two categories.
First, there is information that is both relevant and truthful. An
example of this could be a fire alarm that correctly alerts a home
owner to a fire in the home while he is home. It would be less
relevant if the homeowner were away and unable to respond to the
matter.
Next, there is information that is truthful but irrelevant. For
example, if a person interrupted a business meeting to inform
everyone present that two people in the grocery store were seen
arguing, that would be truthful but highly irrelevant to the business
meeting. It is a distraction.
Following that, there is information that is relevant but false or
misleading. An example of this could be a lie about a situation or
manipulated media that presents a situation differently than what
really happened.
Finally, there is information that is irrelevant and false or
misleading. An example of this might be casual gossip that spreads
an untrue rumor.
Technical problems in the communications channel, such as static
or blurred focus, are distinguishable from the previous categories
and deserve a separate discussion. While technical problems are
neither true nor false, they do impede the effectiveness of
communications.

Further,

they

may

be

caused

by

either
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circumstances (weather, faulty equipment, or user error) or by
malicious activity (jamming, sabotages, or computer exploit).
Note that there are 4 components that are undesirable. We can
simplify by referring to them as misinformation and disinformation,
thusly:
• Misinformation is the general term for information that is one
of the following types:
◦ o Truthful but irrelevant information
◦ o Irrelevant and false or misleading
◦ o Technical problems in the communications channel,
such as static or blurred focus, are distinguishable from
the previous categories and deserve a separate discussion.
• Disinformation is the general term for information that is
relevant but false or misleading.
The challenge to the consumer of information is, therefore,
threefold:
• Figure out what is truthful information;
• Judge the relevancy of the information; and
• Minimize the occurrence of technical problems.
Figuring out either truthfulness or relevance of communications is
not always as easy as it should be. There are charlatans who publish
fraudulent data, there are idea thieves who publish plagiarized
material, and there are simpletons who publish what they think
is good but which suffers from inherent flaws in logic or
methodology. Some publishers exert little control over the quality
of material. As a result, there is a span of quality in the published
literature that ranges from extremely reliable to extremely
questionable.[i]
The

increasing

automation

of

information

collection,

interpretation, and fusion makes the challenge even greater:
As dependence on information increases due to the automation
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of more and more elements in the surrounding environment, the
ability of the warfighter to judge the reliability and accuracy of
information content becomes more important. There are two
aspects to this challenge:
• Judging relative truth: being able to comprehend the inherent
inaccuracies in data that exist due to model uncertainty,
source inaccuracies, and so on; and
• Judging continued truth: being able to determine whether the
information being considered has been tampered with,
replaced, or otherwise interfered with.
The significant technical challenges in both of these aspects range
from human interface issues to confidentiality measures. In
responding to these challenges, complex information display
techniques, such as virtual reality applications, will clearly have
some level of payoff. As capabilities for injecting falsehoods into
otherwise truthful data continue to be developed, the challenge of
determining continued truthfulness will be exponentially greater,
particularly in light of the automated fusion capabilities that are
being relied on to assist humans in handling the huge amounts of
available data in a timely manner.
(Panel on Information in Warfare, 1997, pp. 81-82)

A Simple Model of Communications
For information to be communicated from one entity to another,
there is a surprisingly complex set of requirements. Think about
communications between a person and a pet, or between two dogs
meeting for the first time in the park, or between two people who
speak different languages. The goal of communications is to
transfer information from one entity to another. Let’s look at what
this entails.
First, the entity originating the message must have some way

280 | Chapter 11 UV & Disinformation / Misinformation Channels [Ryan]

of encapsulating the information into the message. This can be
done with facial expressions, body language, words, music, and even
pheromones.
Next, the originator must have some way of transferring the
message to the recipient. This can be done by various ways,
depending on how the information is encapsulated. One simple way
of transferring the message would be to simply place oneself in the
visual range of the recipient and make sure that the recipient is
looking and paying attention. Another way would be to speak within
auditory range of the recipient. Crucially, the actual transmission
a message requires some level of cooperation by the recipient. In
other words, the actions of the originator are necessary but not
sufficient.
The cooperation of the originator and the recipient are also not
sufficient. For communication to occur, the information must be
in a form that is understandable by both parties. The pet must
understand what the person means by a specific hand gesture or
a specific command. Two people talking must have a common
language interpretation. Simply speaking the same language is not
enough: the dialects and common usage patterns matter as well.
To illustrate this point, consider this anecdote of a person from
Australia visiting some American colleagues. Obviously, they shared
English as a common language and communication was seemingly
problem-free. The Americans, as part of their hospitality, took the
Australian to a baseball game. As is customary in the United States,
the song “Take Me Out to the Ballgame” was sung with great gusto
by the fans in the stadium. The Australian was taking this all-in
stride until the song got to the part about “Let me root, root, root
for the home team…”, at which point in time a shocked look took
over his face. The Americans, noticing this, asked him if he was
feeling okay. He then explained how the word “root” was used in
Australia, which is as an offensive and vulgar reference to sexual
intercourse (O’Shea, 2016). So when the Australian heard an entire
stadium of people singing happily about rooting for the home team,
he was somewhat taken aback.
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The simple model of communications is, therefore, this: an
originator forms and encapsulates information into a message
medium, which is received and interpreted by a recipient. The
effectiveness of the communication is dependent upon the shared
knowledge of the originator and the recipient. It is also dependent
on several elements that the originator and the recipient may have
little to no control over: interference in the environment, in the
signal formation, in the signal reception, or in the context. The
originator might sneeze while talking, a car backfire might drown
out a few words, or the context of the conversation may lead the
recipient to misinterpret the intended meaning. In order to reduce
the probability of misinterpretation or misunderstanding, active
strategies can be adopted, including repeating messages through
multiple channels or saying the same thing in many different ways.
Crucially, these active measures to reduce misunderstandings are
generally dependent upon cooperation between the originator and
the recipient.

Effective Listening
There

is

an

entire

philosophy

about

how

to

reduce

misunderstandings in human communication that illustrates this
process. The philosophy is called Active Listening (Rogers & Farson,
1957) and it’s actually interesting to consider through the lens of
“what can go wrong” in communications. Since the entire point
of disinformation and misinformation is to cause problems in
communication, it’s worth taking a moment to reflect on how life
coaches teach active listening as a way to make things go right.
To practice active listening, six skills are emphasized. These skills
are used to enable a “listener to thoroughly absorb, understand,
respond, and retain what is being said.” (Center for Creative
Leadership, 2019) Each of the skills identifies some element of
communication

that

can

improve

the

effectiveness
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of

communication but also identify targets for a disinformation
campaign. These six skills are:
• Paying attention
• Withholding judgment
• Reflecting
• Clarifying
• Summarizing
• Sharing (Center for Creative Leadership, 2019)
Paying attention is exactly what it sounds like: actually listening to
what a speaker is saying. But it is also paying attention to what the
speaker is conveying through other aspects: tone of voice, volume,
pauses, emphasis, word choices, body language, and other elements
of the conversation.
Withholding judgment is meant to imply keeping an open mind
but a more sophisticated interpretation of this skill is developing
an understanding of what the person speaking is actually trying to
communicate, taking into account that person’s culture, language
skill, opinions, and purpose. By integrating the spoken message
into an appreciation of where the person is coming from, a listener
develops a better platform for productive conversation.
Reflecting is the process of repeating what you think you have
heard in other words, with the purpose being to confirm that you
have received the correct message. If your paraphrase of what you
think you have heard is rejected, then you know that there has been
some breakdown in the communication effort.
Clarifying the message is done through asking questions, either
to ensure you have interpreted the context of the conversation
correctly or to request amplifying information. By asking questions,
you give the speaker a chance to expand a topic to contextualize
it better or to explain something that may be slightly ambiguous.
Using reflection and clarification iteratively can be a powerful
method for getting the speaker to be more descriptive and precise.
Similarly, summarizing the message briefly back to the speaker
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can test your comprehension of the conversation, particularly the
sensitive

elements.

Once

you

have

established

that

your

understanding is correct, then you have the ability to share some of
your own thoughts and insights.
The purpose of describing the processes associated with active
listening is to underscore how very complex the act of
communication is.

Communication consists not just of the

information contained in the transmitted message; it also includes
all the noise and extraneous information in the communication
channel, including the brains of the communicators.
Deception As A Strategy
When one has perfect knowledge, one can choose the timing of
actions and go fast or slow as appropriate to the situation and to the
goals of action. Perfect knowledge of any situation is the product
of communication: collecting, analyzing, and interpreting messages
that are both deliberately and inadvertently sent by an adversary.
In the real world, achieving perfect knowledge is both desired and
impossible: there is too much information, variation and change,
and deception.
Deception is used to deny perfect knowledge, to seed confusion
into intelligence, and to mislead adversaries, which ultimately slows
them down, from an effectiveness perspective. Effective deception
can result from hiding information, changing information, and
seeding information. Some examples of the use of deception
include the following:
• In the early 1960s, the Walt Disney Productions company used
a series of companies to buy the land around Orlando that
became the site for Disney World. These companies were
created specifically for the purpose of shielding the true
identity of the purchaser in order to keep land prices from
rising, which surely would have happened if people had known
the truth about who was buying the land and for what purpose.
In fact, when the news broke, “land prices skyrocketed in
Orlando, where in some cases the land went up to $80,000 an
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acre” (Ganninger, 2020).
• In 1944, as the planning for the Allied invasion of Normandy
was increasing in intensity, an actor playing the part of Field
Marshall Montgomery was taken to alternative locations in
order to deceive the Germans as to where the invasion would
take place. This was only one of the many deceptions
associated with Operation Overlord, but an effective one as it
distracted the Axis powers with information that
“Montgomery” had been observed in Gibraltar and North
Africa, leading them to speculate that the invasion would be in
the Mediterranean region. (Breuer, 2001, pp. 198-202) (Whaley,
2007, p. 376) (Howard, 1995, p. 125)
• During the Cold War, agents of the Soviet Union used the
tactic of injecting false news reports into media. One example
of this type of activity was included in a 1981 US Department of
State advisory:
“In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French Journalist, was
convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959.
His articles – all subtly pushing the Soviet line on a wide range
of international issues – were published in a number of
important newspapers and journals, sometimes under the
pseudonym of Charles Morand. The journalist also published a
private newsletter which was regularly sent to many
newspapers, members of parliament, and a number of foreign
embassies. The Soviets used Pathe over a number of years to
try to influence the attitudes of the prominent subscribers to
his newsletter and to exploit his broad personal contacts.” (U.S.
Department of State, 1981)
Deception is a technique that can be reasonably low cost as well
as effective. Deception includes many ruses, such as camouflage,
diversions, and disinformation (Whaley, 2007, p. 7). Barton Whaley,
a scholar of deception and military successes over the century,
noted in his seminal book Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in
War (2007):
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The most important single broad category of ruses includes all
false information fed into another’s information system in order
to deceive him. The standard technical term is “disinformation”. It
is conventionally meant to cover only the verbal or written forms
of information, leaving “camouflage” and “diversion” to cover the
nonverbal or visual forms. (pp. 8-9)
He made this assessment of the importance of disinformation
from his painstaking analysis of the effects of surprise in warfare
over history. A key analytical finding from his scholarship:
Of the 61 cases of strategic military surprise that occurred
between 1914 and 1968, no more than 4 can be exclusively or even
mainly attributed to the initiator’s passive security. More or less
specific warning signals almost inevitably filter through the security
screen and reach the intended victim. Moreover, these warning
usually increase in frequency and specificity as the attacker’s
preparations unfold, drawing more and more indiscrete persons
into the planning and making ever more visible the necessary
adjustments in mobilizations, deployment, logistics, and perhaps
diplomacy. … There is only one type of activity still available that
will multiply [the commander’s] chances of gaining surprise. That is
stratagem. (Whaley, 2007, pp. 1-2)
In this quotation, the word stratagem in its classic meaning, which
is as a reference to strategic deception.
The world that he studied is not the world of today. The growth
and integration of information technologies is a dramatic change
that has affected all aspects of life. Further, the types and
representations of information has increased exponentially, to the
point where it makes less sense to separate non-verbal and visual
information from written or spoken information. The growth of
augmented and virtual reality (AR and VR) applications, the
widespread adoption of artificial intelligence implementations, and
the integration of video, photography, data, and sound has changed
the environment of deception activities. As such, the discussion
in this chapter includes manipulation of non-verbal and visual
information in the definition of deception.
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Implications for Unmanned Systems
Unmanned systems rely on information technology. As noted in
Chapter 1 of this book:
The separation of human labor, cognition, and equipment into
disparate pieces means that a concomitant need for collaborative
technologies becomes important. The most obvious collaborative
technologies are communications – exchanging data, commands,
and responses. Other types of collaborative technologies that need
to be considered are those that prevent adverse interactions
between system components, environmental sensing and reaction
technologies, and control guidance technologies. All of these
enable the remote operation of an unmanned system.
In other words, communication between the various components
are a critical part of unmanned system operations. It is therefore
necessary for operators to plan for identifying and mitigating
deception. A solid information security regime provides a platform
to build upon. Having the people, processes, and technologies in
place that protect the integrity of data in storage as well as in
transactions is a critical first step.
That first step is, obviously, only a first step. It provides a way
of adjudicating information already in the system and that being
shared with trusted edge systems. The next steps need to address
the deception challenges that come from external data of all types:
sensor collected data, aggregated data from a data market, and
deliberately introduced deceptive data. Problems to consider
include the following:
• Sensors that correctly work as engineered but which are
triggered to misread a sensed situation because the target
environment has been manipulated. For example, an
unmanned car could be tricked into “reading” a road marking
because the marking had been augmented with material
designed to trick the car’s sensor.
• Aggregated data from a data market that is used to create
highly detailed virtual reality depictions of a target
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environment, in which the data has been seeded with
deliberately misleading information, such as multiple altitude
power lines in a place where none exist. UAS operations would
use that deceptive information to avoid flying in the vicinity of
the powerlines, which could reduce the effectiveness of their
mission operations.
• Deliberately introduced deceptive data could come from an
insider or from a modified infrastructure component. For
example, an AI application that quickly processes data inputs
to a system could follow a set of rules that leads it to an
incorrect decision. That incorrect decision then becomes
deceptive data: relevant but misleading or untruthful.
Any approach to addressing the problem of deceptive data will be
unique to the operations and mission of the unmanned systems, so a
one-size-fits-all solution is not possible. As with every engineering
problem, the solution lies in understanding what the threats are,
what the potential impacts might be, and what countermeasures
can effectively be used.
Sensing and Interpreting Challenges
Because there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the challenge of
deceptive data, it is helpful to review some examples of historical
events.

“Hidden” Information Embeds
In 2018, researchers experimented with overlaying what they called
“adversarial examples” on actual stop signs to see if autonomous
vehicle detection systems could be fooled. The overlays used did
not change a human’s ability to identify the sign as a stop sign: the
overlays were smaller than many of the graffiti stickers commonly
seen on stop signs in cities. The researchers were able to make the
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sensors miss the stop sign. Further, they were able to make the
sensor detect things that were not present:
… we create perturbed physical objects that are either ignored
or mislabeled by object detection models. We implement a
Disappearance Attack, in which we cause a Stop sign to “disappear”
according to the detector—either by covering the sign with an
adversarial Stop sign poster, or by adding adversarial stickers onto
the sign. In a video recorded in a controlled lab environment, the
state-of-the-art YOLO v2 detector failed to recognize these
adversarial Stop signs in over 85% of the video frames. In an outdoor
experiment, YOLO was fooled by the poster and sticker attacks
in 72.5% and 63.5% of the video frames respectively. We also use
Faster R-CNN, a different object detection model, to demonstrate
the transferability of our adversarial perturbations. The created
poster perturbation is able to fool Faster R-CNN in 85.9% of the
video frames in a controlled lab environment, and 40.2% of the video
frames in an outdoor environment. Finally, we present preliminary
results with a new Creation Attack, wherein innocuous physical
stickers fool a model into detecting nonexistent objects. (Eykholt, et
al., 2018)
One can easily understand the potential impact of an unmanned
system missing or inventing information: the problems could
cascade to the entire system as well as cause harm to external
elements, such as people or property.
In another set of experiments, researchers developed a set of
eyeglass frames that foiled a facial recognition system. The choice
of glasses frames was to minimize the perturbation components
while using something that was easy to modify and widely available:
One advantage of facial accessories is that they can be easily
implemented. In particular, we use a commodity inkjet printer
(Epson XP-830) to print the front plane of the eyeglass frames on
glossy paper, which we then affix to actual eyeglass frames when
physically realizing attacks. Moreover, facial accessories, such as
eyeglasses, help make attacks plausibly deniable, as it is natural for
people to wear them. (Sharif, Bhagavatula, Bauer, & Reiter, 2016)
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The results were impressive. In all but one experiment, the device
worked perfectly. In the one in which it didn’t, the device worked
91% of the time. They were able to successfully show that their
“eyeglass frames enabled subjects to both dodge recognition and to
impersonate others.” (Sharif, Bhagavatula, Bauer, & Reiter, 2016)
These two examples represent a rich and growing field of
research. As the rush towards full automation for unmanned
systems continues, this type of work is both useful for improving the
sensing systems and for identifying the types of threats that need to
be considered during operations.

Distinguishing Signals in Noisy Environments
In 2013, a group of students conducted an experiment on a 213-foot
ship to see if they could successfully change the course of the yacht
without the crew noticing. From the top deck of the yacht, they:
broadcasted a faint ensemble of civil GPS signals from their
spoofing device a blue box about the size of a briefcase toward
the ship’s two GPS antennas. The team’s counterfeit signals slowly
overpowered the authentic GPS signals until they ultimately
obtained control of the ship’s navigation system.
Unlike GPS signal blocking or jamming, spoofing triggers no
alarms on the ship’s navigation equipment. To the ship’s GPS
devices, the team’s false signals were indistinguishable from
authentic signals, allowing the spoofing attack to happen covertly.
Once control of the ship’s navigation system was gained, the
team’s strategy was to coerce the ship onto a new course using
subtle maneuvers that positioned the yacht a few degrees off its
original course. Once a location discrepancy was reported by the
ship’s navigation system, the crew initiated a course correction. In
reality, each course correction was setting the ship slightly off its
course line. Inside the yacht’s command room, an electronic chart
showed its progress along a fixed line, but in its wake there was a
pronounced curve showing that the ship had turned.
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“The ship actually turned and we could all feel it, but the chart
display and the crew saw only a straight line,” Humphreys said.
After several such maneuvers, the yacht had been tricked into a
parallel track hundreds of meters from its intended one the team
had successfully spoofed the ship. (Animation by Erik Zumalt, 2013)
This type of attack is not just in the lab. Around the world, there
have been increasing reports of navigation problems of varying
sorts, all related to the electronic navigation aids in use to make
navigation possible through storms, night, and disputed waters.
The misuse of the technology has led to some very interesting
situations:
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) are causing problems for
mariners transiting waters where there are high concentrations of
fishing vessels, particularly in the East China Sea. … Local fisherman
discovered that by putting AIS transponders on their fishing nets,
large ships would change course for the nets, thinking they were
vessels. … If we are to see more unmanned ships in the future, this
needs to be rectified. What would an unmanned ship approaching
a literal “sea” of AIS targets do without a professional mariner in
charge to properly assess the situation? Ships would be changing
course to avoid fishing nets, only to be “faced” with a whole new
set of AIS targets on the new course. Shipowners may find their
unmanned vessels turning circles in order to avoid what the
automated equipment deems to be dangerous, but may only be crab
pots or fishing buoys. (Kovary, 2018)
Conclusions
These two examples underscore the challenge of sensing and
interpreting, particularly in noisy environments where competing
interests collide.
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12. Chapter 12 Chinese UAS
Proliferation along New Silk
Road Sea / Land Routes
[Carter]
Student Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Explain the sectors of the Belt and Road Initiative that impact
unmanned technology
2. Understand the importance and impact of the relationship
between China and the Middle East
3. Explain the Blue Ocean Information Network
4. Identify factors of the Digital Silk Road that impact them
directly

Progression of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Partnerships
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launch as part of the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 2013. Partnerships
among China and other countries continue increase by engaging
through economic and diplomatic means. The target completion
date for BRI is 2049, the anniversary of the founding of People’s
Republic of China. For lower income countries, the enticement of
low-interest loans and support to build infrastructure is part of the
attraction to a relationship with China. Current events of Brexit
and a spilt United States political infrastructure have played into
China’s goal of becoming a global superpower. As the U.K. and the
Chapter 12 Chinese UAS Proliferation
along New Silk Road Sea / Land

U.S. appear to be in consistent conflict with itself and other nations,
China’s façade to help countries through loans, technology,
infrastructure without personal gain grows. Partnerships with the
European Union, Middle East, Africa, Russia, Latin America and Asia
fall into the different BRI initiative categories of Economic,
Maritime, or Digital. The relationships formed by China have put the
country as the world’s largest shipping nation. China is second in
the world for economy and ranks and third in the world’s military
powers (Tybring-Gjedde, 2020).
As

of

March

2020,

138

countries

and

30

international

organizations are part of BRI, covering the following regions: (Figure
12.1)

• 38 countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
• 34 BRI countries are in Europe & Central Asia (including 18
countries of the European Union (EU) that are part of the BRI).
• 25 BRI countries are in East Asia & pacific.
• 17 BRI countries in Middle East & North Africa.
• 18 BRI countries are in Latin America & Caribbean.
• 6 countries are in South East Asia.
A complete country listing, region, and income status can be found in
Appendix A.
( International Institute for Green Finance II Central University for
Finance and Economics, 2020)
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Figure 12.1 Countries of Belt and Road Initiative as of March 2020
Source: (International Institute for Green Finance II Central
University for Finance and Economics, 2020)
The BRI has the remained strong with the following five goals:

• policy coordination
• facilities connectivity
• unimpeded trade
• financial integration
• people-to-people bonds

The BRI “people to people bonds” has created a network of think
tanks, media agreements, and establishment in communities and
universities (Hamilton & Ohlberg, 2020). The spread of propaganda
using these bonds, delivers a powerful message of international
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trust within a global community, making the BRI appear attractive
and peaceful. With the addition of Italy and Switzerland in 2020,
reinforces BRI commitment and credibility. Along with BRI, China
has evolved to modernize their military defense and establish
themselves as an international arms dealer.

Figure 12.2 China’s Inward Investment
Source: (Harding, 2020)
Middle East
The BRI is critical for China in the Middle East; the gulf region is
a global player for trade and finance. The Middle East’s partnership
will give China advantages in trade, military operations, and
infrastructure. Drones in this region have grown from surveillance
to Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs). The U.S. has strict
polices against the export of these deadly attack weapons. In a
ten-year period, China has sold 163 UCAVs verses the sale of 15
Reaper drones during the same time period (Roblin, 2020). The
largest producer of UCAVs, China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corporation (CASC), has plans to open a factory in Saudi
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Arabia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are given priority by China for
UCAVs, which are 75% cheaper than MQ-9 Reaper (Alden, Fiala, Krol,
& Whittle, 2020).
Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group has taken advantage of China’s
freedom to sell to anyone, not restricted by export policies. Wing
Loong I and Wing Loong II are popular UAV models sold to the
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The Wing Loong series of
UAV are similar to the GA-ASI Predator. Saudi Arabia has acquired
an estimated 300 UAV’s from China (Stevenson, 2019). China is in
close competition with Turkey for supplying UAV’s to the Middle
East. December 2019, Rainbow (CH-5) drones were exported to
Pakistan, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. (Figure 12.3)
In the Middle East, China invests in the energy, infrastructure,
nuclear power, agriculture and finance to strengthen the ties to
the Middle East (Chaziza, 2020). China would bring to Iran
telecommunications (5G), banking, ports and railways to the region.
China’s partnership with Iran could pose detrimental to the U.S.
Military. China and Iran would agree to joint military operations,
training, weapons development and intelligence sharing. This
would give China a military advantage over the U.S. and Iran global
ally.
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Figure 12.3 Sale of Chinese UCAVs Along BRI
Source: (Alden, Fiala, Krol, & Whittle, 2020)
European Union
The build out of China – EU partnerships began in 2013 with
the recruitment of the former Swedish ambassador to an advisor
position with Huawei. Eventually, other members of the EU were
recruited to be advisors for Huawei. With the growth of the Huawei
relationships enabled China to build trust and obtained signatures
of support for the BRI from EU member states. The governing body
of the EU does not have a formal agreement with China regarding
BRI. However, about half EU member states signed on to the BRI
(Hamilton & Ohlberg, 2020). China has not sealed commitments for
BRI from the top European economies (France, U.K. and Germany).
Other EU member states have begun participating in the BRI
through financial, corporate, and educational sectors. In July 2020,
Serbia received their first order of Six Chinese-built CH-92A
combat drones. This marks the beginning of China supplying drones
to Europe, another step-in building ties in the region.
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Figure 12.4 CH – 92A Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)
Source: (Roblin, 2020)
As part of the Made in China 2025 plan, Aviation and Aerospace
Equipment is considered a priority sector. In some reports referred
to as the “Air Silk Road”.
Maritime Silk Road
Tracing back to 12th century BC, the East China Sea Routes
connect mainland China to Northeast Asia. The Liaodong Peninsula
located in this region of Asia holds critical military value, dating back
the Sino-Japanese War (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records,
2020). The peninsula’s trade route value, natural resources, and
military positioning makes it a cornerstone for this route of
Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The South China Sea route is critical
for MSR, opening China to the continent of Africa, following the
maritime routes through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red
Sea. China has 32,000 kilometers of coastline and more than 3
million square kilometers of maritime land, making the country
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a real maritime power, according to the China Engineering
Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

UAE is a leader in supporting China with the Maritime Silk Road
(MSR). The creation of Khalifa Port’s CSP Abu Dhabi Terminal, by
UAE and China shipping giants has attracted twenty additional
Chinese companies to the area (Calabrese, 2020). This is the first
phase of MSR for Abu Dubai. Turkey is the only country in the region
not favorable to MSR.
Blue Ocean Information Network
In addition to the support of countries along the MSR, China
is building an underground network for military communication
and expanding sensors to create a “World Ocean” (Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 2020). The Blue Ocean Information Network,
is part of MSR, will accomplish the following for China:

• Information perception (internationally)
• Target recognition
• Active sonar
• High-resolution marine satellites

The Blue Ocean Information Network is based on Skynet and
Submarine Net according to the PLA. China will have the ability to
detect mineral, biological resources. With the information network
China will have advanced unmanned cyber methods to control and
protect the BRI. The Blue Ocean Information network combined
with the increase of partnerships / locations along BRI will
accelerate China as a maritime superpower.
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Figure 12.5 Schematic Diagram of Underwater Information
Network

(Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2019)
Floating Integrated Information Platforms (FIIP) (also called
Ocean E-Stations are the most visible piece of the Blue Ocean
Information Network. The network is currently deployed between
the Hainan Island and Paracel Islands, and the Bombay Reef. It is
believed a previously identified one of the was deployed to Bombay
Reef in the Paracel Island sometime in 2018. Communications
capabilities of the FIPP include a Ku-band satellite antenna, an Lband satellite antenna, radio antenna, and cellular communications
antenna. Sensing systems include an Automatic Dependent
Surveillance

Broadcast

(ADS-B)

antenna

and

an

Automatic

Identification System (AIS) antenna as well as a small air- and
surface-search radar (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020).
Figure 12.6 Ocean E-Stations
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Left FIIP Between the Hainan Island and Paracel Islands
(February 7, 2019)
Right FIIP Bombay Reef (April 28, 2020)
Source: (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020)
Other components such as ocean buoys, fixed and relocatable
underwater sensors to include sonar and hydrophones, unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) could be part of the Blue Ocean
Information Network (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020).
Revisiting the first edition of this textbook, Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air
Assets, Chapter 16 Chinese Drones in Spratly Islands and Chinese
Threats to USA forces in the Pacific, the case for cyber weapon
spoofing of legacy GPS signals affecting the US Navy and
commercial vessels in Pacific Ocean are relevant to the Ocean EStation that was placed in 2018 Bombay Reef in the Paracel Island.
The FIIP communications functionality includes AIS, which could
be allow for spoofing of AIS sending a fake collision alert by Closet
Point of Approach (CPA) spoofing and negating the true alert
transmitting to the vessel.
China’s goal to complete the development of the “Belt and Road”
sea network cooperation to meet the military and civilian
management by 2025. China’s researchers state there is an urgent
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need for information acquisition in the jurisdictional sea area
(Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2019). China
Telcom will use the maritime information nodes, network and
submarine network to construct ideas and continue to strengthen
the Blue Ocean Information Network.
Digital Silk Road
Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative was introduced by China in 2015.
DSR has more of a government push using Chinese commercial
company channels. The idea to grow DSR through several vectors
such as social media, telecom, fintech, etc. Ideally, China wants
the homegrown companies to fit in with their specific industry, to
become a trusted member and contributor to their specific sector.
This would give China the ability to intertwine DSR within the
different tech vectors. China uses to their advantage of taking lead
in specific technology to gain members for DSR, for example next
generation (5G). They have used mobile technologies and fiber optic
infrastructure to entice countries to the DSR with internet/telecom
advantages (Greene & Triolo, 2020). China also promotes their
payment system technology, digital wallets, two-way QR codes,
paying via social media.
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Figure 12.7 China E-Commerce Europe
Source: (Shi-Kupfer & Ohlberg, 2019)
The fiber-optic members of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), Frankfurt
to Mumbai via Azerbaijan added a new member November 2020.
Turkmenistan agreed to link with Azerbaijan through cables in the
Caspian Sea. It is suspected Iran is part of the DSR with cables
running down the Persian Gulf.
The drone industry plays a critical part of DSR. SZ DJI Technology
is a leader in the global consumer drone marketplace, therefore a
large part of the technology vector. DJI has been accused of sharing
user information and having week cybersecurity practices. Banned
by the U.S. Military, DJI is attempting to create a DoD version of
their product. If DJI is successful reaching DoD level of security, it
could allow DJI access to a broader marketplace.
Conclusions
China’s Brick and Road Initiative has covered several sectors. In
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the context of unmanned, China has a significant role in the Middle
East, Asia, and Africa military drone marketplace. They are
beginning to capture the attention buyers from the Europe Union.
China’s strong relationships across all vectors in the Middle East
has led to a maritime advantage for trade and military operations.
Extensive ties between China and Iran has created an unlikely
partnership for the U.S. and allies. China has expanded technology
under water that will lead to control of several regions if maritime
partnerships continue to grow. The Digital Silk Road is an immediate
cause for concern for Europe and the U.S., as consumers and
industry become dependent on products produced by Chinese
companies. The BRI continues to grow at an accelerated rate as
trusted partnerships across all industries continue crossover into
other opportunities.
Discussion Questions

1. Discuss the key areas of expansion of Belt and Road Initiative
that impact the military drone marketplace.
2. Which Silk Road initiative is a greater threat, Maritime or
Digital?
3. What Silk Road initiative has greater impact to the United
States?
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13. Chapter 13 Automaton,
AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the
Machine – Human Barrier
[Lonstein]
“The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end
of the human race….It would take off on its own, and re-design
itself at an ever-increasing rate. Humans, who are limited by slow
biological evolution, couldn’t compete, and would be superseded.”
Stephen Hawking (Cellan-Jones, 2014)
Student Learning Objectives
Professor Stephen Hawking gave the cautionary warning
above almost six years ago. While no human can predict what the
future will hold with specific accuracy, we can examine new
technology, blend it with the social sciences and history to develop
generalized ideas of the societal risks and rewards of new
technology. Students should use their imagination, experience, and
learning to enhance their understanding of how best to implement
technology, predict intended and unintended consequences, and
engage in their risk-benefit analysis. This process is an essential
precursor for the introduction of Artificial Intelligence into
everyday life. This analysis will challenge the student to think
critically,

not

merely

accept

statements

of

“experts”

or

manufacturers of even celebrity or other endorses of a particular
technology at face value. Someone once said: “Any intelligent fool
can make things bigger and more complex… It takes a touch of
genius — and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction.” –
Attributed to Albert Einstein, E.F Schumacher, and Woody Guthrie
in various publications, for our purposes, the source of the quote
is less important than the message. Students should be bold and
Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law,
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brave, speak truth based on their experience, and education and
not shy away from being unpopular or different. Conformity, for
the sake of conformity, does not honor students’ effort in acquiring
knowledge. It makes them more lemming and less human. Students
should strive to be the best human one can be.
Once Completed Students Should
• Understand that they all possess unique thinking and analysis
tools based upon their imagination, learning, experience, and
uniqueness. Those attributes are critical to better not only
themselves but to better mankind both by embracing new
technology or rejecting it based upon risk.

• Consider the risk of ubiquitously using automation and AI
throughout many aspects of everyday life. Students must be
aware of potential risks from connected technology, such as
social media where information is simple to acquire and digest
in seconds carry risk of abuse, manipulation or even
degradation of human thought processes?

• Be aware that there are no simple answers to the widespread
implementation of AI and Automation and beyond the changes
to how we, as humans do things but also consider how we
might be changed as a result of this process. From mental and
physical health to its impact upon future generations, the
environment, public safety, and many other aspects of the
human existence.

Humans, Humanity and Humanoids
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According the Merriam-Webster Dictionary a “Human” is
defined as “a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens), a
person” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); “Humanity” is defined as “the
quality or state of being human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); And
“Humanoids” are defined as “a humanoid being: a nonhuman
creature or being with characteristics (such as the ability to walk
upright) resembling those of a human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020).
Finally, Merriam-Webster Defines Artificial Intelligence as: “1. a
branch of computer science dealing with the simulation of
intelligent behavior in computers and 2: the capability of a machine
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020)
[See Figure 13.1]
The question which will confront all of us in the very near future
is what will differentiate the human and humanity, one organic the
other more ethereal in terms of their ability to make subjective
judgments, from the Humanoid which is not organic, nor is it
capable of subjective thought, only objective decision making based
upon its programming.

Figure 13.1 The Humanoid
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Source: Courtesy Forbes & Adobe Stock)
Are We Losing Our Minds?
Today there is no shortage of conflicting viewpoints on the law,
ethics, and morality relating to autonomous technology and
Artificial Intelligence. Moving beyond what is their current nascent
state, these technologies will undoubtedly continue to become
staples of everyday life. To focus our discussion on technology
familiar to most if not all of us, we will examine the issues of AI and
Autonomous operation in social media. In 2017 Liz Stillwaggon Swan
wrote an article in the IEEE publication “Technology and Society”
entitled “Are Social Media Making Us Stupid?” Swan asks whether
addiction to social media amongst our youth results in a rapid loss
in writing skills proficiency. Swan writes:
“Social media platforms force users to think and write in bitlike form, with acronyms substituting for sentences and emoticons
substituting for the expression of feelings. We are learning–some of
us more quickly than others–to adapt to a computer-dictated form
of communication. Sherry Turkle (M.I.T.) has noted that a fluency
with texting and tweeting is commonly correlated with a dearth of
skills in face-to-face interactions. We’re noting, in addition, what
social media addiction is doing to written communication:
specifically, it’s eroding the traditional divide between speaking and
writing.” (Stillwaggon Swan, 2017)
Our focus will be on the rapidly decreasing face-to-face
interactions associated with increased social media usage. Social
media is a simple technology, but Swan writes it also has “broken
time and space barriers” by allowing users to communicate with
followers and vice-versa 24/7 around the globe instantly.[1] How do
AI and autonomous technology result in the need for consideration
of laws and ethics relating to their implementation in social media?
According to Courtney Seiter, the Neurotransmitter Dopamine,
(“the Pleasure Chemical”) and the Hormone Oxytocin (the “Cuddle
Chemical”) play a significant role in the addictive use and near316 | Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine –
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blind acceptance of content on social media. According to Seiter,
there is a strong relationship between these two behaviors affecting
biological compounds and the online and increasingly offline
actions of its users. Seiter writes that the roles of Dopamine and
Oxytocin play significant roles in the psychology of social media.
Dopamine
Dopamine is stimulated by unpredictability, by small bits of
information, and by reward cues—pretty much the exact conditions
of social media. The pull of dopamine is so strong that studies have
shown tweeting is harder for people to resist than cigarettes and
alcohol.
Oxytocin
Then there’s oxytocin, sometimes referred to as “the cuddle
chemical” because it’s released when you kiss or hug. Or … tweet. In
10 minutes of social media time, oxytocin levels can rise as much as
13%—a hormonal spike equivalent to some people on their wedding
day. And all the goodwill that comes with oxytocin—lowered stress
levels, feelings of love, trust, empathy, generosity—comes with social
media, too. As a result, social media users have shown to be more
trusting than the average Internet user. The typical Facebook user
is 43% more likely than other Internet users to feel that most people
can be trusted. So, between dopamine and oxytocin, social
networking not only comes with a lot of great feelings, it’s also really
hard to stop wanting more of it.” (Seiter, 2016)
Slot Machines in Your Hand & Head
Creators of social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter,
amongst many others, did not need to look far to learn how to
drive maximum adoption and daily dependence upon social media.
I always enjoy the bells and whistles and lights when walking into
a casino. Yet, after playing a bit, the usual sensation experienced
is regret, foolishness, and quite frankly dirtiness. Much like a
smartphone, noises, visuals, and other sensory stimulation 24 hours
a day can lead to dependence and mistakes. B.F Skinner, the famed
Harvard psychologist, once said “A pigeon can become a
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pathological gambler, just as a person can,” (Skinner, 1977) [See
Figure 13.2]

Figure 13.2 Gambling Pigeons
Source: (Courtesy Bettmann Archive / Getty)
So, what do pigeons and gambling have to do with social media?
“Just as substance addicts require increasingly strong hits to get
high, compulsive gamblers pursue ever riskier ventures. Likewise,
both drug addicts and problem gamblers endure symptoms of
withdrawal when separated from the chemical or thrill they desire.
And a few studies suggest that some people are especially
vulnerable to both drug addiction and compulsive gambling because
their reward circuitry is inherently underactive—which may partially
explain why they seek big thrills in the first place.” (Scientific
American, 2013)
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The Psychology of Social Media
In 2004 Dr. John Suler wrote the groundbreaking paper
entitled the “Online Disinhibition Effect. In the paper Dr. Suler
examined the psychology behind our behavior on line and how it
varies from the brick and mortar world. Dr. Suler wrote in 2004:
“Everyday users – on the Internet—as well as clinicians and
researchers have noted how people say and do things in cyberspace
that they wouldn’t ordinarily say and do in the face-to-face world.
They loosen up, feel less restrained, and express themselves more
openly. So pervasive is the phenomenon that a term has surfaced for
it: the online disinhibition effect.” (Suler, 2004)
What the psychological components of the Online Disinhibition
Effect and how do they drive our online behavior? [See Table 13.1]
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ONLINE BEHAVIOR –IS IT DIFFERENT?
SIMPLE, VIRTUAL, ANONYMOUS

•You Don’t Know Me (Dissociative anonymity) -As you move around the internet, most of
you are. When people have the opportunity to separate their actions from their real world
don’t have to own their behavior by acknowledging it within the full context of who they “

•You Can’t See Me (Invisibility) -Even with everyone’s identity visible, the opportunity to
effect. You don’t have to worry about how you look or sound when you say (type) somethin
look or sound when you say something.

•See You Later (Asynchronicity) -People don’t interact with each other in real time. Other
to reply to something you say. Asynchronous communication is like “running away” after d

•It’s Just a Game (Dissociative imagination) –People feel their online personae exist in a d
demands and responsibilities of the real world. Once they turn off the computer and retur
leave their online identity behind. Why should they be held responsible for what happens
reality?

•It’s All In My Head (Solipsistic Introjection) -Absent cues combined with text communic
Sometimes they feel that their mind has merged with the mind of the online companion. R
experienced as a voice within one’s head, as if that person magically has been inserted or
may not know what the other person’s voice actually sounds like, so in our head we assign
or unconsciously, we may even assign a visual image to what we think that person looks lik
companion now becomes a character within our intrapsychic world, a character that is sh
him or herself via text communication, but also by our expectations, wishes, and needs. Be
people we know, we fill in the image of that character with memories of those other acqua

320 | Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine –
Human Barrier [Lonstein]

•We’re Equals (Minimizing authority) -While online a person’s status in the face-to-face w
have as much impact as it does in the face-to-face world. If people can’t see you or your s
president of a major corporation sitting in your expensive office, or some “ordinary” perso
computer.

Table 13.1 Online Disinhibition Effect
Source: (Courtesy John Suler)
When Facebook was conjured up one of its founders, Sean Parker,
its President at the time said:
“The thought process that went into building these applications,
Facebook being the first of them… was all about: ‘How do we
consume as much of your time and conscious attention as
possible?'” “And that means that we need to sort of give you a
little dopamine hit every once in a while, because someone liked or
commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And that’s going to
get you to contribute more content, and that’s going to get you …
more likes and comments.” “It’s a social-validation feedback loop …
exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up
with because you’re exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology.
“The inventors, creators — it’s me, it’s Mark [Zuckerberg], it’s Kevin
Systrom on Instagram, it’s all of these people — understood this
consciously. And we did it anyway.” (Allen, 2017)

Now that we have enough understanding of how social media was
designed to psychologically effects humans, the question becomes
how it can be used or misused.

By leveraging the known

psychological intended effects social media can be used to cross
the virtual / actual barrier to cause humans to take or not take
actions or behave in a particular way. This can fulfill the objective
of the social media platforms or actors as a tool of disinformation,
confusion, political unrest, or even armed conflict.
Noted internet and virtual reality Jaron Lanier recently wrote
about these and many other concerns in his 2018 book, “Ten
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Arguments for Deleting your Social Media Accounts Right Now.”
In an April 2018 interview with the Intelligencer he spelled out
his concerns about the damage social media may be doing across
society.
Weaponizing AI and Automation Using Social Media as the
Delivery Method
Lanier in a prescient and articulable fashion express his very real
concern with the potential of social media and its digital automation
to have profoundly dangerous affects upon the world:
“One of the things that I’ve been concerned about is this illusion
where you think that you’re in this super-democratic open thing,
but actually it’s exactly the opposite; it’s actually creating a super
concentration of wealth and power and disempowering you. This
has been particularly cruel politically.
Every time there’s some movement, like the Black Lives Matter
movement, or maybe now the March for Our Lives movement, or
#MeToo, or very classically the Arab Spring, you have this initial
period where people feel like they’re on this magic-carpet ride and
that social media is letting them broadcast their opinions for very
low cost, and that they’re able to reach people and organize faster
than ever before. And they’re thinking, Wow, Facebook and Twitter
are these wonderful tools of democracy. But then the algorithms
have to maximize value from all the data that’s coming in. So, they
test use that data. And it just turns out as a matter of course,
that the same data that is a positive, constructive process for the
people who generated it — Black Lives Matter, or the Arab Spring—
can be used to irritate other groups. And unfortunately, there’s this
asymmetry in human emotions where the negative emotions of
fear and hatred and paranoia and resentment come up faster, more
cheaply, and they’re harder to dispel than the positive emotions.
So, what happens is, every time there’s some positive motion in
these networks, the negative reaction is actually more powerful.
So, when you have a Black Lives Matter, the result of that is the
empowerment of the worst racists and neo-Nazis in a way that
hasn’t been seen in generations. When you have an Arab Spring,
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the result ultimately is the network empowerment of ISIS and other
extremists — bloodthirsty, horrible things, the likes of which haven’t
been seen in the Arab world or in Islam for years, if ever.” (Lanier,
2018)
A mere two years later we have seen protests and riots
across the United States and globe started in late May when a
citizen in Minneapolis, George Floyd was seen dying during a police
restraint where an officer kneeled on his neck for over eight
minutes. Spontaneous and understandable protests and cries for
justice ensured and social media became a tool employed to
coordinate some of these demonstrations. Unfortunately, almost
immediately social media’s emotional and Dopamine intensive
qualities were manipulated to turn peaceful protests into riots,
violence, property damage and even death across America. [See
Figure 13.3]

Figure 13.3 Protest Tweet
Source: (Twitter Post @sugaaab_retweeted by
@rave_mom_breezy)
Large sections of the population have recently become more
reliant upon social media, especially during the global Coviid-19
Pandemic, which has turned to social media and away from
broadcast media in droves. According to the Business Insider, a
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“Harris Poll conducted between late March and early May, between
46% and 51% of US adults were using social media more since the
outbreak began. In the most recent May 1–3 survey, 51% of total
respondents — 60% of those ages 18 to 34, 64% of those ages 35 to
49, and 34% of those ages 65 and up – reported increased usage on
certain social media platforms.” (Samet, 2020)
Couple a significant uptrend in the global usage of social media
with a populace that has increasingly become addictively and
compulsively tethered to social media, and the result is an army
of potential human assets which, to a certain degree, can be
transformed to near humanoids.
The ability to deploy a humanoid army, nearly instantly, anywhere
in the world, is a potent delivery system. The ordinance must be
programmed into the delivery vehicle. Bots, fake accounts, fake
news, disinformation, real-fake videos, and memes are all tools of
social media information warfare. They have increasingly leveraged
as a weapon of information warfare globally.
Recently Jeff Elder of Business Insider reported:
Media and citizen journalists are posting video, images, and
accounts of scattered and chaotic protest events in response to the
killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer, and the posts
are being re-shared broadly. The result is an often-overwhelming
stream of media from multiple sites and sources, and experts say
audiences must be aware that the situation is being manipulated.
“People need to be aware that these events on the ground are
being spun for political reasons,” says Angie Drobnic Holan, editorin-chief of PolitiFact, the Pulitzer Prize-winning fact-checking news
service of the Poynter Institute journalism think tank. Much of that
spin likely comes from forces outside of America, the experts warn.
“Were there foreign-backed disinformation accounts targeting
Americans this weekend? Absolutely. I am positive that was
happening,” says Molly McKew, a writer and lecturer on Russian
influence who advises the non-profit political group Stand Up
America.” (Elder, 2020)
Information warfare is nothing new as a tool of conflict. Between
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the 1920’s and 1940’s Germany under Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda
Dr. Joseph Goebbels. According to Dr. Yaniv Livyatan, “Goebbels
needed a staff of 1,000 to generate propaganda. Today all it takes is
the click of a button.” (Livyatan, 2019) [See Figure 13.4]

Figure 13.4 Dr. Joseph Goebbels
Source: (Courtesy AP)
Dr. Levyatan belies that social media, its ubiquitous nature, ease
of automation and ability to instantly “push” notifications to
subscribers instead of them searching for content makes it a
propaganda game changer. He continues:
So, it’s vital to understand who your audience is and what moves
it. At the same time, the world is becoming a place where you can
accumulate more and more knowledge of that kind. You can target
your messages accurately. Scientifically. Think what Goebbels could
have done with Facebook.
“Facebook is excellent for psychological warfare because they’re
constantly collecting information about us. An analysis of that
information is very illuminating with respect to our personalities,
our aspirations, our opinions. We saw that vividly in the story of
Cambridge Analytica [which acquired data from profiles of some
50 million Facebook users] in the 2016 U.S. election. Our behavior
in the social networks, which we perceived as something innocent
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and mundane, has become an instrument through which we can
be influenced via manipulative techniques. The information we
volunteer, such as Likes, make it possible for those who want to, to
understand how to communicate with us in a precise way.
Goebbels had a ministry of 1,000 personnel whose primary task
was not to compose messages but to go into the field and examine
how the messages work on people. Today you can do that by
pressing a small button. If the Nazis had come to power today, they
would have ruled the world.
Indeed, we see which rulers are rising to power today and what
their messages look and sound like. We can take it that there’s a
connection.” (Livyatan, 2019)
Conclusions
While many consider the implementation of Artificial
Intelligence and Autonomous Technology concepts most closely
associated with Drones, Driverless Vehicles, Autonomous Surface
and sub-surface and sea technology, students must keep a keen eye
on their personal technology as well. According to Rescuetime.com
the average American checks their cell phone 58 times each day so
if you wanted to get a message in front of a target’s eyes, the phone
and Social media apps are the way to do it. (McKay, 2019) When
combined with addictive behavior and a growing reliance on short
form messaging and content, critical thinking is under attack and
those who seek to do harm are well aware of this troubling reality.
Questions for students to consider
1. How would you respond to the mass dissemination of false
information on social media video designed to mislead the
public that a terror attack was occurring in New York City
using film from the 9/11 attacks in 2001?
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2. Should social media technology be controlled or be subject to
oversight and regulation from the federal government due to
the risk it can easily be used to destabilize or even overthrow
the nation?

3. Should Social Media companies be allowed to employ
algorithms and use encryption technology without allowing
access to the information to the federal government or military
in a time of national crisis?

4. How would you slow the progress of the pernicious addictive
allure of social media upon today’s youth or do you believe that
is something best left to the social media companies
themselves?

5. Have you ever asked another who informed you that they saw
that a particularly disturbing event occurred where they saw
the information and their reply was Facebook, Twitter, or
another social media platform?
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14. Chapter 14 Maritime
Cybersecurity [Nichols]
Student Objectives
Students will revisit the South China Sea and Chinese Threats to
USN and Commercial vessels in the area.
Students will grasp the size and cybersecurity issues for the
Maritime Transportation Sector (MTS)
Students will understand the nuances of Cyber-Physical systems,
Operational technology, and the Internet of Things (IoT).
Introduction
I would like to dedicate this bonus chapter to Dr Gary C Kessler
and Steven D. Shepard on their 2020 release of a fascinating book
on

Maritime

Cybersecurity:

A

Guide

for

Leaders

and

Managers. (Kessler, 2020). I respect and agree with everything their
many years of experience have witnessed and put into writing on
the subject except strategies for maritime cyberdefense in which
the authors mistake the priorities of Vulnerabilities over real
Threats. The author has liberally cited this excellent work. We can
do something about Threats – applying appropriate countermeasures
to reduce risk. Vulnerabilities are a constant and represent an
existing weakness in the information system that will always be
present, will generally increase even after a computer security
audit, or patch(es), and may or may not be a conduit for a real Threat
to attack an information system. The security goal is to identify
Vulnerabilities and to reduce Threats.
Our views are different. The author is a captain of a cruising yacht
with 40 plus years as previous owner / master of five different
medium – size sail and power boats. Every effort was made to
maximize / duplicate the security of electronics, navigation
systems, powertrain, fire suppression, pumping, SOLAS, anchoring,
weather, piloting, RADAR, AIS, SONAR, seamanship, and passenger
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safety on my marine craft. My charges were USCGA approved /
inspected every two years. It took nearly 20 years to become a
decent captain. The author made every mistake that was on some
novice list of “don’ts” on the water. But that is called experience. My
career has been in cybersecurity and INFOSEC. Multiple systems
on my craft were computer aided including AIS, RADAR plots,
navigation, USCG soundings / charts, ATN, buoys, weight
distribution / loading, emergency systems, power, bilge, satellite
phone, EPIRB, entertainment, three VHS radios, previously LORANC, and remote communications. Threats to these coordinating
computer – information systems were serious and might have
denied me port entry if they were not adequately protected. [1]
The author’s point is that qualitative information system Risk is
~ f(Threats / Countermeasures). This is true because Vulnerabilities
and Impact are essentially constants that drop out of the strategic
consideration for planning for cyberdefense. Increase the Threat
vector and we directly increase the risk. Increase applied
Countermeasures and Risk is reduced. These can be calculated as
qualitative levels of risk or translated into worst, best and normal
case scenarios for comparison of incremental changes to either
dependent variable.
This chapter will not debate the (Kessler, 2020) notions of Risk
Vs Vulnerabilities Vs Threats. There are some valid points, charts,
procedures presented in his final chapters. (Kessler, 2020) Instead,
Chapter 14 will revisit the authors research on the spoofing of
navigation systems on vessels in the South China Seas. This will
be followed by a section on the MTS and potential cybersecurity
vectors and end with a section focused on the holy grail of IoT as
related to the maritime sector.
The Case for Cyber Weapon Spoofing of Legacy GPS Signals
Affecting US Navy and Commercial Vessels in Pacific
In (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019), the author presented a detailed
case for GPS spoofing by Chinese assets of US Navy and Commercial
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Vessels in South China Seas. It is summarized here as a starting point
for a condensed discussion on maritime security.[2]
U.S Navy Vessel Collisions in the Pacific
In 2017 there was a chain of incidents/collisions involving four
U.S. Navy warships and one U.S. Navy submarine. On 17 June, the
destroyer USS Fitzgerald collided with the ACX, a 30,000-ton
container ship resulting in seven dead. Records show that the ACX
turned sharply starboard (right) at the time of collision. The captain
of the Philippine-flagged container ship accused the Navy destroyer of
failing to heed warning signs before the crash. Those warning signs
came from the commercial vessels Automated Collision Systems
(AIS) on the bridge. On 9 May, the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake
Champlain collided with a South Korean fishing boat off the Korean
Peninsula. There were no injuries (Department of the US Navy,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, 2017). On 31 January, the
guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam ran aground dumping more
than 1000 gallons of oil into Tokyo Bay. On 18 August, the ballisticmissile submarine USS Louisiana collided with the Navy Offshore
Support Vessel in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. There were no injuries.
“On 20 August, the guided-missile destroyer USS John S McCain
collided with the 600-foot oil and chemical tanker Alnic MC at 0624
JST resulting in ten dead (Navy Information Office , 2017)”. (Weise,
2017)
Navy Response
In all five incidents, the U.S. Navy blames their field leadership
for not responding in an appropriate manner. This response means
that the Skipper / XO / COB and at least five (5) watch sailors on
each Naval vessel (roughly 40 – 50 personnel including bridge staff
plus 130 lookouts on the USS McCain because of ordered watch
conditions) have been judged incompetent (Navy Information Office
, 2017). Their careers are over, and some will face courts martial
and possible brig time. This response also implies that all five Navy
vessels’ radar, emergency positioning alert systems, AIS, sonar, and
long-range collision avoidance equipment must have been
functioning perfectly, without a catastrophic failure or interference
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of any kind. This conclusion assumes that none of the ships were in
difficult maneuverable waters or serious traffic. The Navy blames
funding, readiness, and training. However, their response may not
fully account for the commercial vessel accident data, actions
required, o GPS positional data received (Olson, August 30, 2017).
(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain:
Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019)
The Navy Official Reaction regarding the possibility of CyberWeapon or Cyber-Attack
The Navy has downplayed the possibility of a Cyber Weapon or
Cyber Attack. Prior Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John
Richardson said in a tweet on Monday 23 August, referring to the
USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald collisions, “there was no indication
of the possibility of cyber intrusion or sabotage was involved or
that the Navy ships were hacked, but the review will consider all
possibilities.” (Weise, 2017) The Navy investigators after inspecting
the physical damage to the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald agree
with the CNO’s conclusions (Olson, August 30,2017).
“Navy experts in the technology and researchers at University of
Texas at Austin say there are certainly scenarios they can imagine
in which GPS hacks could have been used to foil ships’ navigations
systems but emphasize there’s no evidence such attacks took place
in the case of the Navy collisions.” (Weise, 2017) “The technology to
jam or misdirect navigational software is readily available, though
the Navy uses a much more robust encrypted version of GPS that
would be very difficult to disrupt.” (Weise, 2017)
The only way to spoof such a system is a record and replay attack,
“where a recording is made of the encrypted location data being
sent from GPS satellites to the naval ship. Replaying the recording
at a slightly later time could fool a ship into thinking it is someplace
else. This is a very sophisticated and difficult hack that requires
multiple recordings of the navigation data stream from multiple
angles, and then sending the recorded signal from two or more
locations.” (Weise, 2017) “To ensure that nearby ships do not also
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get the false data, it would have to be transmitted from close to the
Navy ship being targeted, perhaps using multiple drones.” (Weise,
2017)
However, according to “ Professor David Lust, former president of
the Royal Institute for Navigation in the United Kingdom, “it takes
two to Tango…. I” think you just have to attack the weakest of the
pair, which is the commercial vessel.” Commandeering the GPS of
the cargo ship to get it to veer off course could cause collision, and
it is a much easier hack.” (Humphreys, 2009)
The Case for a Cyber Weapon
There appears to be valid evidence to support the theory that
at least two of the U.S. Navy Warships, USS John McCain, and the
USS Fitzgerald AND/OR the commercial vessels involved were the
on the wrong end of a Cyber-Weapon and were receiving incorrect
GPS generated positional information. In agreement with Dr. Lust’s
conclusions, the Cyber Weapon may have been deployed by an
adversary’s [China PLAN] UAS off a small nearby vessel. The author
believes that the subject Cyber-Weapon is an advanced modular
entity that can spoof the GPS signals received by all vessels in its
range. J.S. Warner & R.G. Johnson established in 2013 that the cybersecurity of many common automated navigational systems today
lacks basic cyber-attack protection; vessels using incorrect data
will make wrong decisions in terms of navigation and emergency
responses, leading to potential collisions and deaths (Warner &
Johnson, 2013).
Surfacing Questions
Spoofing is generation of false transmissions masquerading as
P(Y) [the encrypted] Precise Signal that makes up the military vessel
positioning basis, or unencrypted C/A [Civilian Acquisition] code
from GPS satellites. In a virtual world tracking invalid data streams
or non-integrity-based data is difficult, especially on three
dimensional vessels moving in time. However, there may be more
than one method to spoof a signal no matter how well it is
encrypted.

The

cargo

ships

involved

could
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have

received

unencrypted GPS ranging; a much less complex method than is
required for military vessels.
Both ships do not need to be disabled or spoofed. All ships
(military,

commercial,

recreational,

specialized

service)

in

international waters require detailed positional information. GPS
systems accurately supply a 3-D position, velocity, and time fix in all
types of weather, 24 hours a day.
GPS satellite signals are ranging devices that deliver two signals
made up of a civilian carrier, C/A code, NAV message, P-Code, and
a military carrier. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition,
2019)
Because of cost, most systems on commercial vessels have legacy
GPS systems. In the author’s view, even if the GPS signals of the
military vessels were not hacked the unencrypted C/A – L1 Civilian
signal may have been.

It is also provable that this spoof is

technically feasible on the legacy systems. Experiments by Warner
and Johnston out of Los Alamos, and surveys by Schmidt, et al out of
Queensland University clearly support the GPS/GNSS Cyberattack
threat vector. (Warner, 2013) In 2013, Humphreys and his students
successfully spoofed an $80MM Yacht’s GPS system. (Humphreys,
2009)
What the physical damage indicates for the USS McCain and USS
Fitzgerald is that both naval vessels appear to have collided on the
starboard side. This leads to the theory that the Civilian vessels
involved in crossing or approaching the US Naval vessels were
relying on faulty information for their position. Further, the cyber
weapon may have been delivered by small UAS from a nearby fishing
or recreational vessel. It would be a perfect delivery vehicle: stealth,
quiet, low radar signature, requiring only 1- 25 watts signal spoofing
power. Since the true GPS signal strength reaching the surface of
the Earth is about -160dBw (1x 10**-16 Watts), a 1-Watt GPS jamming
Chapter 14 Maritime Cybersecurity [Nichols] | 335

spoof signal can override C/A code acquisition for more than 620
miles (Line of Sight (LOS) to horizon.) (Warner, 2013)
The starboard side collisions suggest that one of the vessels may
have turned port or that the commercial ship tried to avoid a fake
collision target received by turning starboard at the wrong time.
The USS Fitzgerald report confirms this observation. These are
huge vessels. Turning, stopping, or reversing course on a dime are
not possible – especially by a large freighter. Decisions must be
made well in advance of potential collision alerts. This is also why
delivery of a cyber-weapon by UAS is so attractive. It would be a
small bird in the glasses while attention was directed to the huge
targets closing in on each other. In the chaos, the adversary wins.
How could GPS chaos be achieved against US Vessels?
The author believes, that for the spoofing GPS signal theory
[targeting a commercial vessel by cyber weapon to give it a false
position and potentially cause collision to itself or another vessel],
to be possible. It would require an enemy Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS) to be launched from either a sea-based vessel or landbased intelligence station in the Spratly Islands. The methodology
contemplated consists of three cyber-attack activities:
1) Breaking the existing AIS GPS commercial vessel receiver signal
locks,
2) Locking the AIS GPS tracking device onto the GPS Simulator
counterfeit signal,
3) Maintaining access by continued broadcasting of the fake GPS
signal.
The problem is interesting because there are two threedimensional maritime targets moving in time based on inaccurate or
false ranging (GPS position) signals. The clocks used in GPS satellite
systems are extremely accurate and present synchronization
difficulties with the target naval / commercial vessel receivers. If it
is possible to simulate and spoof the GPS signals to the commercial
vessel using AIS collision avoidance systems (Cyber-weapon
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CONOP), then it is also possible that the US Navy may not have given
proper attention to the non – personnel issues in their accident
investigations.
Further, the possible delivery of such a Cyber-Weapon by close
range UAS means that adversaries may have increased their
knowledge management and understanding of U.S. Navy defensive
systems. Using asymmetric warfare tactics and attacking the
commercial traffic, which deploys legacy and cheaper GPS
receivers, forces dependence on faulty information. Unfortunately,
it is an effective tactic that bypasses much of the military
modernization of GPS signals and satellites. This same possibility
could affect military and commercial aircraft also, especially at
airports where traffic speeds are reduced, and aircraft are closer
to each other. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in
Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition,
2019)[3]
Chinese Nightmare
Think of Chinese use of swarming drones on the seas, in the air,
floating nuclear power plants, underwater mining, robot freighters
and anti-submarine UUVs. In the author’s view, they are
leapfrogging US technology and antiquating defenses (Lehman,
2017).
It should be clear that the Chinese (PLAN) are heavily invested
in military operations using unmanned aircraft and naval vessels
in the Spratly Islands. This researcher has been tracking Chinese
UAS and Intelligence assets /facilities / naval vessels since 2014.
Figure 14.1 shows a glimpse of the deployment in the Spratly Area
of Operations (AO). The black pin is the Spratly Islands group. Blue
pins represent US Navy capital ships involved in either collisions or
groundings in the AO. Red pins represent center of known Chinese
UAS Intelligence elliptical paths. Green pins represent Chinese
Intelligence facilities or seaborn assets. An exploded map view
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would show many more Chinese assets in the AO (Nichols R. &., 4
May 2018).
Given the capabilities that Chinese (and US) UAS systems can
deploy in almost any conditions and any location, it seems
reasonable to this researcher, that the Chinese military might test
their cyber weapons from their UAS in the Spratly AO coverage
to harass US vessels and potentially disrupt US Navy capital ships
navigation systems. [This would be a natural priority for the
Wanshan Marine Test Facility.] As a lesser alternative, the Chinese
might take the 911 approach [ i.e. turning planes into missiles loaded
full of fuel and ramming them straight into fixed buildings] by
disrupting (signal spoofing) the GPS /AIS unencrypted signals of
huge commercial vessels and forcing them to act as Greek trireme
vessels,

colliding

into the US Naval vessels

maneuverable waters. [4]
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in restricted

Figure 14.1 Chinese UAS Chinese Intelligence Assets Deployment
in Spratlys
Source: (Nichols R. &., 4 May 2018)
Marine Transportation System / Sector (MTS) Scope
To their credit, Kessler and Shepard have a wonderful description
of the MTS. (Kessler, 2020) Its size /scope and value to the economy
as well as the enormity and complexity of its cyber structure cannot
be overestimated. The MTS represents a very large cyberthreat
surface, given every system with it represents a potential attack
vector. (Kessler, 2020)
The MTS comprises ships, shipping lines, ports, passenger
terminals, manufacturers, cargo facilities, intermodal partners, and
all users of these facilities globally. Every element represents a
potential vulnerability to cyber attack – a potential weak point to
cyberthreats – and a vector for infection of other elements in the
MTS. (Kessler, 2020) By 2023 there are expected to be more than
70,000 merchant vessels on the water operating in / out of
approximately 4,800 ports in 200 countries. Merchant ships don’t
make money if they sit idle, they are in constant motion. (Kessler,
2020) All modes of transportation interact with each other as cargo
and passengers move be to disposal, tween ships, inland waterways,
railroad cars, trucks, and airplanes. Intermodal connections are
additional vectors for cybersecurity threats.
(Kessler, 2020) describe the MTS as a system of systems
comprising of six interconnected systems: ships, ports, people,
shipping lanes, inland waters, and intermodal transfers.
MTS Systems / Sector
The Ships subsystem includes all aspects of in the lifecycle of
a vessel, from manufacturing, to maintenance, to operations,
communications, networks, security, and navigation systems.
The Ports subsystem includes construction, maintenance,
logistics, vessel traffic management, and daily port operations.
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The People subsystem includes the entire supply chain, trading
partners, vendors, and customers.
The Shipping Lanes subsystem comprises the operation and
management of companies that own ships, passengers and cargo,
reservation

and

scheduling,

finances,

operations,

and

communications.
The Inland Waters subsystem includes the inland waterway
systems, Aids to navigation (ATN), Notice to Mariners (NTM) and
dredging and maintenance.
The intermodal Transfer subsystem describes the MTS interfaces
with other transportation modalities, including barge, railroads,
trucking and to lesser extent aviation. (Kessler, 2020)
MTS Scope
The MTS is a significant economic driver for the nation. It
contributes about $5 trillion annually to the GDP, supports 30 MM
jobs, representing 20% of the workforce. It includes 25,000 miles of
navigable channels, 95,000 miles of shoreline, 361 commercial ports,
50,000 federal and millions of private aids to navigation (ATNs)
/ (ATONs), 20,000 bridges over water, greater than 3700 marine
terminals, 200 ferry operations, 238 locks at 192 locations. The MTS
user community includes hundreds of thousands of small fishing ,
sightseeing, liveaboard, dive boats, and 12 million recreational boats.
MTS waterways are shared by military, public safety, LEO vessels;
work boats, dredge boats, buoy tenders; commercial fishing vessels;
personal power boats and sailing vessels; and drilling platforms ,
wind turbines, moorings, and fixed location offshore facilities.
(Kessler, 2020)
It should be clear that the MTS environment comprises countless
moving parts, each playing a critical role in maritime transportation
safety and operations. Each represents a potential attack vector
through their associated computer networks.
MTS Cyber Attack Vectors / Targets
Most maritime cyber-attacks are via operational computer
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networks. In general, they are not designed for robust security
nor are they modern.[5] (Kessler, 2020) identifies eight critical
cyberattack vectors in the MTS: vessel operation, shipping line
operations, port operations, cargo and transit, manufacturing,
vessel traffic control (VTC), remote control and autonomous
operations and partners.
Vessel operations: Ships are floating networks. They include
operational networks controlling ships systems, security and cargo
management, bridge controls for navigation, weapons control, and
lad / ship to ship / satellite communications.
Shipping line operations: cargo and passenger shipping lines have
complex outward facing networks and internal networks. They use
the public internet for public relations, e-commerce, reservations,
partner portals, reservations, cargo tracking and sales / marketing
information. Internal networks handle all the vessel operations
above plus payroll, taxes, logistics, legal compliance, route
management and partner relations.
Port operations: networks handle all the shipping line functions,
vessel tracking, USCG operations, vessel traffic management
(VTM),immigration, drug enforcement, cargo security, and links to
intermodal carriers.
Cargo and shipping: cargo-related operations include SCADA
systems to move cargo, onloading / offloading, port cranes,
security at several stages, inspections, and autonomous systems.
Manufacturing: All the functions of the port are seen through
the eyes of its supporting manufacturers and vendors. Critical to
the security is supply chain management, intellectual property
protection, and ID theft resolution.
VTC: Managing the flow of vessels, especially in a busy port or
narrow

body

of

water

requires

reliable

communications;

positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS), NTM, are critical to safe operations.
Each of these systems provides a fertile line of cyber-attack in
geographic areas than can tolerate a low margin of error. VTC does
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not control the recreational or commercial fishing vessels. (Kessler,
2020)
Remote control and autonomy: Unmanned and autonomous
vehicles and vessels, are emerging as
shortage of qualified personnel becomes more acute. Remote
control ships, tugs, docking facilities, drones, trucks, and cranes are
sprouting up like weeds. Each can be manipulated independent of
the owner /operator. The author did a simulation of taking over an
oil company’s storage facilities and SCADA systems to pour 12 MM
gallons of oil into the Chesapeake Bay. The environmental damage
was in the billions and loss of services, crab industry, effects on the
recreational boating industry took a decade to recover. (Nichols R.
K., Nov 28-30 2006)
Partners: Vulnerable computer network systems can be exploited
as a jumping point on to a more fertile target. Attackers do not want
your computers or your networks; they want your information. That
is the very definition of partner in the context of cybersecurity.
A partner is any entity that affects, the chain of custody of your
data. Last point, the IT structure in many organizations are shared
ownership. In terms of security, this is akin to sharing a hypo needle
for cocaine. Organizations use the cloud as a host. Reservations,
ticketing, are managed by an e-commerce host. It is linked to a
financial system. This is nuts of course. So many ID frauds and
compromised credit cards in huge numbers ought to tell us this.
Corporate networks general use VPNs to provide access to their
internal network via a public internet.
Civilian ships have multiple onboard networks to handle ballast,
propulsion, power, status monitoring and provides a pathway to
communicate with their land-based counterparts. GPS, AIS, VHF,
and VTS communicate over public radio channels. (Kessler, 2020)
The MTS represents a huge cyber threat surface, given that every
system within it represents a potential attack vector. (Kessler, 2020)
Cyber-Physical Systems, Operational Technology, and the
Internet of Things (IoT)
342 | Chapter 14 Maritime Cybersecurity [Nichols]

Cyber-physical systems(CPS) is the global term encompasses
people, computers, and physical devices into an operational system.
CPS takes advantage of sophisticated sensors, instruments,
networks, embedded computers, SCADA brains, and combines them
into smart infrastructures and industrial applications. CPS
applications run the whole gamut from the smart grid; medical
monitoring; autonomous vehicles, vessels, aircraft; process control
systems; robotics systems; and automatic aviation and maritime
navigation systems. (Kessler, 2020).

Figure 14.2 Cyberwar: Chokepoints
Source: (Nichols R.K, 2002)
There are lots of views / models of CPS systems. Figure 14.2
shows a differentiation of computer “choke points” (vulnerable to
cyberattacks in cyberwar scenario) based on network parameters,
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transmission media, applications, and services. Figure 14.3 shows
the interaction between physical and cyber systems and how they
leverage each other.

Figure 14.3 Shared Cyber Threats in CPS System
Source: (Nichols R. K., Nov 28-30 2006)
Figure 14.4 shows the complex interdependencies between
Infrastructure and the SCADA controls that dictate the inter-flows
in a CPS system.
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Figure 14.4 shows SCADA and Infrastructure interdependencies
in a CPS System
Source: (Peerenboom, 2001)
Operational Technology (OT) comprises the technologies and
methods that enable the cyber and physical worlds to interact. In
OT systems, computers directly provide real-time monitoring, and
control of physical devices such as valves, pumps, dams, power
grids, robots and transportation systems.

Industrial Control

Systems (ICS) make up the largest OT devices. SCADA is the control
brains of these systems and represents the preferential vector for
cyberattacks. (Randall K. Nichols, 2000) (Nichols R. K., Nov 28-30
2006) (Kessler, 2020)
Internet of Things (IoT)
The Holy Grail of CPS is the Internet of Things (IoT)! IoT combines
data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI), wide available broadband
networks (WABN), advanced sensor technology, miniaturized
processors, embedded ASICS,[6] and advanced software to allow
independent devices to share all kinds of information and engage
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in network-wide decision making. This transforms traditional
physically limited devices into smart equivalents. (Kessler, 2020) IoT
devices number in the multi-billions. IoT applications are found in
every business and infrastructure and home. They are single reason
that privacy is a thing of the past. {I have taught my students the
theory behind hacking the house smart electrical meter (installed
in about 80% of homes without their permission or realization how
much privacy and control of their lives was lost ). The meter-hack
can tell the Bad Actor how many times you flush your toilet, use
the microwave, the frequencies behind your security systems, or
turn lights off /on or even charge your phone. All without the user
knowledge or permission. IoT!}
Computers within CPS and IoT networks are prone to the same
threats and vulnerabilities with any other architecture BUT the span
of control has a much larger purview. Unsecured IoT devices are a
very real threat to the global internet and attached devices. They
are the favorite target for criminals. Websites like censys.io and
shodan.io allow people to search the internet for IoT devices where
one can find passwords to hacked IoT devices. Many of them crack
security monitoring / credit monitoring services.
Maritime CPS Applications and Cybersecurity
The trend is to increase automation systems on vessels. The
trends is also miniaturization and to some extent replace people.
The USN is doing this at David Taylor Research Center in Annapolis
, MD. There goal is to automate vessels and reduce the crew size.
The author has been on some of these experimental ships.
There is no doubt that automation has safety and economic
benefits and achieve precise solutions to navigation scenarios. But
more systems also means increasing interdependencies and more
risky cyber vulnerabilities. New ICS and IoT technologies have
enabled innovations inside the ship envelope and outside. From
bridge to the engine room, system designers have endeavored to
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build more integrated shipboard control systems (ISCS) and make
the supply chain operations and fuel systems more efficient.
New IoT technologies have enabled innovative systems outside of
the ship:
• ü Intelligent mooring systems with embedded sensors in
mooring lines. From the bridge, these monitor tension, time,
temperature, and predict early failure or wear. (Kessler, 2020)
• ü Supplement Interactive Electronic Maintenance Manuals (
IETM) and optimize outcomes.
• ü Act as building blocks for a Cooperative Cognitive Maritime
Cyber Physical System (CCMCPS) to provide high-speed, lowcost communications between ships, ports, buoys,offshore
platforms, and shore stations. This includes automation of the
cranes and transport vehicles. Ports are the bottleneck for
movement of cargo. CCMCPS optimizes communication
between vessels, ports, maritime terminals and cargo handling
systems. (Kessler, 2020)
Autonomous maritime systems are starting to incorporate drones,
UAVs to provide surveillance, situational awareness in a port area,
for both manned and unmanned ships. UAVs supplement ship
inspections by their ability to safely enter locations too dangerous
for people. They are used for a detailed analysis of hull or cargo
bay in real-time. They supplement autonomous tugs and mooring
systems by transporting heaving lines from the dock or tug or ship.
(Kessler, 2020)
Conclusions
IoT, ICS and autonomous maritime systems are technologies
bringing the maritime industry into the future. While the individual
devices are small the systems they interact with are large, complex,
and complete with cybersecurity issues because fundamentally,
they are merely computer hardware, software, SCADA, and
communications technologies.
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Student Questions
1. Make a taxonomy of the top cybersecurity attacks on the MTS
and needed cyber defenses to reduce risk in the chosen
targets.
2. Where do you see the IoT landscape in terms of cyber attack
payloads on MTS.
3. There is no silver bullet to protect the MTS “elephant.” So
develop an initial plan to protect the “part of the elephant”
subsystem in the MTS that offers the biggest return on
investment ( lowers risk of cyber attacks).
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[1] (Kessler, 2020) discuss exactly this kind of scenario in their
Preface. This excellent book is highly recommended for purchase.
https://www.amazon.com/Maritime-Cybersecurity-GuideLeaders-Managers/dp/B08HBDDSQD/
ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=kessler+Maritime+Cybersecurity&q
id=1600025530&sr=8-1
[2] The full case with equations of closest point of approach (CPA)
are given in www.newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27/
[3] The South China Seas GPS scenario is the sole speculation of
the author based on his research and proposals during 2017-2018. It
is not the opinion of KSU, NPP, CADS or any official in the line of
publication. The USN has admitted that cybersecurity of its systems
and commercial vessels has vulnerabilities. They have devoted
significant resources to the cybersecurity threats / subject under
command of an Admiral. There is significant work to mitigate these
navigational threats.
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[4] Triremes were used in the Peloponnesian Wars to ram at about 4
knots at a 60-degree angle of attack. The greater the angle of attack
the lesser the speed requirement for ramming. What is interesting is
that the Athenians used a multi-trireme attack, an early predecessor
to Swarm tactics. They also used grappling hooks to engage the
enemy ships directly up close. This was the predecessor to piracy
tactics in the 1500’s – 1830’s. Wikipedia.
[5] Authors evaluation based on his research at KSU.
[6] ASICs= Application specific integrated Circuits & circuit boards
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Appendices Chapters 10 & 12
Chapter 10: UAS, the Fourth Amendment and Privacy [Shay]
Appendix A – Summary of UAS Provisions in H.R. 302
(Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, 2018)
SEC. 343. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT TEST RANGES.
The Administrator is directed to carry out and update a program
for the use of six test ranges to facilitate the safe integration of
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace. The program
will coordinate with the Next Generation Air Transportation System
and test range operators to develop standards for UAS that support
UAS capabilities specific to beyond visual line of sight operations,
nighttime operations, operations over people, operation of multiple
UAS, and unmanned aircraft system traffic management. The
Administrator is directed to collaborate with the Center of
Excellence for Unmanned Aircraft Systems to carry out research
supporting the above operations. Waivers for operations at test sites
to support the above research will be streamlined.
SEC. 344. SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN THE ARCTIC.
The Secretary of Transportation shall develop a plan to designate
permanent areas in the Arctic where small unmanned aircraft may
operate 24 hours per day, for research and commercial purposes.
These operations include UAS operations beyond visual line of sight
and below 2,000 feet in altitude.
SEC. 345. SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SAFETY STANDARDS.
The Administrator shall establish risk-based safety standards
related to design, production, and modification of small UAS. The
geographic location, altitude, and sense and avoid capabilities shall
be taken into consideration when establishing such standards using
a set of performance-based requirements. Manufacturers will be
required to provide the FAA: aircraft operating instructions,
maintenance procedures, be subject to inspections by FAA to
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ensure compliance of aircraft and be required to provide a
statement of compliance to the FAA for UAS platforms. The Center
of Excellence for Unmanned Aircraft will establish an UAS research
facility to study appropriate safety standards.
SEC. 346. PUBLIC UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
The Administrator shall create a streamlined process for issuance
of a certificate of authorization to facilitate the capability of public
agencies to develop and use test ranges. Government public safety
agencies may operate an UAS under 4.4 pounds within visual line of
sight, less than 400 feet above the ground, during daylight and at
least 5 miles from an airport.
SEC. 347. SPECIAL AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
The Secretary shall use a risk-based approach to determine if
certain UAS may operate safely in the national airspace prior to
the completion of certain rulemakings if operations do not create a
hazard to users of the national airspace system or the public.
SEC. 348. CARRIAGE OF PROPERTY BY SMALL UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FOR COMPENSATION FOR HIRE.
Within one year of bill passage, the FAA shall update existing
regulations to authorize the carriage of property by operators of
small UAS for compensation or hire, considering performancebased requirements and varying levels of risk to other aircraft and
people or property on the ground. The FAA shall create a
certification process pending a rulemaking for persons seeking the
carriage of property for hire.
SEC.

349.

EXCEPTION

FOR

LIMITED

RECREATIONAL

OPERATIONS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
This section states that a person may operate a small UAS without
certification or operating authority from the FAA if: the aircraft
is flown for recreational purposes, the aircraft is operated in
accordance with a community- based organization’s safety
guidelines developed in coordination with the FAA, is flown within
visual line of sight, does not interfere with manned aircraft, is flown
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below 400 feet above the ground, the operator passes an online
aeronautical knowledge and safety test, and the aircraft is
registered with the FAA. The FAA may periodically update the
required community-based organization standards including the
marking and remote identification requirements flying under these
recreational parameters.
SEC. 350. USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AT
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.
The Administrator shall update standards and procedures for the
use of UAS at institutions of higher education for education and
research purposes.
SEC. 351. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
PILOT PROGRAM (IPP).
The Administrator shall improve the acceptance of applications
from state, local, or tribal jurisdictions for the IPP to accelerate the
safe integration of UAS in the national air space with the focus of
testing and validating new concepts, including beyond visual line
of sight operations, detect and avoid technologies, command and
control links, navigation, weather, and human factors. IPP
operations are limited to operation during daylight hours, and
limited operations over public roads and sporting events. The data
from IPP operations will be made available to the FAA to inform
future rulemaking and standards.
SEC. 352. PART 107 TRANSPARENCY AND TECHNOLOGY
IMPROVEMENTS.
No later than 30 days after bill passage, the Administrator shall
publish a sample of the safety justifications offered by applicants
for small UAS waivers and airspace authorizations that have been
approved by the Administrator. The Administrator shall review the
authorization process to provide real time confirmation and review
of application status capabilities.
SEC. 353. EMERGENCY EXEMPTION PROCESS.
The Administrator shall update the Special Government Interest
process for local law enforcement agencies and first responders to
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use UAS in response to catastrophe, disaster, or other emergency
situations in addition to developing best practices for such uses.
SEC. 354. TREATMENT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATING
UNDERGROUND.
An unmanned aircraft system that is operated underground for
mining purposes shall not be subject to regulation or enforcement
by the FAA under relevant law.
SEC.

355.

PUBLIC

UAS

OPERATIONS

BY

TRIBAL

GOVERNMENTS.
This section amends a section of the U.S. Code relating to public
UAS operations by tribal governments.
SEC. 356. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR KNOW
BEFORE YOU FLY CAMPAIGN.
The FAA is appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 2019-2023
for the Know Before You Fly educational campaign to broaden UAS
safety awareness.
SEC. 357. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PRIVACY POLICY.
UAS operations shall be carried out in a manner that respects
and protects personal privacy consistent with the United States
Constitution and federal, state, and local law.
SEC. 358. UAS PRIVACY REVIEW.
The Comptroller General of the United States National
Telecommunication and Information Administration shall review
privacy issues and concerns associated with UAS operations. Such
a review will include analysis of the response to the Presidential
memorandum titled “Promoting Economic Competitiveness While
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic
Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” dated February 15, 2015, as well
as examine existing federal law related to personal privacy, identify
specific issues and concerns that may limit the civil or criminal
remedies regarding inappropriate operation of UAS, and identify
deficiencies in federal, state, and local privacy protections. Such
findings will be submitted in a report to Congress 180 days after
passage of this bill.[1]
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SEC. 359. STUDY ON FIRE DEPARTMENT AND EMERGENCY
SERVICE AGENCY USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
The Administrator shall conduct a study on the use of UAS by
fire departments and emergency service agencies regarding how
such entities currently use UAS, obstacles to greater use of UAS
by these entities, ways to provide greater support of UAS use by
these entities, analysis of laws or regulations that present a barrier
to career, combination, and volunteer fire department use of UAS,
airspace limitations of emergency use of UAS, roles of UAS in fire/
emergency services, and technical challenges to greater adoption of
UAS by fire departments and emergency agencies.
SEC. 360. STUDY ON FINANCING OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SERVICES.
The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a
study within 60 days of passage of the bill that studies appropriate
fee mechanisms to recover costs of regulation and safety oversight
of UAS and air navigation services for UAS. The study shall consider
any recommendations of the Drone Advisory Committee, the costs
incurred by the FAA for regulation and safety oversight of UAS,
general classes of UAS activity, the number of FAA employees
dedicated to UAS programs, the use of privately-operated
unmanned traffic management (UTM) systems, and the projected
growth of UAS, among other factors. A report of appropriate fee
mechanisms will be provided to Congress 180 days after the passage
of the bill.
SEC.

361.

REPORT

ON

UAS

AND

CHEMICAL

AERIAL

APPLICATION.
No later than one year after passage of the bill the FAA shall
submit to Congress a report evaluating which aviation safety
requirements under Part 137 of title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations should apply to UAS engaged in aerial spraying of
chemicals for agriculture purposes.
SEC. 362. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SAFETY.
It is the sense of Congress that UAS operations near airports
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pose a significant safety concern. The Administrator should pursue
remedies available, including referrals to other government
agencies for criminal investigations with respect to persons who
operate unmanned aircraft in an unsafe manner. The Administrator
should prioritize measures to educate the public about operating
UAS over areas that have temporary flight restrictions in place due
to the risk of wildfires, as well as partner with state and local law
enforcement to enforce laws so that UAS do not interfere with
efforts of emergency responders. Manufacturers should take steps
to educate consumers about safe and lawful UAS operations.
SEC. 363. PROHIBITION REGARDING WEAPONS.
Unless authorized by the Administrator, a person may not operate
a UAS that is equipped or armed with a dangerous weapon. Persons
in violation are liable for a civil penalty not more than $25,000 for
each violation.
SEC.

364.

U.S.

COUNTER-UAS

SYSTEM

REVIEW

OF

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESSES.
No later than 60 days after passage of this bill the Administrator
shall review agencies currently authorized to operate CounterUnmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS). The review should include the
process of interagency coordination of C-UAS activity, standards
for operation of C-UAS, safety of the NAS, protecting individuals’
property on the ground, non-interference with avionics of manned
aircraft and traffic control systems, operational procedures and
protocols during C-UAS operations, adequate training for persons
using C-UAS systems, best practices of C-UAS systems, and current
airspace authorization information from LAANC. The Administrator
shall report to congress on the above described review 180 days
after passage of the bill.
SEC. 365. COOPERATION RELATED TO CERTAIN COUNTER UAS
TECHNOLOGY.
The Secretary of Transportation shall consult with the Secretary
of Defense to streamline deployment of C-UAS in the national
airspace.
SEC. 366. STRATEGY FOR RESPONDING TO PUBLIC SAFETY
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THREATS

AND

ENFORCEMENT

UTILITY

OF

UNMANNED

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.
Within one year of passage of the bill, the FAA shall develop
a comprehensive strategy to provide outreach to state and local
governments, local law enforcement agencies, and first responders
on how to identify and respond to public safety threats posed by
UAS, in addition to opportunities to use UAS to enhance
effectiveness of local law enforcement and emergency responders.
The FAA shall establish a website for the above entities that provides
guidance on these topics.
SEC.

367.

INCORPORATION

OF

FEDERAL

AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION OCCUPATIONS RELATING TO UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT INTO VETERANS EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION.
The FAA will work with the Veterans Affairs Department to
determine whether occupations in the Administration relating to
UAS can be incorporated into the Veterans’ Employment Program.
SEC. 368. PUBLIC UAS ACCESS TO SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE.
The Secretary of Transportation shall issue guidance for the
expedited and timely access to special use airspace for public UAS
to assist federal, state, local, or tribal law enforcement organizations
in conducting law enforcement, emergency response, or other
activities.
SEC. 369. APPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNATION.
This section makes corrections to now consider railroad facilities
as critical infrastructure that could potentially restrict the nearby
operation of UAS. It also mandates that by 31 March the
Administrator will publish an NPRM regarding how to carry out the
requirements outlined in this section.
SEC. 370. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.
It is the sense of Congress that UAS beyond visual line of sight
operations, operations at night, and operations over people have
tremendous potential to enhance commercial and academic use,
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spur economic growth, improve emergency response as it relates to
critical infrastructure like roads, bridges, utilities, water and power,
ultimately speeding response times. Integrating UAS safely into the
national air space including the above operations should be a top
priority of the FAA as it pursues additional rulemakings.
SEC. 371. ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION FOR
SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
The Secretary of Transportation and the National Academy of
Public Administration will estimate and assess compliance of small
UAS registrations pursuant to the FAA rule “Registration and
Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft.” The Secretary
shall report to Congress the findings of the assessment one year
after passage of this bill.
SEC. 372. ENFORCEMENT.
The Administrator shall establish a pilot program to take
advantage of available remote identification technologies for
purposes of safety and enforcement of UAS operators not in
compliance with applicable federal laws and regulations. The pilot
program will establish a mechanism for the public and law
enforcement to report UAS operations that violate federal laws and
regulations. The data from that reporting shall be reported to
Congress one year after passage of the bill.
SEC. 373. FEDERAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES.
A study will be conducted on the roles of federal, state, local, and
tribal governments in regulating low-altitude operations of UAS.
The study shall include the state of law federally and locally as it
pertains to UAS, potential gaps in authority, analysis of regulatory
consistency, and infrastructure requirements necessary to monitor
low-altitude UAS operations[2].
SEC. 374. SPECTRUM.
The FAA shall provide the relevant Congressional Committees
of Jurisdiction a report on UAS allocation of Aeronautical Mobile
R Service (AM(R)S) and control links for UAS by the World Radio
Conferences in 2007 (L-band, 960-1164 MHz) and 2012 (C-band,
5030-5091 MHz) for operations within the UTM system or outside
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of such system. The report will address operation barriers to using
the spectrum and determine if some spectrum frequencies are not
suitable for UAS use.
SEC. 375. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AUTHORITY.
A violation of privacy policy by a person that uses an UAS for
compensation or hire in the national airspace shall be an unfair and
deceptive practice in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15U.S.C. 45(a)).
SEC. 376. PLAN FOR FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
(UTM)
FAA and NASA shall develop a plan to allow the implementation
of UTM services that expand operations beyond visual line of sight
and ensure the safety and security of all aircraft as established
in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016. The UTM
system pilot program will work with industry stakeholders to allow
testing of UAS operations in airspace above test ranges including
IPP sites. Testing of remote identification and tracking technologies
is permitted and will be evaluated by the Unmanned Aircraft
Systems

Identification

and

Tracking

Aviation

Rulemaking

Committee. Under this pilot program, blanket waiver authority will
be granted to UAS operators by a UTM pilot program selectee that
otherwise would fall under a case-by-case approval basis. The UTM
pilot program will develop safety standards and outline roles and
responsibilities of industry and government in establishing UTM
services that allows commercial and noncommercial operations.
This section outlines a number of additional logistical details to be
considered in the implementation of the UTM pilot program that are
more appropriate to be described in a separate forum.
SEC. 377. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN UTM
SERVICES.
No later than 120 days from passage of this bill the FAA will
determine if certain UTM services may operate safely in the national
airspace system. If the FAA determines that certain UTM services
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may operate safely in the national airspace, then requirements for
safe operations will be established. The Administrator will provide
expedited

procedures

for

making

the

assessment

and

determinations where the UTM services will be provided primarily
or exclusively in airspace above areas in which UAS operations pose
low risk, such as croplands and areas that are not congested.
SEC. 378. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that any person that uses UAS for
compensation or hire should have a written privacy policy
consistent with section 357 that is appropriate in nature and scope
of the activities regarding collection, use, retention, dissemination,
and deletion of any data collected during operation of UAS. Such
privacy policy should be publicly available.[3]
SEC. 379. COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL OPERATORS.
The FAA should make available by website any certification of
waiver or authorization, a spreadsheet of UAS registrations with
relevant details, description of UAS operations in general locations
and expirations of those operations, links to any applicable privacy
laws associated with those operations, a list of any operations that
collect personably identifiable information and relevant details of
the collection of data, and details of the operations of the UAS
including location, date, time, etc.
SEC. 380. TRANSITION LANGUAGE.
This section ensures that certain orders, determinations, rules,
and other actions based on authority from the FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012 continue to have legal effect after their
appeal or recodification.
SEC. 381. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN RESTRICTED
BUILDINGS OR GROUNDS.
This section amends the United States Code to make it a crime to
knowingly operate UAS with the intent to enter or operate within or
above restricted areas.
SEC. 382. PROHIBITION. § 40A. OPERATION OF UNATHORIZED
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OVER WILDFIRES
Any person who operates an UAS and knowingly or recklessly
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interferes with a wildfire suppression or emergency response
efforts related to wildfire suppression shall be fined or imprisoned
for not more than two years.
SEC.

383.

AIRPORT

SAFETY

AND

AIRSPACE

HAZARD

MITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT.
The FAA shall work with Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to ensure that technologies that are used for UAS mitigation do
not adversely impact or interfere with safe airport operations,
navigation, air traffic services, or the national air space. The FAA
shall develop a plan to authorize, permit, and certify UAS mitigation
systems and charter an Aviation Rulemaking Committee to provide
recommendations on the matter. The FAA shall test UAS mitigation
technology at five airports through year 2023. These activities are
exempt from laws that previously restrict such activity like the
Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986,
and the Wiretap Act.
SEC. 384. UNSAFE OPERATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.
Any person that operate an UAS and knowingly interferes with a
manned aircraft or an airport, including the runway exclusion zone,
shall be fined or face up to one year in jail. If serious bodily harm
occurs, then UAS operators face a fine and up to 10 years of jail time.

Appendix B – Summary of CFR 14 Part 107 (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2016)
Part 107. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS.
• Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg).
• Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft must
remain within VLOS of the remote pilot in command and the
person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS.
Alternatively, the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS
of the visual observer.
• At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close
enough to the remote pilot in command and the person
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manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for those
people to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided
by any device other than corrective lenses.
• Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons not
directly participating in the operation, not under a covered
structure, and not inside a covered stationary vehicle.
• Daylight-only operations, or civil twilight (30 minutes before
official sunrise to 30 minutes after official sunset, local time)
with appropriate anti-collision lighting.
• Must yield right of way to other aircraft.
• May use visual observer (VO) but not required.
• First-person view camera cannot satisfy “see-and-avoid”
requirement but can be used as long as requirement is satisfied
in other ways.
• Maximum groundspeed of 100 mph (87 knots).
• Maximum altitude of 400 feet AGL or, if higher than 400 feet
AGL, remain within 400 feet of a structure.
• Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station.
• Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with the
required ATC permission.
• Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC
permission.
• No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for
more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one time.
• No operations from a moving aircraft.
• No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is
over a sparsely populated area.
• No careless or reckless operations.
• No carriage of hazardous materials.
• Requires preflight inspection by the remote pilot in command.
• A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft if he or
she knows or has reason to know of any physical or mental
condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a
small UAS.
• Foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft are allowed to
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operate under part 107 if they satisfy the requirements of part
375.
• External load operations are allowed if the object being carried
by the unmanned aircraft is securely attached and does not
adversely affect the flight characteristics or controllability of
the aircraft.
• Transportation of property for compensation or hire allowed
provided that◦ o The aircraft, including its attached systems, payload, and
cargo weigh less than 55 pounds total.
◦ o The flight is conducted within visual line of sight and not
from a moving vehicle or aircraft; and
◦ o The flight occurs wholly within the bounds of a state and
does not involve transport between (1) Hawaii and another
place in Hawaii through airspace outside Hawaii; (2) the
District of Columbia and another place in the District of
Columbia; or (3) a territory or possession of the United
States and another place in the same territory or
possession.
• Most of the restrictions discussed above are waivable if the
applicant demonstrates that his or her operation can safely be
conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiver.
Part 107. REMOTE PILOT IN COMMAND CERTIFICATION AND
RESPONSIBILITIES.
• Establishes a remote pilot in command position.
• A person operating a small UAS must either hold a remote pilot
airman certificate with a small UAS rating or be under the
direct supervision of a person who does hold a remote pilot
certificate (remote pilot in command).
• To qualify for a remote pilot certificate, a person must:
◦ o Demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by either:
Passing an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAAapproved knowledge testing center; or
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§ Hold a part 61 pilot certificate other than student pilot,
complete a flight review within the previous 24 months,
and complete a small UAS online training course provided
by the FAA.
◦ o Be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration.
◦ o Be at least 16 years old.
• Part 61 pilot certificate holders may obtain a temporary remote
pilot certificate immediately upon submission of their
application for a permanent certificate. Other applicants will
obtain a temporary remote pilot certificate upon successful
completion of TSA security vetting. The FAA anticipates that it
will be able to issue a temporary remote pilot certificate within
10 business days after receiving a completed remote pilot
certificate application.
• Until international standards are developed, foreigncertificated UAS pilots will be required to obtain an FAAissued remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating.
A remote pilot in command must:
• Make available to the FAA, upon request, the small UAS for
inspection or testing, and any associated documents/records
required to be kept under the rule.
• Report to the FAA within 10 days of any operation that results
in serious injury, loss of consciousness, or property damage of
at least $500.
• Conduct a preflight inspection, to include specific aircraft and
control station systems checks, to ensure the small UAS is in a
condition for safe operation.
• Ensure that the small unmanned aircraft complies with the
existing registration requirements specified in § 91.203(a)(2).
A remote pilot in command may deviate from the requirements of
this rule in response to an in-flight emergency.
Part 107. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS.
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• FAA airworthiness certification is not required. However, the
remote pilot in command must conduct a preflight check of
the small UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe
operation.
Part 107. MODEL AIRCRAFT.
• Part 107 does not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the
criteria specified in section 336 of Public Law 112-95.
• The rule codifies the FAA’s enforcement authority in part 101
by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the
safety of the NAS.

Appendix C – Summary of changes due to CoViD-19 pandemic in
UAS CFR 14 Part 107 & Part 135 (“Coronavirus guidance & resources
from FAA,” 2020)
Drone Use for Response Efforts
The FAA is enabling drone use for COVID-19 response efforts
within our existing regulations and emergency procedures. Our
small unmanned aircraft rule (Part 107) and Certificate of
Authorization process allow operators to transport goods and
certain medical supplies – including test kits, most prescription
drugs and, under certain circumstances, blood – provided the flight
complies with all provisions of the rule or authorization. The FAA
also issues special approvals, some in less than an hour, for flights
that support emergency activities and appropriate government,
health, or community initiatives. The agency’s Systems Operations
Support Center is available 24/7 to process emergency requests.
Safety is the top consideration as we review each request.
Expanded Drone Operations
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The FAA has received inquiries about expanded drone operations
to respond to COVID-19. We are addressing the inquiries using
our existing Part 135 on-demand certification process. Follow us
on Twitter @FAADroneZone and Facebook @FAADroneZone for the
latest drone news.
Relief for Certain Persons and Operations during the COVID-19
Outbreak
The FAA has published a Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SFAR) that provides regulatory relief to a wide range of people
and operations affected by the COVID-19 public health emergency.
The relief applies to pilots, crew members and other FAA certificate
holders including some drone pilots who have been unable to
comply with certain training, recency-of-experience, testing, and
checking requirements due to the outbreak. It also provides relief
to certain people and pilot schools who are unable to meet duration
and renewal requirements, including extending the validity period
of FAA medical certificates. FAA has developed FAQs (PDF) to help
explain the regulatory relief.
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Country

Region

Income Group

“Afghanistan

South Asia

Low income

Albania

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Algeria

Middle East & North
Africa

Upper middle income

Angola

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Antigua and
Barbuda

Latin America &
Caribbean

High income

Armenia

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Austria

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Azerbaijan

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Bahrain

Middle East & North
Africa

High income

Bangladesh

South Asia

Lower middle income

Barbados

Latin America &
Caribbean

High income

Belarus

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Benin

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Bolivia

Latin America &
Caribbean

Lower middle income

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Brunei Darussalam

East Asia & Pacific

High income

Bulgaria

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Burundi

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Cabo Verde

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Cambodia

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Cameroon

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Chad

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Chile

Latin America &
Caribbean

High income

China

East Asia & Pacific

Upper middle income

Cook Islands

East Asia & Pacific
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Comoros

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Congo, Rep.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Costa Rica

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Côte d’Ivoire

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Croatia

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Cuba

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Cyprus

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Czech Republic

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Djibouti

Middle East & North
Africa

Lower middle income

Dominica

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Ecuador

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Egypt, Arab Rep.

Middle East & North
Africa

Lower middle income

El Salvador

Latin America &
Caribbean

Lower middle income

Equatorial Guinea

Sub-Saharan Africa

Upper middle income

Estonia

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Ethiopia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Fiji

East Asia & Pacific

Upper middle income

Gabon

Sub-Saharan Africa

Upper middle income

Gambia, The

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Georgia

Europe & Central Asia

Lower middle income

Ghana

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Greece

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Grenada

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Guinea

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Guyana

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income
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Hungary

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Indonesia

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Iran, Islamic Rep.

Middle East & North
Africa

Upper middle income

Iraq

Middle East & North
Africa

Upper middle income

Italy

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Jamaica

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Kazakhstan

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Kenya

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Kiribati

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Korea, Rep.

East Asia & Pacific

High income

Kuwait

Middle East & North
Africa

High income

Kyrgyz Republic

Europe & Central Asia

Lower middle income

Lao PDR

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Latvia

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Lebanon

Middle East & North
Africa

Upper middle income

Lesotho

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Liberia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Libya

Middle East & North
Africa

Upper middle income

Lithuania

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Luxembourg

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Madagascar

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Malaysia

East Asia & Pacific

Upper middle income

Maldives

South Asia

Upper middle income

Mali

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Malta

Middle East & North
Africa

High income

Mauritania

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income
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Micronesia, Fed.
Sts.

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Moldova

Europe & Central Asia

Lower middle income

Mongolia

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Montenegro

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Morocco

Middle East & North
Africa

Lower middle income

Mozambique

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Myanmar

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Namibia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Upper middle income

Nepal

South Asia

Low income

New Zealand

East Asia & Pacific

High income

Niger

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Nigeria

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Niue

East Asia & Pacific

North Macedonia

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Oman

Middle East & North
Africa

High income

Pakistan

South Asia

Lower middle income

Panama

Latin America &
Caribbean

High income

Papua New Guinea

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Peru

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Philippines

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Poland

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Portugal

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Qatar

Middle East & North
Africa

High income

Romania

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Russian Federation

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Rwanda

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Samoa

East Asia & Pacific

Upper middle income
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Saudi Arabia

Middle East & North
Africa

High income

Senegal

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Serbia

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Seychelles

Sub-Saharan Africa

High income

Sierra Leone

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Singapore

East Asia & Pacific

High income

Slovak Republic

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Slovenia

Europe & Central Asia

High income

Solomon Islands

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Somalia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

South Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

Upper middle income

South Sudan

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Sri Lanka

South Asia

Lower middle income

Sudan

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Suriname

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Tajikistan

Europe & Central Asia

Low income

Tanzania

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Thailand

East Asia & Pacific

Upper middle income

Timor-Leste

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Togo

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Tonga

East Asia & Pacific

Upper middle income

Trinidad and
Tobago

Latin America &
Caribbean

High income

Tunisia

Middle East & North
Africa

Lower middle income

Turkey

Europe & Central Asia

Upper middle income

Uganda

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income

Ukraine

Europe & Central Asia

Lower middle income

United Arab
Emirates

Middle East & North
Africa

High income
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Uruguay

Latin America &
Caribbean

High income

Uzbekistan

Europe & Central Asia

Lower middle income

Vanuatu

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Venezuela, RB

Latin America &
Caribbean

Upper middle income

Vietnam

East Asia & Pacific

Lower middle income

Yemen, Rep.

Middle East & North
Africa

Low income

Zambia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lower middle income

Zimbabwe

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income” (Dahlquist E.,
2017)
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